1

Contents Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................1

I. Recent background................................................................................................................................2

II. Regional Intended Nationally Determined Contributions.......................................................................3

III. Greenhouse Gas Inventories..............................................................................................................8

IV. Putting the problem in context: Share in emissions at the global level...............................................14

V. Regional Challenges.............................................................................................................................19

VI. Conclusions.....................................................................................................................................21

Bibliography................................................................................................................................................24

Annex I. Total GHG emissions and by sector. Share in global emissions.....................................................26

Annex II. Regional GHG emissions by sector. Including AFOLU. 2014......................................................27

1

Climate change, agriculture and regional environmental commitments in the COP

Pablo Elverdin1

Acknowledgements This report would not have been possible without the invaluable contribution of Mr. Ernesto Viglizzo, who provided valuable input in the preparation of the document. On the basis of his extensive knowledge of the subjects discussed, he made a number of remarks and comments on the first draft which helped to organize ideas and make significant changes.

Executive Summary

The Paris Agreement, signed in December 2015 by 195 nations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is without a doubt a great step forward in the world’s commitment concerning climate change, a debt that has been outstanding for more than two decades.2 Despite recent attacks (particularly owing to the US withdrawal), the commitment of the other powers (and large global emitters) to reduce greenhouse gases seems to indicate that the initiative will continue to go forward, and that the commitments made may be expected to be honored.

The Agreement seeks to keep the increase in average world temperature below 2°C with respect to pre-industrial levels, and increases efforts to limit such temperature increase to 1.5°C. As stipulated in the Agreement, achieving this target will entail increasing the capability to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, promoting resilience and economic development based on low Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. All this needs to be achieved in a way that does not compromise food production.

Aware of the importance of this matter, the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) have ratified their adhesion to the Agreement and have moved forward with the formalization of adaptation and mitigation plans to honor the commitments made, in particular in the Energy, Agriculture and Land-Use Change sectors, which are those with the greatest regional impact as regards emissions.

However, aside from the real impact of agricultural production on climate change, the importance of the sector for public opinion has been overestimated, particularly as regards cattle rearing. In addition, the fact that well-managed rural production is the only economic activity that can offset, or even absorb, carbon from the environment, thus helping to mitigate climate change, has been totally overlooked.

In point of fact, the share of Agriculture in world GHG emissions has dropped from 13.2% in 1994 to 10.49% in 2014 and the trend continues to be a downward one. Furthermore, the share of Land-Used Changes and Forestry (LUCF) dropped from 11.2% in 1994 to 6.3% in 2014, albeit with some

1 Member of the CEO Group and GPS strategy and contents coordinator. 2 Even in the United States, where thanks to a strong federalism, there are states that do not accept the position of Trump’s central government and will continue to apply their emission reduction policies.

acceleration of emissions in the last five years. Given their faster annual evolution, the share of the Energy and Industrial Processes sectors combined rose from 70.3% to 77.9% between 1994 and 2014.

However, and despite the evidence provided by the information, it is common to attribute a large portion of the responsibilities of climate change to agricultural activities. In addition, public perception is also affected by the manner in which the data are shown through different indicators (per capita GHG, or GHG by GDP, for example) thereby reducing the relative importance of the emissions of the large powers (and large global emitters), to the detriment of less developed countries.

These mistaken assessments can lead (and, in fact, have already led) to the introduction of new environmental barriers to trade. In view of this, food-producing countries with sustainable production systems need to develop a common strategy to address this new challenge.

This clearly does not mean ignoring the impact of climate change and the commitments made in Paris. Rather, it does mean that, at the same time, work is required with international organizations and public opinion in general to avoid mistaken or incomplete interpretations and prevent unjustified barriers to trade.

I. Recent background

Since the first industrial revolution (in the second half of the 18th century), there has been a constant increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). As a result of these changes in the composition of the atmosphere, average world temperatures are rising rapidly. In 2016, the average global temperature was about 1.1°C (degrees centigrade) higher than in the pre-industrial period, or 0.83°C higher than the average long-term temperature (14°C) of the 1961-1990 reference period established by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and about 0.07°C higher than the previous all-time high, reached in 2015.

In 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)3 published its Fifth Evaluation Report in which it concludes, on a scientific basis, that recent climate change (in the last 200 years) is real and comes, particularly, from human activities. It thus undermined part of the skepticism concerning the existence of climate change and its causes. In that report, the IPCC was able to estimate the accumulated CO2emissions since pre-industrial times and to provide a target for future emissions.

Based on this, in December 2015, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) g adopted the Paris Agreement. Its goal is to keep the global temperature increase by the end of the century well below 2°C with respect to pre-industrial levels and to promote efforts to limit temperature increase beyond 1.5°C.

Concurrently, the Agreement promotes an increase in the adaptation and mitigation capacity of member states, as well as the mapping out of long-term strategies for economic development with low GHG emissions. Signatory states must communicate their national medium and long-term adaptation strategy. The final deadline for submission is 2020.4

3 The IPCC was established in 1988. 4 Available long-term domestic strategies may be viewed at http://unfccc.int/focus/long-term_strategies/items/9971.php

The Agreement was initially signed by 195 countries and, as of the date hereof, has already been ratified by 176 of them. In practice, the Agreement went into effect on November 4, 2016, 30 days after at least 55 member countries of the Convention, which account for not less than 55% of global GHG emissions, accepted, approved and ratified the agreement.

As proposed at the time of negotiation, the Agreement seeks to achieve its target through the individual commitment of the countries to reduce their estimated emissions by 2030 (known as Nationally Determined Contributions, see below).

The structure of the Agreement takes into account the initial gap between developed and developing countries, in the understanding that the latter will continue to show a growing trend in the short term. Accordingly, in order to achieve the long-term target, it includes the notion of a “world balance”. It is stipulated that such balance is to be updated every five years, beginning in 2018, and it is planned to monitor global progress towards the attainment of the proposed targets. At such time, each Party shall perform an individual analysis of its “balance” and may modify its commitments in order to close the gap. Conveniently, during the negotiations it was agreed to accept that emission mitigation policies should not compromise global food security.

In order for the Paris Agreement to be fully operational, a work program was implemented to develop methods, procedures and guidelines on a broad range of issues. Since 2016, signatory countries are working together in subsidiary bodies (Paris Agreement Working Group –APA-, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice –SBSTA- and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation–SBI-) as well as in various others established bodies. In practice, the annual UNFCCC conference acts as a meeting of the Parties in the Paris Agreement and met twice following the agreement (COP22 in Marrakesh and COP23 in Bonn). The work program is expected to be ready by 2018 and to be submitted during COP24 in Katowice.

For their part, the four countries of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), were members of the group that signed the Agreement in the first instance (April 22, 2016), and for all of them, the Agreement went into effect in November 2016 (albeit with a few days’ delay in the case of Paraguay and Uruguay, for which it became effective on November 13 and November 18, 2016, respectively).

II. Regional Nationally Determined Contributions

The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) refers to the national efforts decided on by each of the signatory countries of the Paris Agreement within the framework of the fight against climate change. At COP19, in 2013, it had already been agreed that preparations for development of the INDC would begin or speed up to pave the way for negotiation of the Agreement. The purpose of the term “Intended” within the INDC was to indicate that such contributions were “intentions” with a view to formalizing them once the Paris Agreement was adopted.

One of the goals of the contributions focused on surpassing the prior commitments made by the States (Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Agreement and the Cancun agreements). In any event, the INDCs were examined taking into account the domestic circumstances of each country. Less advanced countries thus have a certain flexibility in establishing them.

Nevertheless, each country’s INDC must include quantifiable elements, mentioning the reference year and the commitment period, as well as the schedule for implementation of adaptation and

mitigation actions. The methods used to consider GHG emissions also need to be specified in all cases.

In short, INDCs are the heart of the Paris Agreement, as they represent the contributions of each Party to achieve the objective of the Convention. In the aggregate, the INDCs set the future path for global emissions.

In its first decision (Decision 1/CP.21), the Paris Agreement specified that the first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC, the word “intended” is deleted) of each Party would be its INDC at the time of ratification of the Agreement, unless that party had decided otherwise.

Aside from all these details, by April 2016, 190 countries had already notified their INDC, covering 94.6% of total CO2 equivalent emissions5 (hereinafter, CO2eq.).6 While NDCs may be amended at any time, the Agreement stipulates that each party must mandatorily notify its NDC every five years. Within this continuous updating scheme, as of the date hereof, 169 countries had already submitted their first NDC.7

In addition, when ratifying the Agreement, countries assumed a number of additional obligations, which include reporting their national GHG inventories and establishing national programs that include measures to mitigate and facilitate adaptation to climate change. This is reflected in the National Communications (NC).

Furthermore, since 2014, developing countries are required to submit biannual update reports (BUR) every two years. Such reports include updated information on domestic GHG inventories, the needs for technological and technical support and information concerning mitigation measures, along with the respective monitoring, reporting and verification methodology.

Argent ina

Argentina’s INDC was based on the Third National Communication, with a base inventory in 2012. Such inventory estimated emissions in the order of 429 MtCO2eq. (million tons of CO2 equivalent). The target set by Argentina stipulated an unconditional 15% reduction in emissions by 2030 with respect to projected emissions in the scenario in effect to that date.

In addition, it also set a conditional 30% commitment for the same year. The enlargement of the reduction in GHG emissions was made subject to some conditions such as: a) international financing; b) support for the transfer, innovation and development of technology, and c) support for the creation of adaptation and mitigation capabilities.

However, owing to changes and adjustment in the measurement methodology in the 2014 inventory (the 2006 IPCC Guidelines were used, while the previous inventory had been based on the 1996 IPCC Guidelines), current emission was reduced to 368 MtCO2eq., which allowed Argentina to revise the INDC submitted and to estimate an unconditional 18% contribution and a conditional 37% contribution by 2030. On that basis, at COP22, Argentina submitted a revised unconditional target, with a commitment not to exceed 483 MtCO2eq. by 2030, or 369 MtCO2eq. conditionally (Chart II.I).

5 http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx 6 CO2eq. is a calculation methodology that unifies the carbon footprint through the equivalence of greenhouse gases in the most common gas (carbon dioxide). Thus, methane, nitrous oxide and other contaminating gases are measured by their equivalent in carbon dioxide (CO2). 7Art. 4, subsection 9 of the Paris Agreement.

Chart II.I: Argentina’s Nationally Determined Contribution. 2016 Revision

Source: Revised NDC Argentina, 2016.

At the COP23, the Argentine government described the progress made in some sector plans for the implementation of its commitments. To date, preliminary versions of the energy, forests and transportation sector plans have already been submitted, and work is still under way on the industry, agriculture and infrastructure sector drafts. National mitigation and adaptation plans are expected to be finalized during 2018 and may be presented during the 2019 COP25.

Brazi l

Brazil, for its part, offered more ambitious targets, and committed to an unconditional 37% reduction in emissions by 2025 and up to 43% by 2030 with respect to 2005 emissions. Brazil has thus become one of the most committed developing countries to achieving emission reduction targets.8

Starting from a total of 2,100 MtCO2eq.9 in 2005, this level of commitment is consistent with emissions of 1,300 MtCO2eq. in 2025 and 1,200 MtCO2eq. in 2030.

To that end, in its INDC, Brazil indicated that it would promote the following measures, among others: a) increasing the share of sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy matrix to approximately 18% by 2030; b) strengthening policies and measures with a view to achieving zero illegal deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, as well as reforesting 12 million hectares by 2030; and c) strengthening the Low Carbon Emission Agriculture Program (ABC by its acronym in portuguese) as the main strategy for sustainable agricultural development, including the restoration of 15 million additional hectares of degraded grassland by 2030 and the improvement of 5 million hectares of integrated forestry, cattle rearing and forest systems (ICLFS) by 2030

In May 2016, Brazil submitted its National Adaptation Plan (NAP) to climate change.10 The Plan identifies current and future impacts on the basis of climate projections, makes a vulnerability 8 Already by 2009, Brazil had set a voluntary commitment before the UNFCCC, and by Act No. 12,187 it established an early National Climate Change Policy (PNMC by its Portuguese acronym). 9Brazil submits its data in Gigatons. 1Gigaton=1 GtCo2eq.= 1.000 MtCO2eq.

analysis, and defines actions, targets and guidelines that promote adaptation in each sector. The NAP defined eleven strategies and sectoral issues to be addressed, as well as priorities and urgencies in connection with vulnerability, distributing powers within the sphere of the Federal Government.

Already in 2017, it submitted its First Evaluation and Monitoring Report on its Plan, stating that the actions deployed within the framework of the NAP achieved 96% of their objectives and 67% of their sectoral guidelines.11 Brazil’s commitment to climate change is such that even prior to the Paris Agreement, it had already managed to reduce its emissions by 41% between 2005 and 2012.12

Paraguay

In its INDC, Paraguay voluntarily undertook to reduce its projected emissions for 2030 by 10%. In addition, it stipulated a further 10% as a conditional goal, subject to international cooperation as regards financing, transfer of technology and creation of capabilities.

In preparing the proposal, Paraguay used the Second National Communication as a reference for its emissions, and computed emissions of 95 MtCo2eq,with 2000 as the base period.

While it already had some prior history in this area, since 2011 Paraguay has a National Climate Change Policy, the purpose of which is to establish the subject at the national level and promote the implementation of measures articulated consistently with national development priorities.13 What is more, since 2014 it had been working on a National Climate Change Plan, as that had been established as a priority in the 2014-2030 National Development Plan.

Against this background, in 2015 it established a National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change. Furthermore, honoring the commitments made in the COP, in 2016 it submitted the National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change,14 identifying the following priority sectors: water resources, forests, agricultural production, territorial planning and land-use, energy, infrastructure, risk and national disaster management, etc.

In addition, in 2017, it did the same with the National Climate Change Mitigation Plan, identifying the following action programs: transportation, home kitchens, waste management and sustainable architecture, among others.15

Uruguay

The Uruguay INDC has one peculiarity, because the country decided to submit its contribution separately by gases, rather than in terms of CO2eq.

That said, the table below shows Uruguay’s national commitments by gas and by emitting sector. The column headed “With domestic resources” is a national commitment, while the one entitled “With additional means of implementation” should be understood as a conditional commitment.

10 Instructed by Portaria N°150 of the Ministry of the Environment of the Federative Republic of Brazil on May 11, 2016. See at http://www.mma.gov.br/clima/adaptacao/plano-nacional-de-adaptacao 11 Available at http://www.mma.gov.br/clima/adaptacao/plano-nacional-de-adaptacao 12 Source: INDC Brazil, 2015. 13 In 2001, by Decree N°14,943, Paraguay established a National Climate Change Program –PNCC by its Spanish acronym, under the Office of the Secretary for the Environment. 14 Available at http://www.seam.gov.py/sites/default/files/users/comunicacion/Plan%20Nacional%20de%20Adaptaci%C3%B3n%20al%20CC%20-%202017.pdf 15 Available at http://www.seam.gov.py/sites/default/files/users/comunicacion/Plan%20Nacional%20de%20Mitigaci%C3%B3n%20al%20Cambio%20Clim%C3%A1tico%202017_0.pdf

Table II.I: Uruguay National Determined Contribution

Source: INDC Uruguay, 2015.

Except for the targets relating to Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and to electric power generation, the other targets are stated with relation to 1990 values. Also, except for the LULUCF sector, Uruguay exhibits aggregate indicators that show the efficiency level sought with respect to GDP. While the aggregate calculation is not present in its NDC, as shown by the second BUR, as of 2010, Uruguay recorded total emissions of 24,692 Gigagrams of CO2eq (GgCO2eq.). 16

According to the INDC submitted and based on its forestry policy, Uruguay expects to be a net CO2 sink by 2030, capturing more than 2.3 Mt by that year (which results from emissions of 10.9 MtCO2 and removals of 13.2 MtCO2). Furthermore, it projects net CH4 emissions of 840 Mt and 39 Mt of N2O by the same year. In all cases, such maximum emission level would be reached with the unconditionally committed portion only.

As regards mitigation and adaptation measures, Uruguay has for some years already been implementing a resilient low-carbon development model, and back in 2009, it established a National Climate Change Response Plan and created the National Climate Change Response System,17 allowing it to begin early with the preparation of National Adaptation Plans for the various sectors, which in some cases have been in effect since 2010, as in the case of the National Water Plan. For its part, and with the support of FAO and UNDP, the National Adaptation Plan for the agricultural sector is expected to be completed during 2018.

In addition, Uruguay’s forestry efforts deserve particular mention. Thanks to a long-term cultivated forest planting policy for commercial purposes, it has been gaining wooded areas in recent years. This sets it apart from its MERCOSUR partners which, despite their progress, have not yet managed to slow down the reduction of their wooded areas. 161Gigagram is equivalent to one million kilograms, or one thousand tons. Thus 24,692 GgCO2= 24.6 MtCO2.17 Decree N°238/2009 of August 20, 2009.

III. Greenhouse Gas Inventories

National greenhouse gas inventories are prepared based on the provisions of sections 4 and 12 of the UNFCCC, which must be submitted to the Convention Secretariat. Such submissions must be made in accordance with IPCC Guidelines. Inventory data are provided in the annual GHG inventory presentations (for Annex I countries) and in national communications and BURs (for Non-Annex I countries).18

IPCC Guidelines encourage the development and use of local emission factors that are in line with national circumstances. Recently submitted national communications show an increase in the number of countries that have prepared their own emission factors for one or more sectors of their national GHG inventory, which in most cases are energy and agriculture. National emission factors must have scientific support and be approved by the IPCC.

GHG emission and absorption estimates are divided into main sectors, which are groups of processes, sources and sinks related thereto. The four sectors which encompass GHG emissions and captures are: a) Energy; b) Industrial processes and use of products; c) Agriculture, forestry and other land uses; d) Waste; and e) Other (such as indirect emissions from the deposition of nitrogen from non-agricultural sources).19

In short, a GHG inventory is an accounting of the amount of anthropogenic gas emissions or absorptions during a specific period. Estimating GHG level is the first step to define an action plan to address climate change and is part of the diagnosis. The importance of making such inventories from time to time lies in having a baseline to assess changes and measure the effectiveness of defined mitigation and/or adaptation measures.

The paragraphs that follow provide a breakdown of the most recent national GHG inventories sent by the four countries of the Southern Cone.

Argent ina

Argentina’s most recent GHG inventory dates from 2014, as shown by the second BUR. Such inventory, prepared following the 2006 IPCC Guidelines instead of the 1996 Guidelines, revised the emissions recorded in the original INDC downward, from 429 MtCO2eq. to 368 MtCO2eq.

As shown in Chart III.I, the Energy sector accounts for 53% of total GHG emissions in Argentina, followed by Agriculture, Cattle Ranching, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) with 39%, while Industrial Processes and Waste only contribute 4% of total emissions.

As for evolution, except for Agriculture and Land-Use Changes, the other sectors exhibit a growth in emissions throughout the period covered, particularly the Energy sector, whose emissions increased from 98 MtCO2eq. in 1990 to 193 MtCO2eq. in 2014.

18 The four countries of the region are part of the Non-Annex I group. Annex I consists of developed countries with mitigation obligations, Annex II groups developed countries which must also provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries. Non-Annex I are developing countries with no quantitative mitigation obligations. 19 2006 IPCC Guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories. Available at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/spanish/vol1.html

Chart III.I: Evolution of GHG emissions by sector (MtCO2eq.). Argentina, 1990-2014 period.*

*Second BUR was presented only in Spanish. Source: Second Biannual Update Report (BUR), 2017.

However, the breakdown by subsector shows that Cattle Ranching contributes almost 20.7% of total emissions (see Chart III.II), followed by Transportation with 15.5%, Land-Use Changes with 13.1% and Electric Power Generation with 11.6%. These four subsectors account for almost 61% of total GHG emissions in Argentina

Chart III.II: GHG emissions by subsector. Argentina, 2014.*

*Second BUR was presented only in Spanish. Source: Second Biannual Update Report (BUR), 2017.

Despite its importance for the economy of the country, Agriculture only represents 5.4% of emissions and has been decreasing over the years. Conservation agriculture practices, such as no-till farming, have allowed Argentina to increase agricultural production by more than 200% and to reduce the amount of emissions per ton of grain harvested, from more than 0.55 tCO2eq. to around 0.12 tCO2eq.

Brazi l

Brazil’s most recent national GHG inventory dates from 2016. While the inventory included emissions to 2010, emissions were updated (with some simplifications) to 2012 in the second BUR of March 2017. The inventory was prepared following 1996 IPCC Guidelines, although some estimates took the 2006 Guidelines into account. Estimates as of 2012 indicate emissions of about 1.2 GtCO2eq.

Chart III.III: Evolution of GHG emission of Brazil (GgCO2eq.). 1990-2012 Period

Source: Second Biannual Update Report (BUR), 2017.

The Third National Communication provides information on emissions by sector and their evolution since 1990 in greater detail. In the last year reported (2010), Agriculture accounted for 32% of emissions, followed by the Energy sector (29.2%) and Land-Use Change (27.5%). However, at subsector level, change in biomes (Land Use) accounts for 26.8% of emissions, followed by Beef Ranching (22%), Transportation (13.8%) and Industrial emissions (5.6%) (See Chart III.IV).

Chart III.IV: GHG emissions by subsector. Brazil, 2010.

Source: Third National Communication, 2016

Despite their importance, emissions from Land-Use Changes have fallen significantly in recent years (from 1,900 MtCO2eq. in 2005 to 350 MtCO2eq. in 2010). This was achieved thanks to a significant reduction in the national deforestation rate in the order of -79% between 2004 and 2015.20

Paraguay

In December 2016, Paraguay completed its Third National Communication, and updated its calculation of emissions to 2012. For that year, it computed net emissions for a total of 167,377 GgCO2eq. (or 167.3 MtCO2eq.).

Table III.I: Total emissions of Paraguay (CO2eq.) for the three base years

Source: Author based on Third National Communication, 2017.

From the standpoint of sectors, Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) accounted for 73% of emissions in 2012 and, together with Agriculture, made up 95% of total emissions of Paraguay that year. At the sub-sector level, 49.7% of emissions are explained by the conversion of forest land, change in the use of agricultural land (19%), agricultural soil (10%) and enteric fermentation (8%).

Table III.II: GHG emissions by subsector. Paraguay, 2012.

*Category that generates GHG absorptions Source: Third National Communication, 2017.

In all the years inventoried, the LUCF sector is the one that contributes the most to net emissions, followed by Agriculture. Other sectors are not too significant in the country’s emissions except for the Highway Transportation subsector of the Energy sector, which accounts for 2.2% of emissions.

20 Third National Communication, 2016.

Sector 1994R 2005 20121.Energy 3,880.22 4,224.03 5,708.602.Industry 743.84 706.33 691.653.Useofsolventsandotherproducts NE NE NE4.Agriculture 21,455.07 25,886.33 36,639.355.LUCLUCF 69,086.58 75,051.61 122,147.626.Waste 276.49 1,478.99 2,189.87

TotalEmissiones(GgCO2eq.) 96,782.41 121,496.27 183,607.37TotalAbsorptions(GgCO2eq.) -1,340.21 -14,148.98 -16,230.28

NetTotal(GgCO2eq.) 95,442.20 107,347.29 167,377.09

Source Sector DirectGHG GgCO2eq.Level

Evaluation(%)CumulativeTotal(%)

5.B.Conversionofforestlandtoagriculturallandandother LUCLUCF CO2 98,258.2 49.69 49.695.B.2.Agriculturallandsthatremainagriculturalland LUCLUCF CO2 37,611.8 19.02 68.724.D.Agriculturalsoils Agriculture N2O 19,945.4 10.09 78.84.A.EntericFermentation Agriculture CH4 15,997.9 8.09 86.865.A.Forestlandsthatremainforestland* LUCLUCF CO2 15,748.0 7.96 94.861.A.3.b.RoadTransportation Energy CO2-CH4-N2O 4,524.0 2.29 97.15

197,727.9Total(correspondingtoallcategories)

Uruguay

Uruguay submitted its Fourth National Communication in 2016 and updated its emission measurement to 2012. However, in the second Biannual Update Report (BUR) of December 2017, it migrated its measurement methodology to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines and updated its estimates to 2014. During that year, Uruguay recorded emissions of 28,341 GgCO2eq.21 (or 28.3 MtCO2eq.)

Table III.III: Evolution of GHG emissions in Uruguay (GgCO2eq.). 1990-2014 Period

Source: Authors based on the Second Biannual Update Report (BUR), 2017.

At the sector level, Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Uses (AFOLU) account for 75.1% of emissions, followed by the Energy sector (20.1%) and Waste (3.2%). At the subsector level, Cattle Ranching stands out because enteric fermentation accounts for 45% of total emissions in Uruguay, followed by soil nitrogen emissions (22%) and transportation(10.9%) (See Chart III.V).

21Using the GWP100 metric

Energy IPPU AFOLU Waste Total1990 3,825 223 21,642 678 26,3681994 4,170 263 21,003 793 26,2301998 5,613 483 17,753 831 24,6802000 5,369 369 9,402 866 16,0062002 4,289 249 9,233 863 14,6342004 5,402 331 12,733 882 19,3482006 6,306 401 13,373 901 20,9822008 7,762 457 17,531 932 26,6832010 6,236 454 16,976 1,026 24,6922012 8,494 495 15,800 988 25,7362014 6,495 510 20,300 1,048 28,341

Chart III.V: GHG emissions by subsector. Uruguay, 2014.*

*Second BUR was presented only in Spanish. Source: Second Biannual Update Report (BUR), 2017.

Cattle ranching is unquestionably the main source of emissions in Uruguay. However, while methane emissions increased 12% in 2014 compared to 1990, it is worth noting that the significant increase in beef production in Uruguay was achieved at the cost of a relatively small increase in the total emissions of that sector.

IV. Putting the problem into context: Share in emissions at the global level

Having mentioned emissions and the commitments made by the countries of the Southern Cone at COP21, we need to set the region and agricultural activity against its share in the global emissions inventory, in order to put its contribution into context and prevent inappropriate approaches and/or unwarranted attacks.

To begin with, we need to know the share of the region in total emissions. Global emissions during 2013 totaled 45,261.2 MtCO2eq. While China and the United States account for almost 40% of such emissions (25.9% and 13.8%, respectively), only 3.1% is attributable to the countries of the Southern Cone (Brazil 2.2%; Argentina 0.7%; Paraguay 0.08% and Uruguay 0.07%) (See Chart IV.I).

Chart IV.I: Global GHG emissions by country. Share in MtCO2eq., 2013.

The chart excludes emissions from Land-Use Change and Deforestation Source: CAIT, 2018.

Computing the emissions from Land-Use Change and Forestry (LUCF), total global emissions increase to 48,257.2 MtCO2eq. Including this variable, the contribution of the region increases to 4% (Brazil 2.7%, Argentina 0.9%; Paraguay 0.4%, and Uruguay reduces its share to 0,04%), while China and the United States reduce their share to 36.5% (23.7% and 12.9% respectively).

In either of the two cases, the five main emitters (China, the United States, the European Union,22 India and Russia), account for over 60% of emissions (without taking LUCF into account) and for 55% including LUCF.23 This shows the high level of concentration of emissions, and while it does not release the region from its responsibilities, it shows that the scope of the regional effort to decrease global GHG emissions is reduced on the basis of the share of the countries of the Southern Cone in total emissions.

The contribution of each sector to total global emissions also needs to be put into context, given the unwarranted attacks on Agriculture (particularly cattle rearing activities) Chart IV.II shows that the Energy sector was responsible for 73.6% of emissions in 2013, followed by Agriculture (10.3%), 22 Within the European Union, Germany is the main emitter with 2% and 1.8% of global emissions (not including LUCF and including LUCF, respectively), followed by the United Kingdom (1.2% and 1.1%) and France (1% and 0.8%). 23 In the latter case, Indonesia would displace Russia as the 5th global emitter, with 5.1 of emissions (vs. Russia’s 4,2%).

Industrial Processes (6.3%), Land-Use Change and Forestry (6.2%), Waste (3.1%) and Bunker Fuels24 (2.3%).

Chart IV.II: Global GHG emissions by sector. In MtCO2eq., 2013.

Source: Author based on CAIT data, 2018.

Within the Energy sector, most emissions are explained by the Electricity/Heating subsector (43.1% of the emissions of the sector), followed by Transportation (20.8%), Manufacturing/Construction (17.2%); Other Fuel Combustions (11.7%) and Fugitive Emissions (7.3%).

Furthermore, looking at sectorial GHGs evolution, we see that the emissions of the Agriculture sector have not increased significantly. In fact, between 1994 and 2014, agricultural emissions grew 16% (measured in MtCO2eq.), while emissions from Land-Use Change and Forestry (LUCF) fell 18% during the same period. On the other hand, emissions from Industrial Processes, Bunker Fuels and Energy grew 152%, 63% and 53%, respectively, so that the relative share of Agriculture and LUCF in total GHG emissions dropped in recent years.

Thus, the share of Agriculture in global GHG emissions fell from 13.2% in 1994 to 10.49% in 2014, with a continuing downward trend. Furthermore, the share of LUCF in global emissions fell from 11.2% in 1994 to 6.3% in 2014, albeit with a certain acceleration in emissions in the last five years. For their part, given their quicker annual evolution rate, the Energy and Industrial Processes sectors together increased their share from 70.3% to 77.9% between 1994 and 2014.

Looking at shorter periods (2010-2014), we see that while the Agricultural sector continued to exhibit a downward trend in emissions (from an annual growth rate of 0.8% in 2000-2014 to 0.6% a year between 2010 and 2014), the Land-Use Change sector reversed its downward trend and increased its emissions once more by 1.06% per annum during that period, which calls for a greater focus on the subject. However, the Industrial Processes (4.7% per annum) and Energy (1.2% per annum) sectors continued to account for most of the annual growth in emissions between 2010 and 2014 (see Chart IV.III).

24 Bunker Fuels are the emissions from international air transport and maritime transport.

Chart IV.III: Evolution of global GHG emissions by sector.* In MtCO2eq., 1994-2014.

*Cumulative annual growth. Source: Author based on CAIT data, 2018.

In other words, even in a context of an increase in world food production of about 65% between 1994 and 2014,25 Agriculture and LUCF increased their GHG emissions by only 0.11% in the same period, which not only shows a marked reduction in emissions due to deforestation, but also entails improvements in agricultural productivity and in the use of more environmentally sustainable production systems (emissions by the agricultural sector, measured individually, increased 15.8% in the same period).

However, despite the categorical nature of the data, it is common to hear that a large part of the emissions problem lies with the agricultural sector, often to the point of saying that emissions of the cattle ranching sector account for 50% of total emissions, which contradicts the facts shown by National Inventory data.

This type of disinformation has not only been transmitted through countless journalistic media,26 but has also been spread by documentaries27 and has reached the general public, to the point that it has even been repeated by various personalities committed to the environment who disseminate the message at the global level28, without taking other social and economic considerations into account, such as the importance of cattle ranching for food security in arid and semi-arid regions where other agricultural activities cannot be conducted.

In particular, the absence of a proper perception of the impact of cattle ranching arose following a controversial FAO report.29 Such report stated that the emissions produced all along the meat and dairy product value chain, from fodder production (including fertilizer production, deforestation to produce fodder and grasslands, etc.), through animal production (which includes emissions from fermentation and nitrous oxide from manure) to the CO2 released during the production and

25 FAOSTAT, food production index. See http://www.fao.org/faostat/es/#data/QI 26 Ver http://www.periodistadigital.com/ciencia/medioambiente/2017/12/18/el-50-de-los-gases-invernaderos-que-emite-espana-los-generan-vacas-cerdos-y-ovejas.shtml o https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/study-claims-meat-creates-half-of-all-greenhouse-gases-1812909.html 27 http;//www.cowspiracy.com/facts28https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/jun/15/paul-mccartney-meat-free-monday29 Livestock’s long shadow: Environmental issues and options, 2006.

transport of animal products to consumer outlets represented more than 18% of total global emissions.

A new 2013 report30 reduced the total contribution of cattle ranching to 14.5% of global emissions. The cattle ranching value chain accounts for 61% of such percentage (8.8% of total emissions). Unquestionably, this figure still is very important, but significantly below the figures that are generally bandied about by the media and which have filtered down to public opinion.

Moreover, the report itself stipulates that emissions from the cattle ranching sector can be reduced by up to 30% by only introducing good agricultural practices, and also includes some carbon sequestration estimates for grass-fed livestock, rating the field systems above the stable systems. Regardless of the truth of the information, the analysis of the value chain will increase the specific weight of the sector under review. Applying this type of analysis to one value chain only undoubtedly produces a valuable contribution, but has resulted in a biased perception of the problem.

But even without creating new approaches such as the one proposed above (value chain), the way in which information is often presented also has a significant impact on the public perception of the problem. In this case, the way in which the information is shown not only takes the share of the sector out of context, but it also affects the way in which the contribution of each country to climate change is perceived.

A clear example of this is to show emission levels through an index that improves the perception of the problem for one sector or country in particular. Map IV.I shows per capita CO2eq. emissions. Under this index, the emissions of the largest global emitter (China, with 25.9% of total emissions), are equivalent to the emissions of countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, which contribute 0.9% and 0,04% respectively, or puts the United States (13.8% of total emissions) on a par with Australia (1,1%).

30 Tackling climate change through livestock. A global assessment of emission and mitigation opportunities. FAO, 2013.

Map IV.I: Per capita CO2eq. emissions. 2012.

Source: EDGAR, 2018.

It is also common to see maps with CO2eq./GDP emissions or similar indices that tend to distort perception of the real situation. Providing a solution to the global emissions problem requires responsibility and contaminating public opinion with mistaken perceptions does not contribute to the construction of a sustainable long-term solution.

We all need to admit that the planet is deteriorating and that this process has clearly accelerated in recent centuries. However, it is impossible to suddenly stop all contaminating economic activities (including the use of fossil energy), and a gradual conversion process must be undertaken towards more sustainable production and consumption systems. The proposal that arose from COP21 appears as an interesting initiative in this regard, because it leaves up to each country the manner in which it will guide its economy towards a more sustainable path, although in every case along an emission reduction road.

V. Regional Challenges

As Non-Annex I members,31 the countries of the region have no quantitative mitigation obligations, but must report periodically on the state of their emissions and implement domestic policies designed to reduce their emissions and adapt to climate change. Nevertheless, the region must make every effort to honor its environmental commitments, including compliance with its quantitative emission targets.

In particular, the countries of the Southern Cone must focus on controlling illegal deforestation, where significant progress has been made, but it is still the target of most external criticism. The greatest progress in this connection has been seen in Brazil where, thanks to restrictive legislation32 and greater controls, the deforestation rate fell significantly. However, since 2012, the deforestation 31 See Non-Annex I countries at http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php 32The Brazilian forestry code establishes a forest reserve within the rural area of 80% in the Amazon region, 35% in the Cerrado region and 20% anywhere else in Brazil.

rate has quickened, which it is hoped to reverse with the completion of the Rural Cadastre33, which will determine the areas to be re-planted by producers (at their own cost) on the basis of the limits imposed by the forest code in each region.

At the same time, and even though the established targets propose an actual reduction of future emissions, a response is needed to complaints concerning commitments. To mention two specific examples, it is claimed that, by taking 2005 as the base year, Brazil’s commitment is unambitious, since between 2005 and 2012, Brazil had already managed to reduce its total emissions by 55%.34 In addition, it is estimated that, in the case of Argentina, emissions by 2030 would be 50% higher than those of 2010 if the contribution to deforestation savings is deducted.35

Furthermore, and from a more aggressive standpoint, the countries of the Southern Cone must generate a joint communication strategy that stresses the comparative advantages of the production systems used in the region, which are much more environmentally friendly than those applied in other important agricultural regions (such as Europe or Asia).

In particular, they must work on calculation methodologies alternative to those of the IPCC, that contemplate those relative advantages of production systems (no-till farming, grass-fed livestock, etc.) and of regional biomes. A recent preliminary publication by Viglizzo and Ricard (2017) may be mentioned as an example. Such work concentrates on the analysis of the carbon balance of rural land in the MERCOSUR countries, and found evidence that carbon sequestration from rural land is apparently neutralizing agricultural emissions (agriculture + cattle ranching + land-use change) in each of the countries studied.36 Brazil has also made progress in this direction through the Carbon Neutral Meat Program using forest-pastoral cattle rearing methods. 37 Validating this type of methodology with the IPCC is an appropriate strategy.

However, the greatest efforts in the region must be directed at counteracting unwarranted criticism. In particular, the countries of the Southern Cone must seek to consolidate strategies with other food producing countries to correct public perception regarding the contribution of agriculture, and of cattle ranching in particular, to climate change. The generation of environmental barriers to trade influenced by a mistaken public perception is a latent risk, and unifying positions with our global partners at multilateral organizations will be increasingly important.

As noted by Idígoras and Papendieck (2017), at present, environmental standards are selling requirements (selling strategy, brand positioning, etc.), but they are likely to become production requirements in the short term. In view of that, the countries of the Southern Cone must define a common standpoint in connection with environmental requirements in food production, seeking to respond responsibly and sustainably to growing social demands.

However, we should not lose sight of the fact that, given its share in emissions, the contribution of regional agriculture to the mitigation of climate change is marginal. In fact, Viglizzo and Ricard (2015) estimate that an extreme reduction in agricultural production in MERCOSUR countries of about 75% would only entail a 2% reduction in global emissions. Given that these four countries represent more than 30% of the net food surplus (Elverdin and Piñeiro, 2016), the cost to world food security would be disproportionate.

33 See http://www.cadastrorural.gov.br/ 34 During this period, LULUCF emissions dropped 86%. 35 Climate Action Tracker https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/argentina/ 36 It would even offset emissions of other sectors of the economy37 See https://www.embrapa.br/busca-de-noticias/-/noticia/24842296/projeto-carne-carbono-neutro-promove-um-diferencial-na-pecuaria-de-corte-em-minas-gerais

Thus, to try to address both concerns, the region needs to continue to make efforts to increase agricultural productivity, while reducing environmental impacts. “Sustainable agricultural intensification” makes it possible to increase agricultural production without increasing environmental costs, obtaining the maximum possible efficiency of the resources and inputs used and reducing GHG emissions per product unit. Making progress in the use of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and Good Farming Practices (GFP) is essential.

Finally, given that climate change has cross-border effects, its implications and its solution must be global. Accordingly, some enforcement mechanism needs to be created in order to ensure that the commitments of the Agreement are honored. It is a known fact that in the current international context, it will be difficult to conceive multilateral agreements that make it possible to build consensus regarding the mechanisms to achieve them. Nevertheless, some kind of recognition needs to be generated for those countries that are making a contribution to reduce global warming.

Taking the difficulties into account, there are actions on which agreement may be reached at the multilateral level. To mention one specific example, the European Union has indicated it will not sign new trade agreements with countries that do not implement the Paris Agreement38 and has even stipulated specific provisions in the agreements currently being negotiated (such as Japan or Mexico). Building some minimal consensus in this or other matters could create greater incentives for each Party to the Agreement to honor its commitments.

VI. Conclusions

To begin with, it must be admitted that world GHG levels have increased significantly in recent decades, from 421 ppm in 1992 (measured in CO2eq.), when the UNFCCC was adopted, to 485 ppm in 2015 (+12%). Although it seems superfluous to mention it, there are still lines of thought that attribute it to a natural warming cycle of the earth, or which deny the fact outright. Such difference of opinions would not entail significant risks if it did not lead to irresponsible decisions, as was the case with the United States leaving the Paris Agreement.

That said, it must be acknowledged that the Paris Agreement represented a great step forward not only towards the acknowledgement of the problem, but also for the attempt to find a global solution to it. Given the cross-border dimension of climate change, most countries of the world have reflected their concern in the emission reduction targets they have set in their commitments, and that, in and of itself, is worth underscoring.

However, given the voluntary nature of the Agreement, there are still some doubts concerning how to “force” commitments that will make it possible to achieve its targets. By not including specific provisions, there is a high risk that countries will fail to comply with the targets, or will leave the Agreement outright. Creating some enforcement mechanism, at least at the multilateral level, may be necessary in the medium term.

From a regional standpoint, it should be noted that the four MERCOSUR countries have been complying with the processes and obligations stipulated in the Agreement. What is more, three of them (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) have worked jointly to find common ground for the negotiations conducted for the COP23 held last year, which resulted in highly significant progress in

38See http://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/02/02/france-us-no-paris-agreement-no-trade-agreement-1/ and http://www.lr21.com.uy/mundo/1359286-union-europea-acuerdo-paris-cambio-climatico-eeuu

defining a common strategy and is a direct indication of the responsibility with which this matter has been addressed.

Nevertheless, regional challenges are significant. While the region only accounts for 4.1% of total global emissions (including AFOLU), additional efforts are required to implement effective mitigation and adaptation measures that will make it possible to go beyond the commitments made (especially in the case of Argentina and Brazil).

A more aggressive strategy for the defense of regional interests is also required that will make it possible to make the most of the advantages of local production systems (and biomes) which are more efficient in terms of GHG emissions per product unit than those obtained elsewhere in the globe. Working within the framework of the IPPC to demonstrate these advantages by estimating national/regional measurement factors is absolutely necessary and should be a priority for governments.

In addition, it is absolutely unavoidable for the region, together with other sustainable food supplying countries, to establish an appropriate and mutually agreed communication strategy to work on public perception of agricultural emissions through the dissemination of reliable and contextualized information.

The share of Agriculture in global GHG emissions has dropped from 13.2% in 1994 to 10.49% in 2014, with a continuing downward trend, and this happened within the context of an increase of about 65% in world food production during the same period (the agricultural sector, measured individually, exhibited a 15.8% rise in emissions in the same period). It is necessary to put in context the contributions of the various sectors before taking hasty measures.

However, it should be noted that consumer demand for products set apart by their lesser environmental impact will be ever growing. The region should not ignore this fact and should promote environmental efficiency in food production, while creating tools to allow consumers to correctly interpret the carbon footprint and provide a consistent rationale for their decision (Viglizzo, 2017). Errors of judgment by the public concerning sector emissions are generating considerable pressure for the establishment of a growing number of new environmental barriers to trade that lack any scientific basis, but have significant implications for global food security.

What is more, unwarranted environmental barriers could even be counterproductive for net emission reduction, as they might entail punishing those countries that are most efficient in terms of food production (measured in product units) in favor of less efficient countries. Conversely, the reduction of import barriers for environmentally efficient agroindustrial products could be an effective way of achieving food security, while mitigating climate change (Idigoras and Papendieck, 2017).39 Seeking allies, achieving consensus and establishing common positions in that regard in international governance bodies is increasingly necessary.

In any event, we should not lose sight of the fact that, given the low contribution of the region to global emissions and its large contribution to world food security (with more than 30% of the net food surplus), any unjustified constraint on agricultural production will have little impact on the reduction of global emissions and a disproportionate cost on global food security.

39 The link between agricultural trade, climate change and food safety: Tariff elimination for environmentally efficient agricultural goods, 2017.

It is also important to bear in mind that the five main global emitters (China, the United States, the European Union,40 India and Russia), account for over 60% of emissions (not including LUCF) and for 55% (including LUCF). Their relative contribution obviously does not release the region from its climate change mitigation responsibilities. But it does show that any strategy designed to achieve a significant reduction in emissions requires the support of the large global emitters.

Responding to climate change will only be possible if all the countries of the world are committed to it. Finding the solution to the problem requires responsibility, because all contaminating activities cannot be suddenly discontinued; rather, a gradual conversion process must be commenced towards more sustainable production and consumption systems.

The proposal that emerged from COP21 appears as an interesting initiative in this regard, and the greatest efforts must be put forward to sustain the Agreement and achieve its targets. Despite the progress made, projections show that deeper commitments (NDCs) are required to achieve the established targets. Given the acceleration of GHG emissions in recent decades and their cumulative effect in the atmosphere, the window of opportunity is closing fast, and it will be impossible to achieve the established goals if countries act irresponsibly. Undeniably, contaminating public opinion with mistaken perceptions does not contribute to the construction of a sustainable long-term solution.

40 Within the European Union, Germany is the main emitter with 2% and 1.8% of global emissions (not including and including CUTS, respectively), followed by the United Kingdom (1.2% and 1.1%) and France (1% and 0.8%).

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