La Política Monetaria Nunca Volverá a Ser Como Antes

8/10/2019 La Poltica Monetaria Nunca Volver a Ser Como Antes

1/11

La poltica monetaria nunca volver a ser como antes

Publicado en December 5, 2013

PorOlivier Blanchard

(Versin enEnglish)

El mes pasado, el FMI organiz una importanteconferencia,en honor a Stanley

Fischer, sobre las enseanzas de la crisis. En este artculo, presentar mi visin

personal de la misma y me centrar en lo que, en mi opinin, son las enseanzas

para la formulacin de la poltica monetaria, pero antes permtanme mencionar

otras dos conclusiones importantes.

En primer lugar, es til tener la situacin macroeconmica en orden cuando se

produce una crisis (externa). En comparacin con otros episodios anteriores, la

aplicacin de una poltica fiscal prudente antes de esta crisis les dio a los pases

demercados emergentesmargen de maniobra para aplicarpolticas fiscales

anticclicasdurante la crisis, y esto hizo una gran diferencia.

En segundo lugar, despus de una crisis financiera, es esencial sanear y

recapitalizar rpidamente los bancos. Esto no ocurri enJapn durante los aos

noventa,y fue un proceso costoso. Pero s ocurri en Estados Unidos, lo que

ayud a la recuperacin.

Quisiera ahora referirme a la poltica monetaria y centrarme en tres cuestiones:

las implicaciones de la trampa de liquidez, el suministro de liquidez y la gestin

de los flujos de capitales.

Con respecto a la trampa de liquidez: hemos constatado, lamentablemente a un

costo muy alto, que el lmite inferior cero puede ser realmente vinculante, y que

puede serlo durante un perodo prolongado: de cinco aos hasta este momento.

Tambin hemos constatado que, aun en ese caso, existe cierto margen de

maniobra de poltica monetaria. La mayor parte de laevidencia empricamuestra

que la poltica no convencional puede afectar sistemticamente a las primas a

plazo y, por consiguiente, inclinar la curva de rendimientos a travs de los

efectos de cartera. Sin embargo, sigue siendo un hecho que, en comparacin

con la poltica convencional, los efectos de la poltica monetaria no

convencional son muy limitados e inciertos.

Por lo tanto, en el futuro es aconsejable por muchos motivos evitar, en primer

lugar, caer en la trampa, y esto plantea nuevamente la cuestin de latasa de

inflacin.Existe un amplio consenso en que actualmente en la mayora de los

pases avanzados sera positivo que la inflacin fuera ms elevada. Cabe

suponer que si antes de la crisis hubiera sido ms elevada, hoy tambin lo sera.

Concretamente, si la inflacin hubiera sido 2 puntos porcentuales ms alta antes

de la crisis, podemos suponer que hoy sera 2 puntos ms elevada, que la tasa

real sera 2 puntos porcentuales ms baja y que hoy estaramos ms cerca en

Estados Unidos de una salida de esta situacin actual de tasas nominales de

nivel cero.
http://blog-dialogoafondo.org/?p=3369http://blog-dialogoafondo.org/?p=3369http://blog-dialogoafondo.org/?page_id=95http://blog-dialogoafondo.org/?page_id=95http://blog-dialogoafondo.org/?page_id=95http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/11/19/monetary-policy-will-never-be-the-same/http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/11/19/monetary-policy-will-never-be-the-same/http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/11/19/monetary-policy-will-never-be-the-same/http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/index.htmhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/index.htmhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/index.htmhttp://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=2820844470001http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=2820844470001http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=2820844470001http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/vegh.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/vegh.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/vegh.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/vegh.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/hoshi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/hoshi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/hoshi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/hoshi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/english.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/hoshi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/hoshi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/vegh.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/vegh.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=2820844470001http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/index.htmhttp://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/11/19/monetary-policy-will-never-be-the-same/http://blog-dialogoafondo.org/?page_id=95http://blog-dialogoafondo.org/?p=3369


2/11

No deberamos descartar la posibilidad, planteada porLarry Summers,de que

probablemente tengamos que mantener tasas reales negativas durante un

perodo prolongado. Los pases podran, en principio, alcanzar tasas reales

negativas a travs de unas tasas nominales bajas y una inflacin moderada. En

cambio, seguimos enfrentndonos al peligro de que se produzca un crculo

vicioso, en el cual una demanda dbil d lugar a una inflacin ms baja, unainflacin ms baja d lugar a tasas reales ms altas, y estas tasas ms elevadas

den lugar a su vez a una demanda an ms dbil.

Con respecto al suministro de liquidez: en los pases avanzados (pero, tambin

en este caso, la enseanza es ms general), hemos aprendido que las corridas

no solo son importantes para los bancos, sino tambin para otras instituciones

financieras, y para los gobiernos. En un entorno de elevados niveles de deuda

pblica, no se pueden excluir los riesgos de refinanciamiento. Esto significa, y

es uno de los temas subrayados porPaul Krugman,que es esencial tener un

prestamista de ltima instancia, que est dispuesto a prestar fondos no solo a

las instituciones financieras sino tambin a los gobiernos. La evidencia sobre

los bonos soberanos de los pases de la periferia de la zona del euro, antes y

despus de que el Banco Central Europeo anunciara el establecimiento de las

transacciones monetarias de compraventa, es bastante convincente a este

respecto.

Por ltimo, en lo que se refiere a los flujos de capitales, en los mercados

emergentes (y, a nivel ms general, en las pequeas economas avanzadas,

aunque estas no estaban incluidas de manera explcita en la conferencia), la

evidencia parece indicar que la mejor forma de hacer frente a los flujos de

capitales voltiles es dejar que el tipo de cambio absorba la mayor parte delajuste, aunque no necesariamente todo.

El argumento tpico a favor de dejar que el tipo de cambio absorba el ajuste fue

planteado por Paul Krugman durante la conferencia. Si los inversionistas

quieren retirar sus fondos, que lo hagan: el tipo de cambio se depreciar, y esto

dar lugar, en cualquier caso, a un aumento de las exportaciones y del producto.

No obstante, tradicionalmente se han planteado tres argumentos en contra de

basarse en el ajuste del tipo de cambio. En primer lugar, en la medida en que los

prestatarios internos se han endeudado en moneda extranjera, la depreciacin

tendr un impacto negativo en los balances, y dar lugar a una disminucin de lademanda interna que probablemente contrarrestar con creces el aumento de

las exportaciones. En segundo lugar, gran parte de la depreciacin nominal

posiblemente se traduzca en una mayor inflacin. El tercer argumento es que

una fuerte variacin del tipo de cambio puede generar perturbaciones, tanto en

la economa real como en los mercados financieros.

Sin embargo, la evidencia muestra que los dos primeros argumentos son mucho

menos importantes hoy que en las crisis anteriores. Gracias a la aplicacin de

medidas macroprudenciales, al desarrollo de los mercados de bonos en moneda

local y a la flexibilidad del tipo de cambio y, por lo tanto, a que los prestatariostienen una mejor percepcin del riesgo cambiario, la exposicin a este riesgo en
http://larrysummers.com/video/http://larrysummers.com/video/http://larrysummers.com/video/http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/krugman1.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/krugman1.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/krugman1.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/krugman1.pdfhttp://larrysummers.com/video/


3/11

los pases de mercados emergentes actualmente es mucho ms limitada que en

crisis anteriores. Y gracias a la mayor credibilidad de la poltica monetaria y las

metas de inflacin, las expectativas de inflacin parecen estar ms firmemente

ancladas, por lo que los efectos de los movimientos del tipo de cambio en la

inflacin son limitados.

Sin embargo, el tercer argumento sigue siendo relevante. Y, por ello, los bancos

centrales de los pases de mercados emergentes an no han adoptado

regmenes de plena flotacin, sino de flotacin dirigida, es decir, utilizan

conjuntamente la tasa de poltica monetaria, la intervencin cambiaria, medidas

macroprudenciales y controles de capital. Esto les ha permitido reducir el

antiguo dilema que se plantea cuando el nico instrumento utilizado es la tasa

de poltica monetaria: un aumento de la tasa de poltica monetaria posiblemente

evite el sobrecalentamiento asociado a la afluencia de capitales, pero al mismo

tiempo, posiblemente haga que esta sea ms atractiva para los inversionistas

externos. La intervencin cambiaria, los controles de capital y los instrumentos

macroprudenciales pueden, al menos en principio, limitar los movimientos de

lostipos de cambio,y las perturbaciones del sistema financiero sin recurrir a la

tasa de poltica monetaria. Los pases han utilizado todos estos instrumentos

durante esta crisis. Algunos se han basado en mayor medida en los controles de

capital, otros en la intervencin cambiaria. Y laevidencia,no solo derivada de la

conferencia, sino tambin de los trabajos realizados en el FMI, parece indicar

que estos instrumentos han funcionado, aunque no haya sido de manera

perfecta. De cara al futuro, debemos hacer frente a un desafo importante (y

enorme): comprender cul es la mejor forma de combinarlos.

En resumen, la poltica monetaria nunca volver a ser como antes de la crisis. Laconferencia nos ha ayudado a comprender cmo ha evolucionado y en qu

aspectos debemos centrar nuestros estudios y esfuerzos de poltica en el futuro.

Smart Governance: Solutions for Todays Global Economy

By Nemat Shafik

Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Oxford, United Kingdom, December 5, 2013

As prepared for delivery

Good afternoon! I am so pleased to be here with you today, where I spent very happy

years earning my DPhil in economics. This is a magical place, full of beauty and clever

people. My only regret is that I left too soon.

Fortunately, my good friends Ngaire Woods and Max Watson have invited me to return

to give the Annual Global Economic Governance Lecture. Let me outline the main

points I plan to make today.

Making the case for smart governance

Global economic crises tend to reignite discussions of global governance and

international cooperation. The recent crisis has been no different. This is because

crises lay bare the shortcomings of existing international rules and institutions.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/Ostry.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/Ostry.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/farhi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/farhi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/farhi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/forbes.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/forbes.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/forbes.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/forbes.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/farhi.pdfhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/Ostry.pdf


4/11

We have seen how weaknesses and failures in banks and capital markets can spread

through the international financial system. The same is true for other challenges faced

by the world today, whether we are talking about climate change, nuclear weapons

proliferation, or health pandemics. What happens anywhere affects everybodyand

increasingly so.

So it is pretty clear that the world needs more, not less, international coordination and

cooperation. But how to achieve this goal? In a recent article, the FTs Martin Wolf

discussed the importance of global public goods and how to provide them. The states

on which humanity depends to provide these goods, from security to management of

climate, are unpopular, overstretched and at odds. We need to think about how to

manage such a world. It is going to take extraordinary creativity.

Martin is right. We need to be creative if we want to make progress. We need smart

governance if we want solutions that work for todays global economy.

I would like to focus today on three related topics. First, I will briefly touch upon thehistorical relationship between crises on the one hand, and governance reforms and

policy coordination on the other hand. Second, I will discuss the response in terms of

governance reforms and policy coordination that we have seen in the aftermath of the

financial crisis of 2008. Finally, I will close my talk by sharing with you some reflections

on how global economic governance might evolve going forwardhow smart

governance may provide the right balance between flexibility and effectiveness that

the world needs to manage globalization.

A world in transition

The global economy is in transition. Global economic power is shifting from west, toeast and south. Emerging and developing economies already make up more than

50 percent of global GDP (on a PPP basis)ten years from now this number is

expected to increase to 64 percent.

At the same time, trade and financial linkages have risen spectacularly. Cross-border

bank claims grew from $6 to over $30 trillion between 1990 and 2008, and global

merchandise exports of goods and services increased from $4 trillion to $20 trillion.

While these numbers contracted somewhat in subsequent years due to the global

crisis, the growth rates for the past 20 or 30 years are still impressive.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2la0MaL00


5/11

On the production side, global supply chains have become the norm rather than the

exception. A typical manufacturing company today relies on inputs from more than 35

different contractors from around the worldfor some companies, such as car and

airplane manufacturers, this number can range in the tens of thousands.

With the sharp increase in interconnectedness and the growing diffusion of economic

power, it would have been reasonable to expect a simultaneous transformation and

expansion of global governance. In theory, demand for global governance should have

increased with rising levels of global integration in order to manage the rules of the

game and reduce negative spillover effects.

But as we all know, global governance issues were on the backburner in the run-up to

the financial crisis. Indeed, against the background of high growth and low output

volatilitywhat has been called the Great Moderationobservers even wondered

whether global governance was a concept of the past, and institutions such as the IMF,World Bank and WTO superfluous.

Only in 2008, when a disruption in a relatively small segment of the U.S. financial

system spilled into distant markets and countries, and morphed into a full-fledged

global financial crisis, it became clear that there had been an undersupply of global

governance in the years leading up to the crisis.

Crises as opportunity

Five years after the onslaught of the global financial crisis, economic governance

remains at the center of the policy debate. I would argue that this is no surprise, giventhat, historically, there has been a symbiotic relationship between crises and the

evolution of governance.

Granted, governance is often seen as evolving slowly and in an incremental manner

and at a stately pace, while crises are intrinsically disruptive and revolutionary.

However, as history has repeatedly shown, crisis often bring out the shortcomings of

existing governance arrangements, while the fear of recurrence can galvanize support

for reform.

For instance, in the wake of World War I, the League of Nations was created to

promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security, whileexperiences of hyperinflation in the 1920s motivated efforts to restore the gold


6/11

standard. Similarly, the Great Depression and World War II triggered much of our

current architecture of global governance, with the creation of the United Nations, IMF,

World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now the World Trade

Organization. The traumatic experience of World War II also provided impetus for

political and economic integration in Europe.

In the United States, the financial crisis of 1907 paved the way for the creation of the

Federal Reserve, while the bitter experience of the Great Depression led to a major

overhaul of financial regulation, with the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933,

which separated commercial and investment banking, and remained in place for more

than sixty years. More recently, the regional currency swap arrangements among

ASEAN members known as Chiang Mai Initiative were created in the aftermath of the

Asian crisis.

As with similar situations in the past, the global financial crisis of 2008 imposed large

costs and hardship on affected countries. However, from a perspective of economic

governance, it has also provided a window of opportunity to advance reforms and

strengthen policy coordination. Did we manage to not let a good crisis go to waste? (a

quote associated with Rahm Emanuel, President Obamas former Chief of Staff, but

like all great quotes was said by Churchill first). Let me provide a brief overview of what

we have achieved in the past five years before looking at the gaps that remain.

A mixed score card

The efforts in governance reform since the crisis can be broadly split into three

categoriescoordinating macroeconomic policies, fixing global financial regulation,and strengthening regional and global safety nets.

First, macroeconomic policy coordination.Although not perfect, such coordination was

particularly strong at the initial stage of the crisis. For instance, six major central banks

announced, in an unprecedented move, a coordinated cut in policy rates in October

2008 to ease global economic conditions. The U.S Federal Reserve and 14 different

monetary authorities established temporary U.S. currency swap arrangements to

mitigate dollar shortages in short-term funding markets. And the first ever G20 Leaders

Summit was convened in November 2008 and led to a commitment to coordinated

fiscal stimulus and a pledge to refrain from protectionism.


7/11

These massive efforts meant that, instead of another Great Depression, we got the

Great Recession, which actually is a significant achievement, given the possible

counterfactuals. However, more recently, the momentum for policy coordination has

slowed, as the focus has shifted from preventing a calamity to avoiding future crises

and supporting the nascent recovery. Some have argued that while the G20 was good

in war, it might not be able to deliver as much in peace time.

And the task is far from over.

One challenge faced by the international community going forward will be to continue

the dialogue on unwinding unconventional monetary policies and managing potential

spillover effects as well as managing our way out of the debt burdens accumulated

during the crisis.

Second, global financial regulation. To address the origins of the crisis, G20 members

committed to a fundamental overhaul of global financial regulation, with the intention of

promoting a more transparent, safe, and resilient global financial system.

Most notably, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was created in 2009 with a mandate

to develop and promote effective financial regulation. Significant progress has been

made in terms of strengthening system-wide oversight, increasing capital and liquidity

buffers, promoting the exchange of financial information, and implementing

macroprudential policy frameworks. Efforts are also underway to facilitate cross-border

resolution.


8/11

Yet major challenges remain, such as ending the too-big-to-fail problem, reforming

shadow banking, and making derivatives markets safer. In the euro area, recent policy

actions have helped ease market stress, but more still needs to be done to reverse

financial fragmentation and move towards a full banking union.

Third, strengthening regional and global safety nets.To mitigate the impact of thecrisis, countries came together to strengthen the global financial safety net, including

by trebling the size of the IMFs resources and increasing the allocation of SDRs. In

Europe, the financial architecture of the euro area was enhanced through the creation

of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the ECBs Outright Monetary

Transactions (OMT) framework. In other parts of the world, commitments to regional

financing arrangements, such as the Chang Mai Initiative and the Eurasian Economic

Community Anti-crisis Fund, were reinforced.

However, progress has been uneven in other areas. For example, in the case of the

IMF, the agreement reached in 2010 on important quota and governance reforms that

would further increase the voice and representation of emerging market anddeveloping economies has not yet been implemented. While two of three required

conditions have been fulfilled, further support is needed to meet the final condition that

will allow the reform to take effect.

If we put all this together, the report card on global governance reform since the crisis

is somewhat mixed. Policymakers across the globe need to keep the momentum alive

and seize the opportunity to advance governance reform while memories of the crisis

and the sense of urgency remain fresh. Indeed, there is a real danger that the window

of opportunity for addressing some of the most challenging global issues might soon be

closing. How can this trend be reversed and important reforms finalized? To answerthis question, it is helpful to look at the different types of solutions that have evolved as

means to deliver global public goods.

Soft versus hard policy coordination

In what direction is the global system of economic governance and policy coordination

evolving? To answer this question, I find it instructive to differentiate between hard

and soft governance and policycoordination.

Hard policy coordination is typified by quid pro quos in policies with a focus on

specific and tangible outcomes. Examples include the two initial G20 Leaders Summits


9/11

that took place in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and resulted in the coordinated

fiscal policy response I mentioned earlier and the creation of the FSB.

In contrast, softer forms of coordination are more process-based without a priori

expectation of substantial outcomes or agreements. They are designed to facilitate the

exchange of views and information sharing on an ongoing basis, such as the regulardiscussions among central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

Soft and hard policy coordination can complement each other. For instance, soft

arrangements can keep the policy dialogue alive during quiet times, and provide a

framework for harder cooperation, and even full-fledged policy coordination, during

crises.

Soft versus hard governance

A parallel argument can be made for governance. Hard governance arrangements

require the establishment of legal obligations and independent institutions throughtreaties. The UN, IMF, World Bank and the WTO typify such arrangements.

On the positive side, this kind of hard, treaty-based architecture strengthens the

credibility of member countries commitments and grants legal enforcement powers to

institutions. However, their establishment and adaptation to changing circumstances

tends to be a relatively slow-moving process, which can be a problem when the global

environment or the needs of members change.

Soft governance arrangements, such as the G20 and BRIC country groupings, the

FSB, or the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have no international legal personality

or obligations. As a result, they tend to be more flexible and can often be put in placemore quickly. They do not, however, have treaty-based mandates or legal enforcement

powers. As a result, they have a more limited ability to enforce commitments, which

can pose challenges for their relevance and effectiveness over time.

Finally, there are, of course, also private sector solutions to governance challenges.

One example are Collective Action Clauses (CACs) which allow a supermajority of

bondholders to agree to changes in bond payments terms, with the intention of

facilitating smoother debt restructuring. Another example is IFRS, an independent

nonprofit foundation that promotes the harmonization of global accounting standards.

A mosaic of solutions

In sum, the global economic governance structure of the future may well be a mosaic

or ecosystemof hard and soft elements that operate in a complementary fashion.

In such a system, governance arrangements would essentially be issues- and context-

driven, with choices between hard and soft governance arrangements depending on

what is the most efficient and practical solution to regulate and oversee a specific

matter at hand. Making such a system smart depends crucially on using hard or soft

governance at the right time and for the right issues.

Lets consider three examples of how hard and soft governance have been combined:


10/11

First, take trade. We all prefer multilateral trade agreements over regional ones.

Since the gains from trade are well recognized, the WTO dispute resolution

process has real teeth with an ability to impose sanctions on those who violate

global trade rules. Increasingly mega-regional agreements (like US-EU or TPP)

are less about tariffs but about standards and non-tariff barriers. To the extent

that they help set global norms that facilitate trade, they bring us closer to moreglobal solutions and potentially reinforce (and in the future possibly become

integrated with) the WTO framework.

Second, consider the balance between hard and soft governance in the

euro area crisis. Arguably the hard governance came from the IMF and the

ECB and soft governance from the Eurogroup. Europes complex governance

arrangements worked well in peace time, but decision making processes were

not well suited to managing crisis.

Finally consider the areas of financial regulation. As part of its mandatory

Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), the IMF conducts f inancialstability assessments every 5 years of jurisdictions that have systemically

important financial sectors. Mandatory FSAPs are a good example of hard

surveillance where countries are assessed against compliance with clear global

standards and stress tested against national and international spillovers. Every

two years after an FSAP, the FSB does a peer review (a sort of soft

governance) of follow up on FSAP recommendations as a complementary way

to advance key reforms for financial stability.

However, a flexible and efficient global governance structure may not emerge

automatically. For example, when hard global institutions, such as the IMF, the WorldBank, and the WTO adapt too slowly to changes in their environment, governance

gaps will open up. Softer institutions may step in to fill these gaps, but as substitutes

rather than playing a complementary role. This would not be efficient and could leave

us with a weaker global governance system.

The case for IMF governance reform

This brings me to a final point. In the evolving ecosystem of global governance and

policy coordination that I described, it is essential for the elements of hard

governance to stay relevant by adapting to changes in the world economy.

Over the years, the IMF has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adjust its work and

operations in response to major changes in the global economy, including the fall of the

fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, and the

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The key reason why the IMF has remained relevant has been a political governance

structure that, albeit slowly, does adapt to changes in the world economy. It also has

an independent staff, and a constitution (in the form of our Articles of Agreement) that

allows the Fund to adopt a longer-term perspective. Moreover, the IMF has, in some

aspects, also managed to internally integrate hard elements of governance such as

mandatory surveillance, with softer elements, such as voluntary Reports on theObservance of Standards and Codes or facilitation of standards for sovereign wealth


11/11

funds. On the softer side, the Funds consensus-based decision-making has been

effective at ensuring that member countries points of view are being heard.

Going forward, it will be crucial for the IMFs effectiveness and legitimacy to ensure that

its governance structure reflects the relative position of its member countries in the

global economy. Approval of the 2010 reforms would be an important step in thisdirection, although further shifts in quota and voting shares to dynamic economies will

also be needed.

To achieve this, some countries will have to accept relative declines in their quota and

voting shares. Understandably, for them this will not be an easy decision, but in return

they will help ensure that the Fund can continue to remain strong and legitimate for the

benefit of the entire membershipand the global economy.

Conclusion

While significant efforts to improve global economic governance were made in theinitial phase of the crisis, the momentum of reform and policy coordination has slowed

recently.

Indeed, while the current system is able to deliver governance and policy coordination

when there is a lot to losesuch as in a crisis, it is much less effective in galvanizing

action when there is potential for mutual gainsuch as global economic rebalancing.

One possible explanation is that the global community tends to rally in a time of crisis

when the time horizon is short and immediate costs are high. However, in normal

times, gathering momentum for action today may be hard because the cost of inaction

lies far in the future.

Some observers point toward plurilateralism and the rise of soft global governance as a

threat to the traditional pillars of hard global governance, including the IMF. I am much

less pessimistic. I see these two forms of governance as potential complements rather

than imperfect substitutes. Soft governance works when innovation is needed but there

is time to act, when getting a subset of countries to act is sufficient and ad hoc

implementation can work. Hard governance is needed in a crisis or when global

approaches are needed and when consistent enforcement is key.

So, coming back full circle to Martin Wolfs call for extraordinary creativity in seeking

solutions to the multitude of challenges faced by the world today, I believe we cantackle the issues by being smart about the governance we need, and by making the

most of political opportunity when it presents itself. By integrating soft and hard

governance more intelligently, better outcomes can be achieved for everyone, small

and large countries alike.i

iI am grateful to Andreas Bauer, Sanjaya Panth, Niklas Westelius, Camilla Andersen

and Dustin Smith for their help in preparing this speech and to Olivier Blanchard, Sean

Hagan, and Jose Vials for their thoughtful comments.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm#P123_20629http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm#P123_20629http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm#P123_20629http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm#P123_20630http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm#P123_20630http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm#P123_20630http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm#P123_20629

La Política Monetaria Nunca Volverá a Ser Como Antes

Documents

Transcript of La Política Monetaria Nunca Volverá a Ser Como Antes