Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes

8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes

1/15

Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes

Author(s): Sarah BroadieSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 101 (2001), pp. 295-308Published by: Wileyon behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545350.

Accessed: 26/11/2013 11:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The Aristotelian Societyand Wileyare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=blackhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aristotelianhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4545350?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4545350?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aristotelianhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black


2/15

XIV*-SOUL

AND

BODY IN

PLATO

AND

DESCARTES

by SarahBroadie

ABSTRACT

Althoughhey

re

often

rouped ogether

n

comparison

ith

on-

dualist

heories,

lato s

oul-body ualism,

nd

Descartes

mind-body ualism,

are

fundamentally

ifferent.he doctrinesxamined re thoseof the

Phaedo

and theMeditations.he main

difference,

rom

hich thers

low,

ies n

Plato s

acceptance nd Descartes ejectionf the

ssumption

hat he

oul

=

intellect)

is identical ithwhat nimates he

body.

W

henphilosophyeachersresent

he -ism s

ertinent

o

mind-body

elations,

nd are till t thebroad-brush

tage,

quite

often ne finds hem

pairing

lato and Descartes

s

the

twomost minent ualists f ourWestern radition. s Plato to

the

hrough-and-throughaterialist

emocritus,

o Descartes

o

Gassendi, t is often uggested-reasonably, erhaps.As the

modern on-reductive aterialisto his

Cartesian

ete

noir,

o

Aristotle o Plato on

soul-bodyrelations,

we are sometimes

told-a misleading

nalogy, ome

hink. or

thepurpose

fcon-

trastwith arious

non-dualistiews t

may

eemuseful o

group

Plato sdualism nd

that fDescartes ogether,nd n

many

on-

texts heir ifferences

ay

not matter. ut

if

one

simply

om-

pares

he heories ith ach

other,

otwith

ny

third

ystem,

he

differencesrefascinatingnd seem mportant.

Of coursethere re

similaritieso sustain he nitial

airing.

Both

philosophers

rgue hatwe consist f somethingncorpor-

eal,

whetherne

calls t mind r

soul ,which or he

ime eing

is

somehow nitedwith

body

hat

s

part

fthe

physical orld.

Both

identifyhe self,

he I , with he ncorporealmember f

this

lliance.

Both

hold

thatmy mindor soul will survive he

demise fthe

bodyby

which

am now

presento this

udience-

whichnturn spresent ome throughtsmembers odies.Both

1.

A

version f this

paper was

delivered s the2000 Foerster ecture n the mmor-

tality

f

the

Soul,

at

the

University

f

California t Berkeley.

*Meeting

f

the Aristotelian

ociety,held in Senate House, University f London,

on

Monday,

4th

June, 001,

at 4.15

p.m.

This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/15

296

SARAH

BROADIE

may be

understood

s

holding hatthe mind

or soul can

exist

altogether

ndependently

f

body, though

Plato

may

have

changedposition n thispoint.2Bothare concernedwith he

immortality

f the oul.

Here shallfocus n

separability

f

mind r soul from

ody

in

Plato s Phaedo and Descartes Meditations. ut first

word

about terms. everal imes

lready

have

said mind r soul

as

if

thewords

meant he ame,

which

f course

hey

o not.

Plato

consistently

peaks

f

the oul

psuche?),

utnot o Descartes. n

his

preface

addressed

to

the

theologians

t the

Sorbonne

Descartes laims hathe willprove he mmortalityf the oul.

He is

using

he hurch s

abel for he

doctrine,

ut t s doubtful

thatwhathe

thought

e

could

prove

s

what hechurchmeans

by

the

phrase.

Roughly, suppose,

he church s

meaning

pot-

lights he

human

ndividualminus

biological

ody.

t

is this

thatcan sin and

be

forgiven,

s

summoned o the Last

Judge-

ment,

has

prayers

aid

for ts salvation.But

what Descartes

believed e could how sthe mmortalityfthemind r ntellect,

and

although he

mind,

s he

was for ver

tressing,

s

prone

o

error

nd shouldbe

expected o conduct tself

ccording

o an

intellectual

ode of conduct, ts

errors re

not

sins or offences

against

morality.

n

more

philosophical

ontexts

Descartes

explicitlyistinguishesindfrom

oul, reservingsoul for hat

which

nimates

he

body.

n

this enseof soul he

either enies

that

any such

principle

xists r reduces t to

a

physical

on-

figuration.hebiological ifferenceetween living ody nd a

corpse

s the

purely

hysical ifference

etween

machine

n

working

rder nd one

that s broken r

worn ut.

So what

Descartes s

left

with,

n

addition o

his machine-

body-if

his or

any

other

ody

even

exists,

which

t the

begin-

ning

of the

Meditations e calls

into doubt-is

a

mindwhose

business s to

think nd

imagine,

ut not to

animate

ny cor-

poreal

ystem. nd since t s

himselfhathe

finds

hinking,nd

sincehe sunable, omatter owhardhetries,odoubthisown

existence s

this

currentlyhinking

hing,

Descartes

dentifies

himself ith

hismind.

Butat

first e snot na

position o

assert

that

he,

or

the mind

that s

he, can exist

without he

body,

2. In

the

Timaeus t

s taken or

rantedhat he

world-soul ust

ave body;

nd

purified

uman

ntellectseturn

o

spatial ocations

n

stars.



4/15

SOUL

AND BODY

IN

PLATO

AND

DESCARTES

297

because

prima acie

t s

possible

hat hemind s xistence r

its

essential ctivityf

thinkingepends

n

body

n

some

way.

For

even houghheminddoes notrequire ody n theway nwhich

an

animating rinciple resumably

equires body

f

t s to

do

its

thing fanimatingomething,

hemindmay

depend

n the

body

n

some other

way, way

n

which,

o to

speak,

t

is the

body

that

gives

ifeto

the

mind,

much as an

arrangement

f

particlesgives

rise to a

magnetic

ield. Later

on, however,

Descartesmaintainshat

ccording

o hisclear nd

distinct

deas

of mind ndbody,neitherfthesenatures ontains rrefersothe

other.And meanwhile e takeshimselfo

have established

that

verythinge clearly nd

distinctlyerceives

s

true.

Hence

he can conclude

hatmind, nd

perhaps

oul

in

the

theological

sense,

s

separable

rom

ody,

which s

thebasis for

proving

he

mind r

soul mmortal.

Or,

more

precisely,

escartes an concludethat

mind

and

body

are

separable

rom

ach other nce he is free f his nitial

wholesale oubt oncerninghereal xistencefbody.Forobvi-

ously

f

thephysicalworld s

only

his

finite ind s

ream

bject,

neither

t

nor

any

of its

partscan exist

ndependently

f

that

dreaming.

nd in that

ase

it

may

not

be

easy

to show

that he

finitemind hatdreams uch a

dream-a dream n which

t

is

embodied

nd ts

body

s

part

f

physical

orld-can

be

free f

dreaming

his r other

reams ike t.But fwe

take he

opposite

hypothesis,

hat he

physical

orld

xists

ndependently,

hen his

world,especially he part of it that is Descartes body, can

reasonably e held

responsibleor

he ppearances f

thephysi-

cal that

re

present

o

Descartes

mind.

n

that ase it

s reason-

able to assume

hese ppearances ill

ease when

ody nd mind

actually eparate.

The

mindwill

thenbe

phenomenallynem-

bodied

s well

s

really

o.

But as

long

s it

s uncertain hether

the

physical

s real

ndependentlyf

thefinite ind,

ne

can

sup-

pose

that ither

hismindgenerates

he ppearances

rom tself,

orthey re caused n tbyGod. But since hefinitemind annot

be

separated

rom

God

any

more han t can be

separated

rom

itself,

n either f

thesehypotheseshe ause of the

ppearances

is

necessarilylways

with hat inite

ind-so

why hould t ever

be

withouthe

ppearances?

t

s

true hat n

the

ixthMeditation

Descartes

ays he can clearly nd

distinctly

nderstand imself

to

be a

complete

eing

ven

without is

faculty fsensory nd



5/15

298

SARAH

BROADIE

imaginational

ppearances.

rom hishe concludes hathe or

his

mindcan

existwithout hat

faculty

nd its

objects.

t

follows

from histhat thoseobjects, heempirical ppearances, rise

neither rom is own ntellectual aturenor

directly

romGod

who s

always resent o,

or even

n,

hismind.Thus Descartes s

only

one

stepaway

from

oncluding

hat he mmediate

ource

of

these ppearances

must e

somethingltogether

ifferentrom

mind,both from he finitemind hat s

Descartes

himself,

nd

from he nfinite indthat s God.

In

sum,

the

sourceof the

appearances

must e a

corporeal

ubstance,

real

physical

hingthat xistsndependentlyf Descartesmind.

But et us

stop

our thinker efore e takes hat ast

step,

nd

question

him about

his

premiss.

f

he

or

his mind

really

s or

would be a

complete eing

minusthe

faculty

f

sensory

nd

imaginational

ppearances, hy, y

his own

admission,

o

these

appearances

esethim

so? No doubt

they

ade

away

whenhe

completely

bsorbshimselfn

puremathematicsr

in

thoughts

aboutGod and aboutpurefinite ind,ftheres such things

pure

finitemind.But

n

Descartes

wn

experience

he

mpirical

appearances lways

return.

o

perhaps

t is

the nature f his

mind o

conjure

hem

p

for tself

gain

nd

again,

r to become

receptivegainand againto

these

ffectsaused

n him

by God.

If,

on

careful

eflection,ne can

consider

his

ossible,

escartes

is

mistaken

n

claiminghat hehuman

mind an

attain clear,

distinctnd

complete

dea

of

itself

s

existing

ree

f

empirical

appearanceso tself. hatthese ometimesecedewhen hemind

is

abstractly

ngaged

oes

not

prove

hat

heyre not

mong he

objectsnatural o it or

naturallyerved

p to

it

immediately

y

God. For

where s it

writtenhat ll

themind s

natural bjects

are

present

o

it at once?

Certainly, artesian

oubt can

save

Descartes

from

egardinghese

ppearances s anything

more

than

phenomenal,

uthe knows

rom

xperience

hat oubt an-

not

put

an

end to the

phenomena s such.

He

may always

be

saddledwith hem, hen, ven fonly s appearances ecognised

as

such.

n

this

ense, sortof

phenomenalist

ense, he

self s

body

and

physical nvironment

ay be as

immortal s the

human

mind.

Thus Descartes

deas of

himselfr

his mind re not,

think,

able to show

thatthe

humanmind

s in every

ense

separable



6/15

SOUL

AND

BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES

299

from

ody.

To show

this,

e must allback on

the

ndependent

attractivenessf the

thought

hat real or

externallyxisting

body s what ausesthe mpiricalppearances. his s ofcourse

an

independentlyttractive

hought

o

the

xtent hat

t

s unat-

tractiveo

suppose

hatGod

(whomDescartes as

by

now

pro-

ved

to exist

nd to be his

creator) eceives r

meanly

rustrates

a

finitemind

ike

that of Descartes.For

insofar s Descartes

cannothelp

taking

heempirical

ppearances o

be

of

ndepen-

dently

xisting

odies,

f

Descartes

were

lwaysmistaken

n this

thenGod wouldbe a deceiver;nd even fDescartes an break

out of

thedeception

y

meansof

systematic

oubt,

God would

be cruel n

making

he

escapedepend

n a

method o hardfor

the

humanmind.

So

if

one

is

a

Cartesian,

he

position

hat

mind s

separable

from

body,

not only

ontologically

ut

also

phenomenally,

s

secured y

meansof

two

conclusions:f

there s

any

such

thing

as a really

xisting

ody,

mind s not

existentially

ependent

n

it;and: body really xists nd is theseparable ause ofmind s

corporeal

xperiences.

I

wantnow

to

say something

bout

the

universalityf

Car-

tesian

eparability,nd

somethingbout what

unites he

separ-

ables while

they

are

together.

hese are

points on which

Descartes nd

Plato differ

undamentally.

irst,

niversality:

n

claiming

that

mind

and body

are

ontologically

eparable,

Descartes,

f

course, laims

much

more

han hat

givenmind

canexist partfrom given atural ody. eparabilitysguaran-

teed for

him

by the

essence

f

mind

n

general nd the

essence

of

body

n

general.

romhis

deas of

these ssences

e

believes

he can

see

that

mind-any

mind-can

exist

partfrom

ody-

any

body, ndvice

versa

Meditation ).

This

s in

linewith he

Church s

eaching,

ccording

o

which

very uman oul

comes

to

the

Last

Judgementither

trippedf

body

ltogether,r

with

a

sortofsupernaturalodythrough hich tcan communicateand

suffer,

ut

which

s not

et

n

a

natural hysical

nvironment

and is

not

subject o the

aws of

physical ature.

Phenomenal

eparability,s I am

calling t, s

likewise

niver-

sal for

he

Cartesian

nsofar s the

Cartesian

olds

thatmind s

such is

subject to

corporeal

appearancesbecause

and

only

because n

associated eal

body

auses

hem. t

follows rom

his



7/15

300

SARAH

BROADIE

premiss hat

for ny

mind

M, once

thecausal nexusbetween

M

and real

body

s

broken,

M is

automatically

eparated

ot

only

from ealbodybut also from ll corporealppearances.3

In

sum: both

ontologically

nd

phenomenally,

he

possibility

that

humanmind

s

inked o

corporeal

hings,

nd the

possibil-

ity

f tsnot being

hus inked, low rom henature ommon o

all

humanminds; nd a mind s ctual

inkage

r

non-linkage

s

or is

based on its

standing

r

not

standing

n

causal nexuswith

something

etaphysically

xternal o itself.ts

inkage

r not

to

corporeal

hings

s thereforeot

determined

y

any

nternal en-

tal disposition f itsown,still ess by anyinternal espectn

which

ne

particular

umanmind

may

differrom

nother,

or

example

n

respect

f

strong

nvolvement

n

a

certain

ype

of

pursuit. onsider

escartes imself

n

his unusual fnot

unique

enterprise

f

seeking ertainty

hrough oubt.This

extraordinary

practice

an

surely

e

described s a

letting o

of the

corporeal

perspective,nd it

leads

him,

r

so he

thinks,

o the

proof

hat

mind ndbody reontologicallyeparable. utthis roof pplies

even to minds

unk

n

ordinary abitsof

thinking, indsfor

which

Cartesian oubt s

meaningless

nd

impossible. nd this

proof s

not

performatively

iven

n

the

practice, ut

s

derived

from

ndependent

ruths hich he

practice

ncovers s suitable

startingoints.

huswhat

Descartes

roveswhen

he

proves

ep-

aration

ossible s a truth hat

wouldhold even f

no mind

ver

engaged

n

Cartesian

r similar

etachment.t surely

uits he

doctors forthodoxheologyhatDescartes resentshemwith

the

discovery

f

a truth

hat

s

likethe

ruths f

ogic nd

math-

ematics

nd Cartesian

hysics

n

that

t

holds no

matterwhat

any

of

us

may

think

r

feel bout

anything.

his

s by

contrast

with

any facts or

possibilities e

himselfmight

bring bout

through

mental

ctivity illed y him.

Now for

he

question f

whatunites he

Cartesian

eparables

when

hey

re

together.t is

not the finite

mind sown agency

thatconnectstwith bodywhich t thenfeels o be its own.

This

could

onlybe doneby an

act ofwill

on the

part f thefinite

mind.

But

although escartes

egards

is

will

as not restricted

in

anyway

Meditation), its

unrestrictedomain urns

ut to

3. For

Descartes these

include

memories

o

far as

the latterdepend on

images

grounded

n

the

body.



8/15

SOUL

AND BODY

IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 301

consist ntirely

f

propositions

o whichhe

may

choose not to

assentwhen hey ailto be clear and distinct.

his unrestricted

will s nota will obring nythingboutexcepttsownassertion

and denial

f

already

onstituted

ruthsnd

falsehoods.

or this

unrestricted

ill

belongs

o

Descartes

nsofar s he is

pure

ntel-

lect. On

its

own, therefore,

t cannot ake

as its

objects hings

that are sensed

or

imagined,

or

according

o Descartes

uch

things an be present

o the

mind

nly

when

t s

already

nited

with hebody.Consequently,he xplanation

or his nion

an-

notbe that hefinitemindwants rwills o be connected ith

particularody, r with

ome

particularody

r

other.

or

with-

out sense xperience

e couldnothave

an

idea,

either efinite

r

indefinite,

f

a

particular ody.

And

presumably

ny xplanation

in

terms f themind s

wanting

o

be connected

ith

ody

would

attend o what

t

feels

ike

to

have a

body-the

mind

wouldbe

assumed

o have a

sense

f

what

hat eels

ike,

nd

to

be

drawn

towards

corresponding

xistences

if t would

be

at

home

n

a

body.But for Descartes uchfeelingsnd the maginationf

them an

only

risewhen hemind

s

already mbodied,

o

they

cannot xplain

mbodiment.

Nor can we explain t by turningo body

by tself. bviously,

body by

itself s

powerless

o connect

tself

with mind.

Only

God,

a third

eing

f nfinite

ower,

an cause

by

his

will union

between ubstances

f

such

mutually

lien

natures

s mind nd

body.

Of course

very rrangement

f finite

hings epends

n

thewillofGod,butother rrangements,ayofbodywith ody,

fall within

natural ystem nd can be explained y familiar

secondaryauses ccordingo the ystem saws.Mindand body,

however,fall within no such single system, ccording to

Descartes; heir nion hereforepeaks

directlyfa supernatural

cause. On present howing, his ause is as differentrom inite

mind

s

it s from

inite ody, ince he

atter re bothdevoid f

thethird hing s ower o unite hem. n thisrespect, hefinite

mind s as passive nd inert s matters traditionallyupposed

to

be.

Let me now turn o Plato.

Readers

of

thePhaedo sometimesake Plato to task for on-

fusing

oul as mind

r

thatwhich

hinks, ith oul as thatwhich

animates

he

body. Perhaps

his

s

a

terriblemistake. ut it is

not

a

confusion

n

the sense of a blunder

ommittedn route



9/15

302 SARAH

BROADIE

to

something

lse. For the

dentification

f

thinking

oul

with

animatingoul is Plato s

theory

n

the

Phaedo.

In tryingo understandhis, nemighteem odiscern close

analogy

between

hinking

nd

animating

f

one identifies

hink-

ingwith

he xercise

f

ntelligence

nd

assumes,

s is

natural

or

many

eople, hat

hepractical

phere

s

the

renafor

xercising

intelligence.

or

the

person

f

practicalntelligence

s

switched

on to the

practical emands f his

situation

n a

way

not

unlike

the

way

n

which

perceptually

ensitive

rganism

s

switched

on to

signals

n

theenvironmentnd

its

own

body,4

nd

again

not unlike heway n which he lements f a physiologicalys-

tem

re switched n

and

off

by

chemical

ignals

n the

nterest

of

purely

iological nimation.

gain, omeonewho s

irrespon-

sive to

things

hat nterest

ost

people

may

be said

not to be

properlylive,

nd even

not to

be properly

nimating is

body.

In

saying his

we need

not mean thathe

functions elow

par

physiologically;

e

may

nstead e

regarding

is

body

s a

social

presence,

n

instrument

oraction and

communication,hich

comes to lifewhen ctivated. eing liveon this evelpresup-

poses

being biologically

live, and

for

most normal

human

beings,

eing

iologically

live

utomatically

esultsn

ife n the

level of

practice,

xcept

orwhenthey

re

sleeping.

hese two

modesof

being live are linked n

sucha

way

that,

ather

han

deeming

hem

nalogous,

ne

might,

more

primitively

erhaps,

fail

o

distinguishhem,

nd thus

onflate hat

hinks

ithwhat

animates hebody.

Plato s

view,

however,s quite

different,

ecauseforhimthe

paradigm

xercise f

ntelligence

s

theoreticalrat any

ratenot

immediatelyractical: t deals in

universalsnd

abstractions,t

is

conducted t leisure

rom

racticalife, nd it has

no

palpable

effects

xcept

n

the

houghts

f

oneself

nd a few

nterlocutors.

Plato

believes hat

he oul

thinks

estwhen

issociated

rom he

body.

He

has two

reasons: ne s

theobservation

hat

we cannot

engagenthekind fthinkinghat orhim sthinkingar excel-

lencewhen

we are

physicallyctive nd

attendingo goings n

in

our

bodiesand in

our

physical

nvironment;

nd the

other s

his

theory

hat

he oul has

latentwithin

t a

supremelyure nd

beautiful

ind

of

knowledge hich t

could only

have

come by

4.

Thus

phronein

=

to

have one s wits

about one )

ranges n meaning

rom to be

sane

to

to

be conscious .



10/15

SOUL

AND

BODY

IN PLATO

AND DESCARTES

303

before

irth

nto

a

body.

Since

the

thinking

oul is at its

best

when

n

full

ontactwith he objectsof

this

knowledge,

lato

concludes hat he bestthing hat anhappen o this oul is to

be

separated

rom

odyupon

death.

So far ne

might

hink hatPlato s

thinking

oul

cannot

oss-

iblybe what

nimates he body;

for t seems bsurd o

suggest

that

omethingoth nimates body nd is a

pure

ntellecthat

functions

estaway from he body. But

in

fact,

he belief hat

the

soul is

an intellect hatfunctions estaway

from

ody

s

precisely ne

of two assumptionshat ie at thebase of Plato s

equationof intellect ith nimator. he secondassumptions

that

his

elf-samentellects also intimatelyonnected ith he

body.

The

argument

or his s mediated

y

the

concept

f

the

self.On the one hand it is natural or

Socrates

nd his inter-

locutorsn the

Phaedo o identify

hemselves ith heirntellects.

After

ll,

if

you

are Socrates nd

I am

Simmias

n

the

Phaedo,

then

what re you and

I

engaged n

if

not

paradigmatic

ntellec-

tion,while

minimallysing urbodies o exchange urthoughts?

Ifwe couldthink t our bestwithoutver xchanginghoughts,

or

could

exchange houghts y some non-physical eans, hen

we as

intellects

ouldnotneedbodies

t all. On theother and,

though, ach

one

of

us knowshimselfo be in or ntimately

on-

nectedwith

body.And Socrates

riends now his fSocrates,

or

whywouldthey read osing

ocrates nce

his

physical eath

has

been

decreed? o the elf hat s Socrates ntellect

s

the elf

bound

up

with

his

body.

And the

fact hat

n

this ife he soul

functionsestas intellect hen east nvolvednbodily ctivity

and

sensation,

ogether ith he

doctrine hat

he

oul s ntellec-

tual

activity asat its absolute est

when he oul was attached

to

no body,now

stronglyoints o

theconclusion hat ntellec-

tual activity

axes as bodily

nvolvement anesand viceversa.

And

since t

is natural o think f

bare biological nimation

s

the imiting

ase of a soul s bodily

nvolvement,nd as the

basic

form

whichmore complicated

orms-the ones expressed n

actions ndemotions-depend n andpresuppose,t s not dif-

ficult

o draw

he

furtheronclusion

hat he oul that an func-

tion

s pure

ntellects the ameas the oul thatkeeps he

body

alive.5

5. If

bare biological nimation

s thought

f as continuous n kind

with

ntelligent

physical ctivity

uch s playing

ennis r cooking, t will

eem

plausible hat

heoreti-

cal

contemplation

t its fullest ependson

suspension f

animation,

ince t seems o

be

a fact, nd not a

merely

ontingentne, that ttention

sed

in

theoretical

ontem-



11/15

304

SARAH

BROADIE

But now if

one and

the same

entity,

he

soul,

can

function

both as unembodied

ntellectnd as

animator

f a

body,what

determinest to one of thesefunctions ather han the other?

And since

hey re

alternatives,

nd

the oul

s

capable

of

both,

is neither

unctionssential

o

it,

any

more han

piece

of

wax

is

essentiallyhe hapeof ball

or

essentially

he

hape

ofa

cube?

But f

neither unction

s

essential

o the

oul,

we havebeen

told

nothing f the soul s

nature. f,

on the other

hand,

both

are

essential, hatunites hem?

According o the

theory

f the

Phaedo,

the soul

becomes

involvedwith bodybecause t desires o live n a way nwhich

it

only

an

if

t has a

body

of

suitable ind.

To

beginwith, er-

haps,the

oul s notoriented o

anyvery

pecificetof physical

activities

r pleasures, ince t

has no

experience f any. So to

begin

with

perhaps

ll

that

t

takes o involve soul with

body

is

the oul s

failure o

understand

r

fully elieve hat ts xistence

can be

complete s a

pure ntellect. ot

realizing his, t

feels

incomplete,nd thisbreeds hedesire or ome non-intellectual

activity;

nd

lo and

behold

he

oul findstself ith

body,

nd

presumably physical

nvironment,f a sort

hatwould

enable

it

to live n

theway t

thought

ouldbring t

completeness,ut

which n

fact, f

course, oesnothing f the

kind.Now

it is in

the

bodyof a human

eing, r

perhaps

humanmale, nd if t

continues o

misunderstandts own original

ature-which s

easier

now for t to do, since t

has come to

feel t home

n an

actualphysical xistence,nd to becomehabituated o various

kinds f

embodied

leasures-then t seeks o be in a

body, nd

always bodythat

wouldbest

express heway t wants

o live.

So

on

physical eath, soul n

this tate s

reincarnated,

erhaps

as

another uman

eing, ut also

perhaps so Plato held,

o the

great

mbarrassmentf someof

his admirers)

s a lower

nimal,

say

a

pig or

wolf

whose

wallowing r raveningife-style

leshes

out

the

oul s most

precious revious esires.6

lternatively,he

plation

s attention

aken

wayfrom

ntelligent

hysical

ctivity,

nd

viceversa.

lato

models

ntellection

n

dreaming,

hich

he oul s

free o

do only

whennot

governing

the

imbs nd

perceiving

hrough

he sense

organs n

waking ife cf.

the

Hippocratic

treatiseOn

Dreams

Regimen

V],

86).

However,

Plato

then urns

hings

oundwith

his

familiar

ictum

hat he

waking

world s

that f

the

ternal

ntelligibles,

he

dream

world

thatof

everydayife.

6.

Aristotle

was

unfair

f

he

meant

o

includePlato

in his

criticismf the

Pythagor-

eans for

ssigning

any

chance soul

to

any

chance body

De

Anima

3,407b

20-24).



12/15

SOUL

AND

BODY IN

PLATO AND DESCARTES

305

embodied oul

may

ncline

owards

isembodiment,

nd

achieve

it

or

come closer o

achieving

t

by

practising

ts

ntellectuality

andrejectinghysicalndworldlynthusiasms.his s why,n

the

Phaedo,

bout-to-dieocrates ries o

comfort

is

friends

y

telling

hem hat f

death

s the

eparation

f

soul from

ody,

he

philosopherhould e

glad

to

die,

ince he

philosopher

as

ived

his presentife

gladly

ractising

or

death

by

losing

himself

o

intellectual

ctivity.

In

Plato,then, he

question f

separability

f soul from

ody

is not a

simple ne. In the

first

lace,

every

mbodied oul is

separablefrom ts current ody,since the soul is immortal,

whereas

nygiven

ody

will

wearout.

Secondly,

very

oul

s

in

principle

eparable rom ody

altogether,

ince

very

mbodied

soul is

in

principle,

r at least

by

virtue

f

its

original

ature,

able to refine

tself o the

pointwhere t wants

nothing

hat

body

can

provide.

However, aying

his s a bit

like

saying:

human beings

by

nature an live

withoutheroinor

cocaine;

heroin nd

cocaine ddicts

re human

eings y

nature;

herefore

they an live without eroin r cocaine.Granted heyhave the

capacity,

hey

ack the

power

to exercise t as

of

now,

ust

as

humanbeings

by

contrastwith

bull-frogsave

the

capacity o

speak

severaldifferent

anguages,

ut someone

who has never

learnt

foreignanguage

acks

the

bility o exercise his

human

capacity.

n

this

ense, ome

mbodied

ouls annot ive

eparate

from

body

suitedto

their

desires,while

others,

minority

perhaps,

an.

According othis icture,hebody s simplyhe nstrumentf

the

oul,

view

hat

Aristotleoo would

ndorse

t one

stage f

his

career.

hat

s, the ouldoes

not

depend n the

body xcept

to do

through

t

somethinghat t

wants

o do. Thus t

fashions

and

animates

ts

body

for

he

ake of physical

ction,

ensation

and

experience.hat

the oul can do

this f

t

choosesgoes along

with

he

thought, hichwe find

gain

and

again

n

Plato, that

thesoul is divine r godlike.Thismeansthat n itselft has a

sort f

imited

mnipotence.

f

t

wills r really

esires

certain

kind

of ife or

tself,ts

will s

done

even f t wills

what s bad

for t:

automaticallyt comes o

be

equipped

withwhat s neces-

sary.

But once t

s

in

a body, f

course,

what t can

bring bout

is

limited

y

the

nature f ts

body nd

the

nvironment.

So to

answer

our

earlierquestions

bout

the

essence of

soul-the

soul

for

Plato s

essentially valuing

ower:

power



13/15

306 SARAH

BROADIE

to

create

nd maintain or tself

he ife t

truly

esires

nd

thinks

good,along

with hat

ifestyle s

ccoutrements

r freedom

rom

accoutrements.tspurelyntellectualunctionnd itsbody-ani-

mating

unction

epresentifferentents

r inclinations.f we

consider oul

n

general

nd

n

the

bstract,

t s

presumably

on-

tingent

hether

oul

s

embodied,

nd

embodied

his

way

or

that,

or

whether

t s

pure

ntellect.

hat

s essential nd

fundamental

is soul s

determinability,n fact

elf-determinability,

n

contrary

ways. f,

however,

e consider n individual

oul,

tsdeterminate

condition-its

being

embodiedor

not,

and if

embodied hen

how-is all butfundamentalor his ndividual. or on theone

hand

this condition eflectshe

individual s

urrently

earest

values,

nd

on

theotherhand it

affects

lmost verythinghe

individual oes andexperiences

n

itscurrent

ife.

We

maywonder ow the oul is

supposed o take

on

a

body.

Plato

says ittle

boutthis.At one pointhe

seems o

suggest hat

the

soul

weaves a

bodyfor tself.7

ertainly e does not want

to implyhat he oul has hands nd moves shuttleo and fro.

The

idea presumablys that

the soul informs

ertainmaterials

which n

its presence row

and organise

hemselvesnto the

requisite ody.A

previously

mbodied oul

may tartwith ome

matter

rom ts

previous

ody.8 lato showsno

sign

of

holding

that

he oul

creates ts

body

x

nihilo.

Some

philosophers

might

alk at

the

dea

that

the

soul has

power

to

re-arrange

atter.

hey

might,

f

they ccepted he

existence f the soul at all, feel more comfortable ith the

thought

hat the soul

actuallydreams ts body and

physical

environment.

ome work

would henhaveto

be done

to

explain

whether,nd

f

o,

how, ouls

dreaming ifferent

hysical reams

nonetheless

n

some

ense hare world

with ach

other. utthis

is not

Plato s

problem,

or

he does

not strike ut

in

the

dealist

direction.

It

is

sometimes

uggested

hatone needsto have

been bitten

bythebugofexternal-worldcepticismefore necan seriously

consider

dealism.

ertainlyhebug of

external-world

cepticism

did

not

get

o

Plato. But

there

s

somethinglse one

shouldbear

7.

Phaedo

87b-e. The

weaving

dea

occurs s part

of a

view

that

s

rejected,

ut

what

is

rejected s not

the

weaving, ut

the

thought

hat, s with

an actual

weaver, he

soul might

ease to

existbefore

wearing ut its

final oat.

8. Cf.

Phaedo

80c-81c.



14/15

SOUL AND BODY

IN PLATO AND DESCARTES

307

in mindwhen

onsidering

lato ssilence n these

reat uestions

of

modern hilosophy.

he

fact s

that

rom he

point

f

view

f

Platonic thical oncern, hichs a pointof viewthatpervades

most

of

the

dialogues,

t makes

no

difference

hether he

soul

choosesto

dream,

nd thenbecomes ddicted o

dreaming,

ts

embodiment,

r whethert chooses nd

then

becomes ddicted

to lifemediated

y

a

real, ndependently

xisting,ody

n

a real

physical

nvironment.9hereas orDescartes

hismakes

ll the

difference-one ay God is a deceiver,

he other

way

not-for

Plato eitherway the

soul

in

questiongets

what

t

wants,

nd

is just as misguidedn wantingt if thebodyturns ut to be

independently

eal as it wouldbe

if

thebody

were ts

fantasy.

I

have been

comparing

lato s

argument

n the Phaedo

with

Descartes

n

the Meditations

hat

oul is

separable

rom

ody.

Let

me

end by

comparing

ome of thewider

purposes

f

those

arguments.lato offershe

rgument

f thePhaedo

s,

inter

lia,

an instance nd

example

f

thekindof

ntellectualxercise hat

loosens the human soul s attachmento its body. Since the

attachmenteflects

he

oul s

misunderstanding

fthe

rue

ature

of

happiness,

hePhaedo

argument,

or

hosewho enter nto

t,

is

an

exercise

n

soul-saving. y contrast, hat

Descartesdis-

coverswhen he

discovers is reasonsfor

declaring

he mind

separable

rom he

body s entirely ifferent

rom he ntellec-

tualization e himself

ndergoes

n order

o reach

heproof.

And

he cannot

overtly,

ven f

he

is

inclined o

inwardly,laimthis

refinements a sortof soul-saving ithout unning oulof the

religion f his time.For although his

religion iffered ithin

itself n how

muchfaith ountsfor

alvation, nd how much

works, hese

were

the

onlyoptions

onsidered,nd Descartes

activity

oes

not

come

under ither.

nstead,

is

avowedpurpose

in

following

he

path

of the

Meditationsrom

oubt

to

himself,

and from

imselfo the

God

who s not

deceiver,s

to

establish

something

irm

nd

lasting

n

the

sciences ,10.e. mathematics

andmathematicalhysics.

This is

an

extremelyuzzling emark f it means that these

sciences

ail

s sciencesf

hey

annot e

renderedndubitable

y

9.

Plato can of course

make this

distinctionven f,

s

I

am arguing,t

does not carry

forhim

burning uestion;but the

word real

used as above

would presumably ot

be

his

tool

for

making t,

since

his

realia are

immutable orms.

10.

Meditation

,

first

aragraph.



15/15

308

SARAH

BROADIE

an

argument

hat

first

oubts nd thenreinstatesheclear

and

distinct

deas

on

which

uch

nquiries epend.

or

the

mathema-

tician sperformances such s not ess clearor less accuratef

he lacks a

proof

o

the

effect

hat

although

he

most

rigorous

mathematics

onceivable

o man

can

be

doubted,

onethelessn

the

end

we

are

theologicallyustified

n

accepting

hem.

But

surely escartes

hope

s not to makethemathematician

more

successful

athematician,

ut

rather

o

show

the

rest f us that

mathematical

cience

n

ts

own

phere arries he ame

uthority

as divine

evelation

n

ts, ince oth omefrom he ame

ource.

Rightly nderstood,hepractice f such bstracttudies, hough

nota

religiousxercise,s

not secular ither, or t

expresses od

as

reason

or

the natural ight. lato

would surely ave

agreed

that

t s not

secular,

uthe

couldnot

have magined hehistori-

cal

context hat

made

t so

important

or

omeone n

Descartes

position

o

distinguishriest nd

mathematicalcientist,n

effect

postulating

t leasttwokinds f

higher alling , ne

devoted o

faith,heother oreason.

Princeton niversity

1879 Hall

Princeton, J

08540

U.S.A.

Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes

Documents

Transcript of Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes