Consti May 29.pdf

7/27/2019 Consti May 29.pdf

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ASSIGNMENT FOR May 29, 2013Prepared by Prof. Ma. Clara de Castro

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Constitutional History

EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONSMALOLOS CONSTITUTION

Philippine Revolution of 1986first REPUBLICAN constitution in Asia framed by revolutionary convention.the Constitution recognized that sovereign power was vested in the people, provided for a parliamentary

government, acknowledged separation of powers and contained a bill or rights

1935 CONSTITUTIONratified in a plebiscite on May 14, 1935Philippine Commonwealth established in November 15, 1935

1973 CONSTITUTIONPresident Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 declaring that the new Constitution had been

ratifies by the Citizens Assemblies and has come into force and effect on January 17, 1973

1986 FREEDOM CONSTITUTIONProclamation No.3 of March 25 1986 announced the promulgation of the new constitutionadopted certain provisions of the 1973 Constitutionadded articles on the executive department, on government reorganization and on existing lawsprovided for the calling of Constitutional Commission to be composed of 30-50 members to draft a new

constitution

Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution

1987 CONSTITUTIONpresent constitutionresult of the Constitutional Convention called for in 1986

took effect in February 2, 1987 date of the plebiscite when the people ratified the Constitution (DE LEON vs

ESGUERRA)De leon v. Esguerra , 153 SCRA 602

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitionersas Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held undeBatas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leonreceived a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra onFebruary 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the otherrespondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. Petitoners prayed to the SupremeCourt that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited bytaking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June


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7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position thawith the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replacethem and to designate their successors. On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective andappointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by vvirtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the ProvisionalConstitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election

Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for beinginconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year periodwhich ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designatingrespondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force andeffect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must bedeemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3,thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987Constitution further provides in part: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, whichshall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x." Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determinedby law, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern

Definition and Scope/Divisions of Political Law

POLITICAL LAWbranch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State

and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.

SCOPE OF POLITICAL LAWCONSTITUTIONAL LAW

the study of the proper maintenance of balance between the authority as represented by the three inherentpowers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights

ADMINISTRATIVE LAWThat branch of public law which fixes the organization of government, determines the competence of the

administrative authorities who execute the law, and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation ofhis rights.

LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERSELECTION LAWS

Definition, Nature and Classification of a Constitution

CONSTITUTIONis the written instrument ENACTED by the direct action of the PEOPLE, which the fundamental powers of the

government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the severaldepartments for their sage and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.

is the body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.

PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONto PRESCRIBE the permanent framework of a system of governmentto ASSIGN the several departments of their respective powers and dutiesto ESTABLISH certain first principles on which the government is founded

CLASSIFICATIONSWRITTEN UNWRITTEN


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one whose precepts are embodied inone document or set of documents

consists of rules which have NOT beenINTEGRATED into a single, concreteFORM but are SCATTERED invarious sources

Sources:Statutes fundamental in characterJudicial decisionsCommentaries of publicistsCustoms and traditionsCommon law principles

ENACTED EVOLVED

Conventionalformally struck off at a definite time and

place (through a plebiscite) followinga conscious or deliberate efforttaken by a constituent (people) bodyof people.

Cumulativea constitution that is the result of political

evolution, not inaugurated at anyspecific time but changing byaccretion rather than by anysystematic method.

RIGID FLEXIBLE

can be amended ONLY by a formal andusually difficult process

can be changed by ordinary legislation

the Philippine Constitution is written, enacted and rigid.

Qualities of a Good Written Constitution

Essential Parts of Written Constitution

CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY

is the series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposinglimitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing enjoyment of those rights

ART III Bill of Rights

CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENTprovisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules

relative to its administration and defining the electorateART V SuffrageART VI Legislative DepartmentART VII Executive DepartmentART VIII Judicial DepartmentART IX Constitutional CommissionART X Local Government

CONSTITUTION OF SOVEREIGNTYprovisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which the formal changes in the

fundamental law may be brought about.

Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution

VERBA LEGISwhenever possible the words used in the Constitution must be GIVEN their ORDINARY meaning EXCEPT

when technical terms are employed. (Francisco vs. HRET)RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA

the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. (Civil LibertiesUnion vs. Executive Secretary)


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UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREATthe Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole

In case of doubt, the provisions should be considered SELF EXECUTING, MANDATORY, rather than directoryPROSPECTIVE rather than retroactive.

SELF EXECUTINGa provision that is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislationa provision which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected

a constitutional provision is a self-executing provision if the nature and the extent of the right conferred and the liabilityimposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of itsterms, and there is no language indicating that the subject referred to the legislature for action.

AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

AMENDMENT REVISION

refers to a change that adds, reduces,deletes WITHOUT altering the BASICPRINCIPLE involve

affects ONLY the specific provisionsbeing amended

implies a change that ALTERS the BASICPRINCIPLE in the Constitution like theprinciple of separation of powers.

alters the substantial entirety of theConstitution

affects several provisions

CONSTITUENT POWER LEGISLATIVE POWER

power to formulate a Constitution or topropose amendments to or revision ofthe Constitution and to ratify suchproposal

exercised by Congress (by specialconstitutional conferment), byConstitutional Convention orCommission, by the people throughinitiative and referendum and ultimatelyby sovereign electorate

exercise of constituent power DOES NOTneed the approval of the ChiefExecutive

power to pass, repeal or amend ordinarylaws or statutes

is an ordinary power of the Congress andof the people, also through initiativeand referendum

exercise of legislative power NEEDS theapproval of the Chief ExecutiveEXCEPT when done by the peoplethrough initiative and referendum

INITIATIVE - phase where people proposeREFERENDUM - phase people vote to reject or ratify the proposal

AMENDATORY PROCESSPROPOSAL adoption of the suggested change in the ConstitutionRATIFICATION through plebiscite held not later than 60 not later than 90 days upon approvalJUDICIAL REVIEW test of validity

WHO MAY AMENDCONGRESS

by a vote of 3/4 of all its members (each of the house)


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CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONmay be called into existence by a 2/3 vote of all members of the Congressif not obtained, majority vote subject to plebiscite

WHO MAY REVISECONGRESSCONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONPEOPLE

Requisites:Petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voteEvery legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered votersNo amendment shall be authorized after 5 yrs following the ratification of the Constitution nor more than

once every 5yrs thereafter

RA 6735Initiative and Referendum Act

It was held that the law, as worded does not apply to constitutional amendment, therefore amendment by initiative andreferendum must still await a valid law (Defensor-Santiago vs. Comelec)

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

FACTS:Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan

T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek adeclaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the cabint, their undersecretaries and assisstansecretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinentprovisions of EO 284 is as follows

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the executivedepartment may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and governmentcorporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof

Section 2: If they hold more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of thesubordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two positions other than his

primary position

Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the bords of such corporation should either be a secretary, undersecretary orassistant secretary

The petitioners are challenging EO 284's constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII of theconstitution.According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or empolyment ingovernment are those provided in the constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as the CabineMember under Sec. 3 (2) of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtueof Sec. 8 of Article VIII

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Held: Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under considerationThe Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and theevils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices oemployment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commissionshould see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-Presidentmembers of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure,unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies ofthe constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition onthe President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is


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concerned.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated fromall the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought intoview and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particularsubject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and onesection is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will rendeevery word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

Francisco v. HRET, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261;

10 Nov 2003]Sunday, January 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciablecontroversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint tocontrovert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.

Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether theresolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues whichthis controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort toextra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution andprotection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth thatthe inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government byno means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned

to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by theConstitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying theirindispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial reviewover impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of thecalibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond thepowers assigned to it by the Constitution

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct andpersonal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained

or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffersthereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied someright or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties byreason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, themere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or thapublic money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through theenforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, hemust specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation

and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is notsufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.html


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At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Couropts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senateof the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure ofpublic funds

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes hisprerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of theHouse of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the

prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached thefloor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate

impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the Housedoes not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings becauseSection 3 (1) says "The House of Representativesshall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,"This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating"impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachmentcomplaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House ofRepresentatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clearOnce an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one year period

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on themerits only the main issue ofwhether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposedone-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminatelyturn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assertjudicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of almen before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedienceto its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protectingthat principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramificationsthrough its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The ChiefJustice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justicedoes not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rightsirrespective of his station in life.

Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on

November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief JusticeHilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.


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ARTICLE XVII , 1987 ConstitutionR.A. No. 6735

Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774Gonzales Vs. Comelec

27 SCRA 835G.R. L-27833

April 18, 1969

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting theperiod of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, thebasic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify theact. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila andthe Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 111967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a politicaleader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period ofelection campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtaiby and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation andlimitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the statewould render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada wasasked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on thepreferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clearand present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being

debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with theloss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, theU.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend thatthe act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissiblerestriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. Thefirst, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree ofimminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantiveevil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule inconstitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is

such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words arepunishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It issufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonablycalculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probableeffect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated tosatisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the authorTaada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessaryand appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantiveevil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred electioncampaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably forconsultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression,this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evilthat Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the electionof any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature ormaterials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature orpropaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.


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Imbong v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28Petitioner: ImbongRespondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)Petitioner: GonzalesRespondent: ComelecPonente: Makasiar

RELATED LAWS:Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representativedistrict who shall be elected in November, 1970.RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportionedamong existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2delegates.RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacySec 2: apportionment of delegatesSec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointiveoffice/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to theconvention.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegatesto the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity ofentire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call isconstitutional.

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specificprovisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:

- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for thepurpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions isreasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinceswith less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with morepopulation.- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, thisdisqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and toallow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity sincecandidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does notcreate discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA v COMELEC, SENATOR RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR HONASANFollowing the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passedResolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with theregular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The


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resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only forthe unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senatorswith the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years oSenator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13thPetitioners Tolentino and Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, for nullification ofResolution 01-005

Issue: WON Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: (1) for failure to give notice by the bodyempowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of filling up vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645

Held: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fixthe time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice isconsidered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullityThe test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election iswhether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of speciaelection. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no specialelection to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorialelection on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass

separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatoryunder Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and state among others, theoffice/s to be voted forSignificantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merelyimplemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution asintroduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former SenatorGuingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend theresolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shallserve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELECG.R. NO. L-34150

APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the validity of threebatasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the voteof 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assemblyby a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission onElections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutionsin proposing amendments:ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was validlyobtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power topropose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified inaccordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore,the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as aconstituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather thanamendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only proposeamendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitutionbased on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to thepeople for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the newConstitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument agains


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the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the momentthe same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for propesubmission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. Itwould be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body appliesas well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not arequirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution wascomplied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of thevotes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment orrevision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly onFebruary 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thuswithin the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Sanidad v. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333SANIDAD vs. COMELEC181 SCRA 529

Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) wasenacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987

Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V.Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscitecampaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer orpersonality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, duringplebiscite periods.

Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulatethe use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other publicutilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply,

including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator,announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his workduring the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to superviseand regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Mediapractitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor thecandidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167has no statutory basis.

Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSDAVIDE; March 19, 1997

FACTSAtty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative. In his petitionhe wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article 6, Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term limits of alelective government officials. He asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures bysetting up signature stations all over the country, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The COMELEC tookcognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing. Senator Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before theCOMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory petition properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago, on the other hand, filed a special civil action for prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar as theinitiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. She further alleges that what the petitioners are willing to proposeare not amendments, but revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK and MABINI filed their motions for intervention, arguing onthe same points.


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ISSUES

1. WON the court can take action of this case despite there being a pending case before the COMELEC2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for people's initiative3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition

HELD1. Yes. Comelec's failure to act on roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe andviable the instant petition under sec 2 rule 65 of rules of court- Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari since delfin didn't come up with the minimum number osignatures- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance.2. No. The law is inadequate.- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that the word Constitution was a delayed afterthought. Theword Constitution was neither germane nor relevant to the said section. It only proves that it is silent to amendments in theconstitution.- Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the constitution.- Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution.- Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and referendum of national and local laws. It failed toprovide for details in implementation of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and standardfor the delegated power.3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete, it does not have the power to prescribe rules and regulationson the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also, comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition. Thedelfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.Decision Petition granted

Calderon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992No digest (*_*)

Lambino, et. al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153,Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 ofthe constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government tounicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions andinvoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution onamendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting inessential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groupspetition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoplesinitiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.


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1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the natureand effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the thirdmode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of thelegislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to bea valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

ARTICLE VIII, Sec. 1, Sec. 4(2) & Sec. 5(2)SEC 4(2) ART VIII explicit recognition of the judicial power and judicial review

WHO MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL POWERSUPREME COURT recognized by the Constitution ( Sec 4(2) Art VIII)REGIONAL TRIAL COURT recognized by BP 129 and Jurisprudence

notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory to enable the same to decide whether nor not his intervention in the action isnecessary

RA 6735Initiative and Referendum ActIt was held that the law, as worded does not apply to constitutional amendment, therefore amendment by initiative and

referendum must still await a valid law (Defensor-Santiago vs. Comelec)

What is the power of Judicial Review?JUDICIAL REVIEW

the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in the light of their conformity with theConstitutionan expression of the supremacy of the Constitutionthe power is inherent in the Judicial Department by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers

JUDICIAL POWERthe authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before

the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights.

What are the functions of Judicial Review?FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

CHEKINGLEGITIMATING

Rule on Double NegativeUses the term not unconstitutional; the court cannot declare a law constitutional because it already

enjoys a presumption of constitutionalitySYMBOLIC

educating the bar and bench and the people on the extent of protection given by the constitutional guarantees

REQUISITES OF A JUDICIAL REVIEWACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which ca n be resolved on the basis of existinglaw and jurisprudence

must be definite, concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of the parties who are pitted against each otherdue to their adverse legal interests

a request for advisory is not an actual case but an action for declaratory relief is proper for judicia


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determinationthe issues raised must not be moot and academic except:

when there is grave violation of the constitutionwhen the situation is of exceptional character and of paramount public interest is involvedwhen the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,

the bar, and the public.When the case is capable of repetition yet evading review

MUST BE RAISED BY THE PROPER PARTYa proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act

complained ofLocus Standi personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or wil

sustain direct injury as a result

GENERAL RULE: a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutionalEXCEPTION: Facial Challenge the state is absolutely unconstitutional under no circumstance but the only time a facial

challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression

Overbreadth Doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him, it is nounconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before the Courts whose activities are constitutionallyprotected.

Void for Vaugeness the doctrine that holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarilyguess at its meaning and differ as to its application (in all its application)

MUST BE RAISED AT THE MOST OPPORTUNE TIMEthe earliest opportune time to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent

court that can resolve the same, such that if not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at thetrial and if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered in the appeal

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE CASE ITSELFLis Mota cause of the suit

EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

ORTHODOX VIEWan unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection, it createsno office, it is inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all

ART 7(2) CIVIL CODE when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the formershall be void and the latter shall govern.

MODERN VIEWCourts simply refuse to recognize the law and determine the rights of the parties as if the statute had no

existencecertain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized

REQUISITES OF PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITYthe Legislature must be willing to retain the valid, portion(s), usually shown by the separability clause

the valid portion can stand independently as law

Who may exercise the power of Judicial Review?SEC 4(2) ART VIII explicit recognition of the judicial power and judicial review

SUPREME COURT recognized by the Constitution ( Sec 4(2) Art VIII)REGIONAL TRIAL COURT recognized by BP 129 and Jurisprudence

notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory to enable the same to decide whether nor not his intervention in the action isnecessary

Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139Angara vs. Electoral Tribunal


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Facts: Angara was elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon and was already proclaimed a member of the NationaAssembly when Ynsua protested to the ELECOM. Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest but since his motion wasdenied by the ELECOM, he filed an original action in the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM to hear theprotest of Ynsua, provided that ELECOM was under the National Assembly which already proclaimed him as its memberas the elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court could take cognizance of the case and has jurisdiction over the ELECOM

Held: Yes. When there is an actual case or controversy, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which canbe called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integraconstituent units thereof. [based on the powers vested by foreign constitutions to the Judiciary]

The judiciary has judicial power, and included in this power is judicial review. The Court has the discretion whether or notto exercise this power. Hence, it produced standards for justiciability.

Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792BONDOC V PINEDAGRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991

FACTS- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng DemokratikongPilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of

Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.- On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc filed aprotest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9)members: 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

- July 1989 - Bondoc filed petition- Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on areappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4)months. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107votes. Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.- March 4, 1991 - Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in

the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriatemoves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.- March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No. 25.- March 13, 1991 - Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LDP had already expelledhim and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, andfor having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V.Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of itespecially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.- March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated March 13, 1991, from theOffice of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the HoR decided towithdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.- Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of this "distressingdevelopment' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the decisionpreviously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now beexpected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It wasalso said that:> Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide instead for a return tothe composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the partyhaving the largest number of votes and (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judiciacomponent consisting of three (3) justices from the SC> Suggestions:+ The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So that there would be lesser chances of non-judicial elementsplaying a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.+ There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal,those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their


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independence and objectivity. (like that's possible)- During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5 members without Cong Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24 othe Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.- March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be relieved of their membership in the tribunal and directedthem to do their duties. The court even said that all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legaconsiderations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges. The term of office of everymember thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legallyterminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including politicadisloyalty.- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps PinedaPalacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to:1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Rep.Camasura, Jr. to HRET2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming anddischarging functions as a member of the HRET3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member ofthe HRET; and4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.- The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition> Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.> Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress' is the sole authority that nominates

and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole power to remove any member whenever the ratio in therepresentation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity,removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislativeterm, for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutionalprovision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the expulsion oCongressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind his membership inthe House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purelypolitical question beyond the reach of judicial review.> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet beennominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House ofRepresentatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded CongressmanCamasura's membership in the HRET.> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no

cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of hisrights. What he assails is the act of the HoR of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as amember of the HRET.- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No.25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents because after theHoR had announced the termination of Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that theHoR would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.

ISSUEWON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" therepresentation in the tribunal of the majority party

HELD- Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the mainpolitical parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead ofequal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.- The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitutionunderscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returnsand qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives ElectoraTribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians.- To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent.The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating toelection returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary whenand while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission forthe purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of


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all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. ElectoraCommission, 63 Phil. 139.)+ Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. -The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be thesole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.+ Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. -

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with completedetachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,"disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.As

judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachmentimpartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty toparty" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.+ Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just asmembers of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Thereforemembership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of theterm of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formaaffiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House oRepresentatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As therecords of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political partyhis expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for alawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of

the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of theconstitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the legislature, may not be interfered with by theHouseDecision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the HoRwithdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the HouseElectoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G.Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 datedMarch 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano APineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to theprejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interestof justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on theparties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

SEPARATE OPINION

PADILLA [dissent]-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed among three (3)great departments. Each separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authoritydirectly from the fundamental law.- This does not extend to the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those inauthority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every otherdepartment.- The HoR has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal provided that the proportionalrepresentation of parties is maintained.- The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a member of the House ElectoralTribunal must necessarily include the power to remove said member.- The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the House of Representatives havethe power to do what it has done and not whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has done.- The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the constitutional authority of the legislature The judiciadepartment has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in theexercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle ofseparation of powers.

SARMIENTO [dissent]


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- I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it - can the Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its HouseElectoral Tribunal? - is a political question and a question in which the Court cannot intervene.- The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charterdid not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.- Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the lower houseThis Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world opolitics. If they do, they risk their independence.

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659YNOT vs IAC Case DigestRESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATEDNATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRYREGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, whenthey were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-Awhich provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subjectto confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions asthe Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deservingfarmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a

supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of thecarabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined torule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumedvalidity.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he hasnow come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of dueprocess, and undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and isrestrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and

property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justifyExecutive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaosexcept under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appearfirst, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interferenceand second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressiveupon individuals.

In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter ofthese animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of thenecessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing theirimprovident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannotsay with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that tostrengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of thecarabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. Thereasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measureis missing.

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughterconsidering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retainingthe carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province willmake it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executiveorder, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the liveanimals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to


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prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with thesanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao orcarabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, thestatute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trialand conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the propertybeing transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to thegovernment. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution.

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was feltnecessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down animplacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty.The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging orconstricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confinethemselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of theclause whenever indicated.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed withbecause they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicialsystem that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of

law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed withnotwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summaryaction may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In theexceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, theimmediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. Theproperties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reasonwhy the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accusedbeing accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.

Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the

police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and onlyafter trial and conviction of the accused.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the methodemployed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is undulyoppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in hisdefense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power toadjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrineof separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned thereinwho are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we herebydeclare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

Francisco v. HRET, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Fuentabella,which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner ofdisbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada held an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) againsChief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of theConstitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives SuplicoZamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance withSection 3 (2) of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides the substantial rules in initiating impeachment cases.The House on Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient inform, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint, or on October 23, 2003, a day afterthe House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the SecretaryGeneral of the House by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentabella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.,


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founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the abovementioned House Resolution.Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et al., most of which petitions contend that thefiling of the second impeachment complaint was unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of theConstitution that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a periodof one year.On their comments on the petitions, respondent House of Representatives through Speaker De Venecia and/or its co-respondents, submitted a Manifestation asserting the Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin theHouse of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from theperformance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.The Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Drilon, also filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it isconcerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of thepetitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.

Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by the Court onthe ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and the Court in a constitutional deadlock and praying for thedismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. Several motions fointervention were filed and were granted thereafter.Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issuesand at what time; and whether or not it should be exercised by the Court at this time.Held: The matters will be discussed in seriatim.1. Judicial ReviewThe Supreme Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Sec. 1, Art. VII ofour present 1987 Constitution, the second paragraph of which states:Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.Citing the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Court expounded on the power of judicial review stating that incases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the properallocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof when the

judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert superiority over the other departments; it doesnot in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to itby the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in anactual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to themThis moderating power to determine the proper allocation of powers of the different branches of the government andto direct the course of government along constitutional channels is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence ofthe judicial power itself, which is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government The Constitution has provided for anelaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of thegovernment And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the otherdepartments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void ifviolative of the Constitution. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission)Ensuring the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentalitiesof government, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, in his sponsorship speech, evenstates that such power is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.2. Essential Requisites for Judicial ReviewThe courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act mushave standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, orwill sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliestpossible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

a. StandingLocus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that theparty has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. IntervenoSoriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the ChiefJustice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. On the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts thapetitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance.There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is aconcept of civil procedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.Standing is a special concern of the constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who havebeen personally injured by the operation of law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, voterswho actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake


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in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues uponwhich the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.On the other hand, the question as to real-party-in-interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injuredby the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House oRepresentatives, none of the petitioners asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrarythey invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in aclass suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the allegedunconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been mehave been given standing in this Court.When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct andpersonal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or isin imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not

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