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Political Obligation and the Argument from GratitudeAuthor(s): A. D. M. WalkerSource: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 191-211Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265244 .
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A.D.M.
WALKER
Political
Obligation
and
the Argument
fromGratitude
Political
obligation
s now
an unfashionable
topic,
remarkedJ.
P.
Pla-
menatz
in I968;
and
whathe wrote
thenis still
true.
Nodoubt
the
decline
in interest
in the
topic
s due
in largepart
tothe
increased
popularity
f
the
view
thatwe
do
not in
fact haveany general
obligation
o
comply
with
the
law.Buteven those who areunsympathetic o thisview no longersee the
problem
of
political
obligation
as central
to
political
philosophy
n the
man-
ner of
Hobbes
or Locke. One
reason
is
that the problem
n its
traditional
form
has
been
felt tofocus
in an unnatural
way
on
just
one
aspect
of
a cit-
izen's
relationship
with the state;
it distorts
mattersby inviting
us
to
con-
sider
the issue
of ourcompliance
with the
law in
isolation
fromour
other
political
responsibilities.2
Perhaps
more
significantly,
t has been
argued
thatthe
traditional
roblem
sets
an
impossible
task:
the demand
foran
en-
tirely
general
justification
of the obligation
citizens
have
to comply
with
the law simplycannot be met. The search fora single line of argument
that will
generate,
for
all or at least most
citizens
of most states,
a general
obligation
to comply
with
the
law
is doomed
to failure,
and the problem
of
political
obligation
can
only
be solvedpiecemeal.3
My
concern
in
this
article s
not
with the
reasons
for
the relative ack
of
interest
in
the
question
of
political
obligation,
but with
the question
itself.
I would ike
to thank
Angela
Walker,
T.
S.
Champlin,
and
the Editors
of
Philosophy
&
Pub-
lic
Affairs
for theirhelpful comments
on
earlier
draftsof
this article.
i.
J.
P. Plamenatz,Consent,
Freedom nd PoliticalObligation,
d ed.
(Oxford:
OxfordUni-
versity Press, i968), p. I63.
2. See, e.g., Political Philosophy,
d.
Anthony
Quinton Oxford:
Oxford
UniversityPress,
I967), p. 13.
3. See, e.g., MargaretMacDonald,
The
Language
of Political
Theory,
n
Logic
and
Lan-
guage,
ser.
I,
ed. A.G.N. Flew
(Oxford:Blackwell,
963);
and A.
J.
Simmons,
Moral
Princi-
ples and
PoliticalObligations Princeton:
Princeton
UniversityPress,
1979),
esp. chap.
VIII.
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Philosophy
&
Public Affairs
I want to
addressthis
unfashionable
question,
and answer t in
an unfash-
ionable
way.Political
obligation,
shall
argue,can
be seen as
an obligation
of gratitude:
our obligation
o comply
with
the law is grounded
n consid-
erations
of
gratitude
or
benefits
receivedfrom
the state. This,
I
realize,
is
a claimfew
willbe disposed
to regard
with favor.
The argument
fromgrat-
itude
has neverenjoyed
philosophical
popularity.
First sketched
in
Plato's
Crito,
it does
not
figure
in the writings
of the classical political
philoso-
phers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It appearsto be en-
dorsedby
Mill
in On Liberty,and
in the present
century
has attracted
a
handful
of adherents,
of whom
the bestknown
is probably
Sir
DavidRoss.
But
within the last
decade
it
has
received
detailed critical
scrutiny
on
a
numberof occasions,
and each
time been
pronounced
adically
defective.4
The argument's
widespread
ack of
appeal,
however,probably
wes
less to
a
sober
examination
of
its
supposed
defects
than to a deeperrevulsion
at
the veryidea
of basing political
obligation
on considerations
of gratitude.
Some
perhaps
think
that if
political
obligation
s
a matter of
gratitude
we
are boundto accede tothe demandsof the statein an uncriticaland child-
like way,
and
are led
by
this
thought
to
have no
truck with an
argument
which seems
to
legitimize
so
deplorably
upine
an
attitude
to
authority.
Othersmay
feel
that,
like
the
argument
rom
prescription,
t
requires
spe-
cial
prior
assumptions
of
a
religious
or
metaphysical
kind and
commits its
advocates
to
a
mystical
or
Hegelian
reverence
for the state.5
There is
no
denying
the
melancholy
history
of the
argument
from
grat-
itude.
But
nonetheless
I
wish
to
argue
that the
argument
does
represent
a
defensible response
to the
problem
of
political
obligation.My
basic
point
will be that discussion of the argumenthas been vitiatedby misunder-
standing,
prejudice,
and
an
imperfect
grasp
of the
nature of
gratitude.
As
a
result, only
the less
plausible
versions
of the
argument
have been
con-
sidered,
and while the
objections
advanced
against
them
are often
well
4.
See Plato,
Crito
48b-52d;
J.
S.
Mill,
On Liberty London:
Collins,1979),
chap. IV,
p.
205; W.
D. Ross, The Right
and the Good Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press, 1930),
p.
27;
Plamenatz,
Consent,
Freedom
nd Political Obligation,
p.
24;
A.
C.
Ewing,
The Individual,
the State
and
WorldGovernment
London:
Macmillan,
947), p.
218. Recent
discussions
of
the argument
are
to be foundin
A. D. Woozley,
Law and
Obedience
London:
Duckworth,
1979), chap.
4;
Simmons,
Moral Principles
and Political Obligations,
chap. VII;
M.B.E.
Smith, IsTherea PrimaFacieObligationo Obeythe Law? YaleLawJournal
82
(i973),
esp. pp.953-54.
5. Cf.
Nannerl
0.
Henry
on the
argument
rom prescription
n
Political
Obligation
and
Collective
Goods,
n Political
andLegalObligation,
Nomos
XII,
ed. J. R. Pennock
andJ.
W.
Chapman
New
York:New YorkUniversity
Press,
1970),
p.
265.
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Political
Obligation
and the
Argument
from Gratitude
founded, they neglect
the
possibility
of
restating
the
argument
in
a more
powerful
orm
that would
evade
their
force.
I
At
least
two
versions
of the
argument
rom
gratitude
are
to be found
in the
literature. The first has its prototype n
Plato's Crito
and
appeals
to an
analogybetweena citizen's
relationship
o the
state
and a
child's
to
its par-
ents.6
It
compares
the benefits
citizens
receive from
the state
with the
benefits children
receive
from
their
parents
n the course of their
upbring-
ing, and argues
that
as
a
child
owes obedience
to
its parents,
the
citizen
has
an
analogous obligation
of
gratitude
o
comply
with
the law.
This ver-
sion
of the
argument
need not detain
us.
Quite apart
rom
the
many points
ofdissimilaritybetweenpoliticaland familial
relationships,
which
weaken
the analogy,a crucial flaw in the
argument s its assumption
that a
child's
obligation
o
obey its parents
s
an
obligationof gratitude.
Even
if
we
con-
cede
that children have
obligations
of
gratitude
o
their
parents
and also
have an obligation o obey them, it is unclear that the
latter s
a
particular
instance of
the former.
And
if a
child's
obligation
o
obey
its
parents s
not
an obligation
of
gratitude,
he
appeal
to the
relationship
between
parents
and
childrendoes
nothing
to
show
that
among any obligations
of
gratitude
a
citizen may
have to the
state,
there
will
be, specifically,
an
obligation
o
obey the
law.
The second version
of the
argument
needs
to be considered at
greater
length.
It
dispenses
with the
analogy
between
political
and familial
rela-
tionshipsand seeks to derivea citizen'sobligation o complywith the law
from
a
general principle
of
gratitude.
The brief remarks n
Ross and Pla-
menatz suggest
that
they
would
have
developed
he
argumentalong these
lines,
and it
is
in
this
form
that
the
argument
has
received careful
scrutiny
in A.
J. Simmons's
recent discussion.7As discussed
by Simmons,
the ar-
gument appears
to
rest
on
the
idea
that
the
receipt
of
a
benefit
puts
one
under
an
obligation
o
requite
one's
benefactor,
o confer on him a
benefit
in return for
the benefit one has received
from him. It
is this
principle
of
requital
or
reciprocation
hat the
argument
applies
to the
relationship
be-
6.
This version
of the
argument
s
discussed
n
Woozley,
Law and Obedience, sp. pp.
64-
70,
and
Simmons,MoralPrinciples
and PoliticalObligations,pp.
I60-62.
7. See Ross,
The Right and the Good,p.
27; Plamenatz,Consent,
Freedomand
Political
Obligation,
p.
24;
Simmons,MoralPrinciples
and PoliticalObligations,
hap. VII.
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Philosophy&Public
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tween citizen and state to establish
the fact of politicalobligation.In out-
line the argumentruns as follows:
(i) The
person
who
receives benefits from
X
has
an
obligation o re-
quite or make a suitable returnto X.
(Let us call this the principleof
requital. )
(2) Everycitizen has received
benefits
from the state.
(3) Every citizen has
an
obligation
to
make
a
suitable
return to
the
state.
(4) Compliance
with the law is a
suitable
return.
(5) Every
citizen
has
an
obligation
to
comply
with the laws of
his
state.
Simmons rightly challenges this version of the argument. First, its
foundation s insecure.
As
it
stands, step i,
which states the
principle
of
requital, s false.
The
mere receipt
of
benefits does
not
put one under an
obligation of requital or reciprocation; he person who receives benefits
from anotherdoes not always havean obligation o requitehis benefactor,
but only in certaincircumstances.
So if
we are
to
defend the argument,we
need to modify step
i
by restrictingthe application
of
the principleof re-
quital
tQ
hose circumstances
in
which beneficiaries genuinely have
an
obligation
o
requite
their
benefactors.
Simmonshimself clarifies ive con-
ditions
which he claims must
be
satisfiedbefore
the
recipient
of a
benefit
has
an
obligation
of
requital-the
chief
of
these
being
(i)
that
the benefit
must be grantedby
means
of
some
special
effort
or sacrifice and
(2)
that
thebenefit must
not
be grantedunintentionally,
nvoluntarily,
r for
dis-
qualifyingreasons such as reasonsofself-interestormalice).But all this
merely shifts
the
difficulty
to
a
different
point
in
the
argument.
For
whether ornot we accept everydetail
of
Simmons's mplicitreformulation
of the
principle
of
requital,
t
looks as
if
the
benefits
citizens receive
from
the state will
not meet all the conditions aid down
by
this new
version of
the principleas necessary
for the existence
of
an
obligation
of
requital. In
other
words,
the
problem
will now be
step
2:
if we
modify step
2
in
line
with
the necessary
modifications
to
step i,
what
step
2
asserts will
be
false.8
Simmons'ssecondobjection ocuseson step4. Evenif, as step3 asserts,
citizens
have an
obligation
of
gratitude
to make
a
suitable return
to
the
state,
it
still
has to be shown
that
compliance
with
the
law
constitutes
a
8. See Simmons,
Moral
Principles
and
Political
Obligations,pp. I69-79,
I87-90. The
quotations ummarizing
Simmons's
irst and second
conditions
are
takenfrom
p.
178.
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Political Obligation
and theArgument
from Gratitude
suitable return.
That it
does is
not
self-evident.And even if this could be
shown,
it
would
not be
enough.
For
what seems needed at step 4 to com-
plete the argument is the premise that compliance with the law is not
merely a suitable,
but the
uniquely suitable, return.Withoutthis stronger
premise it may be argued that there is some other, equally suitable return
and that the citizen who has made that return, having dischargedhis ob-
ligation
of
gratitudeto the state, has
no
further obligationof gratitudeto
comply with the law.9
Finally,
to
add
a comment of
my own, this version
of the
argument s
in
fact even
more
seriously defective
than
Simmons supposes. The funda-
mental problem
s
that it
does
not
take sufficient account
of
the
existence
of differentkinds
of
obligations
of
gratitude,
and in
consequence
states the
basic principle
to which
it
appeals
n a
vague
and
confused
way.
The truth
is
that
the principle
of
requital,
however
qualified,
does
not
focus
unam-
biguously on any genuine obligation
of
gratitude.
In
this
connection it
is
worth remembering
that
Simmons
typicallyregards obligations
of
grati-
tude as a matter of compensationorrepayment.He occasionallyrefersto
obligations
hat it would be
strained
o
characterize
n
these
terms,
but
ap-
parently
without
recognizing
the
significance
of the fact.
And he aban-
dons his
discussion
of
the content
of
obligations
of
gratitude
without
reaching any
definite conclusions.
o
He
has,
I
suspect,
little
interest
in
the
matter because
he
thinks
that
whateverkinds
of
obligationmay
be distin-
guished,
none will
provide
a
secure foundation
for the
argument
from
gratitude.
I
shall
argue
that the
gratefulresponse comprises
a
number of
different
obligations
and
that
while we
cannot
base
politicalobligation
on
a beneficiary'sobligationto requiteor compensatehis benefactor,argu-
ments
based
on
other
obligations
of
gratitude
have
a
better
prospect
of
success.
Before
developing
hese
thoughts, though,
Imust dealwith a dif-
ficulty
which seems
to threaten
any
version
of the
argument
from
grati-
tude.
II
Since the state
is
the
source
of
the benefits
to which the argument from
gratitudeappeals,and the resultantobligationof gratitudes an obligation
owed
to the
state, proponents
of the
argument
must assume
it
makes
9. See ibid., pp. I85-87;
and cf.
Smith,
Is There
a
Prima Facie
Obligation
to
Obey
the
Law? pp. 953-54.
io. See Simmons, MoralPrinciples
and Political
Obligations,
p. I64-69.
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Philosophy
& Public
Affairs
sense to be gratefulnot onlyto individualpersons, but also to institutions.
This assumption is,
I
am sure, the source of much hostility to the argu-
ment,
it
being widely
held
that
gratitude
o
institutions or even groups of
persons is impossibleII-unless perhaps an exotic metaphysics allows us
to conceive of socialentities as superpersons.This difficultyrequires m-
mediate
attention
f
my strategy
s to stand
any
chance of
success.
Like many contemporary
hilosophers,12
I
take the state
to
be
a
kind of
association.I see it as a collectionofindividualsorganized orthe achieve-
ment of certain aims
within a
legal
and
political ramework,
and
I
under-
stand
claims about
the
state as claims
about
ndividualsor
groups
of indi-
viduals nsofar
as
they play
a
part
within
this framework.Thus in
speaking
of
politicalobligation
as
an
obligation
of
gratitude
owed to the
state,
I
mean
that the
obligation
s
owed to
one's
fellow
citizens
collectively.Two aspects
of
this
position
deserve
emphasis. First,
the
state is not
to be
identified
with the
government. Acceptance
of
the
argument
from
gratitude does
not commit us to
viewing politicalobligation,
n
the
manner
of Socrates,
as essentiallya relationshipbetween rulers nd their subjects. The ob-
ligation
is owed
by
citizens to
their fellow
citizens
collectively
rather than
to the
government. Second,
the
conception
of the
state as an
association
of
individuals,
whatever its
problems,manifestly
does
not
depend
on ex-
otic
metaphysicalassumptions.
If
the
argument
rom
gratitude
has a
mys-
tical
flavor,
ts
source
is
not
here.
Now, some may
think that I
have
already
said
enough
to
dispose
of
the
objection
that
gratitude
to
institutions
is
an
impossibility.
For if
the state
is
no more than
an
associationof
individuals,
and
the
obligation
o
comply
with the lawis owed to ourfellow citizenscollectively, s not the objection
irrelevant
to
the
argument
from
gratitude?
Our
fellow
citizens
are
surely
not
an
institution.
I
have
considerable
ympathy
with
this
line
of
thought,
but nonetheless
it
seems unwise
to
dismiss the
objectionquite
so
quickly.
After
all, might
it not
be
counterargued
with
some
plausibility
hat if
our
fellow
citizens viewed
collectively
are the
state,
it
follows,
since the
state
is
an institution,
that our
obligation
o
comply
with
the law is owed to an
institution?
And
in
any case,
as
I
mentioned
earlier,
even
the
possibility
that
gratitudemay
be owed to a
group
of
individuals
collectively
s
some-
times held to be problematic.It will be better,I think, to proceedmore
i
i.
See
ibid., pp.
I
87-89.
i2.
See, e.g.,
the
account
in D. D.
Raphael,
Problems
of
Political
Philosophy London:
Macmillan,
1976),
pp.
39-53.
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Political Obligation
and the Argument
from Gratitude
slowly
and
consider
n
its
own
right
the claim that
gratitude
o institutions
is impossible.
I shall offer two arguments against this claim: first,
that ordinary
thought recognizes the possibility
of gratitude o institutions, so gratitude
of this
kind
is
at
least
not as strange
or
exceptionalas some philosophers
would have us believe;
and
second,
that the
reasons
commonly given for
believing that institutions
cannot be a
legitimate focus
of
gratitude are
easilycountered.I shouldalso addthatmy own accountof gratitude,pre-
sented
in the next
section,
has no
difficulty
n
accommodatinggratitude
toinstitutions.
But
naturally
at
this stage
I
cannot
develop
this point.
Let me
begin my
first
ine of
argument
with
some examples:
the patient
who donates
a sum
of
money
to the
hospital
n
which
she received treat-
ment, perhaps many yearsbefore,
and the former
pupil
or former
student
who
gives something
as
a
gift
to his old school
or
university.
These
indi-
vidualswill say
that
they
have been
helped
or benefited
by
the
institution,
and
that the donation
or
gift
is
given
out of
gratitude
or to
express
their
gratitude.Nor,I shouldadd,do they merely eel gratefulto the institution
without thinking
that
they
have
any obligations
o it.
Sometimes this
may
be so. But if, say,
the
institution were
in financial
difficulty
or
threatened
with
closure, they might
well see themselves as
under
an
obligation
to
contribute
o an
appeal:
hey
would
insist,
and
rightly,
that
they
owed it
to
the institution
to do
what
they
could to ensure its
survival.
All
this
is fa-
miliar
enough. Cynics may
attribute
t
to
a
mixture
of
sentimentality
on
the part of the donors
and self-interest
on the
part
of the
recipient
institu-
tions. But why
should the cynics always
be
right?
And even
if
they were,
it would stillbe asignificantfact thatsomeonewho wasnotactually grate-
ful to an
institution
could
at least
represent
himself
or
herself
as being
grateful
to
it.
Certainlyby
themselves
these
examples
do not take us
very
far.
They
merely
invite
the
stock
response
that the
persons
in
question
are
really
grateful
not to
an
institution
but to
particular
ndividuals
within
it, and
that
to
describe
them
as
grateful
to the
institution
s
to
speakloosely
and
improperly.'3
But this
response,
I
believe,
s
inadequate.
Even if
the
grate-
ful
patient
and
gratefulpupil
are
grateful
o
specific persons
within the
rel-
evant institutions, it does not followfrom this that they are grateful to
these persons
and
not to
the institutions.
And
it
is,
after
all,
to
the
insti-
13. See Simmons,MoralPrinciples
and Political
Obligations,
p.
I
88.
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Philosophy
& Public Affairs
tutions,
and
not to particular
persons
within
them,
that the
giftsare
given.
Further,
the suggestion
that
if we
are to
speakaccurately
we
must
always
describe
individuals
as
grateful
to persons,
never
to
institutions,
rides
roughshod
over
a vital
distinction.
Mustwe
not distinguish
between
the
person
who
loathes
his
old
school
and all
it
stands
for
but feels
gratitude
towards
a particular
master
who befriended
him,
and the
very different
person
who,
while having
no recollections
of
special
kindness
from
any
particularmaster,thinksthathis schooldayswerethe happiestdaysofhis
life?
Against
the background
of these
and
similar
possibilities
he
descrip-
tion of someone
as grateful
to an institution
seems
sometimes
precisely
the
rightdescription
of
him.
But,
our
objector
may persist,
even when
the former
pupil
cannotfix
on
any
particular
master
or masters
to whom
he is
grateful
(so
that we
are
inclined
to
say
that he is
grateful
o the
school),
he must still
be primarily
or basically
grateful
oindividualpersons.
His
gratitude
o the
school
rests
on-that
is,
has arisen by
association,
ransference,
or
some
other process
out of-gratitude to certainindividuals(whom perhapshe can no longer
identify).
Gratitude
o institutions
must always
be derivative
n
this
way
fromgratitude
o individuals.
This
claim
too,
however,
neednot disturbus.
For one thing,
it
implicitly
acknowledges
the
genuineness
of
gratitude
to
institutions.
In
insisting
that
gratitude
o
institutions
s derivative,
t con-
cedes
that
gratitude
o
institutions
is
a
genuine
possibility.
So
even if the
claim
were
true,
it would
pose
no threat
to the
argument
from
gratitude.
But
the claim
is
not
obviously
rue. While
gratitude
o an institutionmay
sometimes
be
derivative
rom
gratitude
o
persons
within the institution-
as when the patient who appreciatesthe dedication of the staff who
nursed
her
in the
intensive
care
unit is
grateful
to the
hospital
when
she
is,
basically,
grateful
to
these
particular
members
of its staff-the
reverse
process
also appears
to be
a
possibility.
What of the
person
who
has
been
in
hospital
many
times, perhaps
without ever
encountering
conspicuous
concern
or kindness
from the
hospital
staff,
but
who one
day
happens
to
reflect
on
the extent
to which she
has
benefited
fromher treatment over
the
years?
Couldshe
not feel
grateful
o the
hospital
or the
totality
of
these
benefits,
and
grateful
derivatively
to
particular
doctors and
nurses
as
membersof this beneficentinstitution?What does seem to be trueis that
if one is
grateful
to
an
institution,
one's
gratitude
presupposes
activity
by
some
person
or
persons
associated
with
the
institution.(This
would
be
a
simple
consequence
of the truth
that
an
institution
cannot
benefit
or
help
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Political
Obligation
and the
Argument
from
Gratitude
us except through the activities
of
its members.) It would be easy to con-
fuse this point with the ratherdifferentone that gratitude o an institution
presupposesgratitude to
a
person or persons associated with the institu-
tion, and to take the
truth of
the former or the truth of the latter.Needless
to say, the fact
that
gratitude
o an
institutionpresupposesactivityon the
part
of
its
members raises
no
difficulty
or
the argumentfrom gratitude.
Ordinary hought, then, recognizes
the
possibility
of
gratitudeto insti-
tutions, and philosophically nspired attempts to disposeof orreinterpret
familiar
examples
of
this
possibility
do
not
succeed. Further-to
turn
now,
more
briefly,
to
my
second line of
argument-the objections commonly
advanced against
the
possibility
of
gratitude
o
institutions are easily met.
Take the objectionthat we cannot be gratefulto an institution because
gratitude s appropriate nlywhen benefits are conferred rom
a
particular
motive,
and
institutions
cannot have motives.'4
Well, certainly
an
institu-
tion cannot have
motives;
but
institutions
do
have
something analogous
to motives. We
can
speak
of
the purpose
or
function
of an
institution,
of
the policieswhich guideits operations,and of the reasonswhyit produces
whatever benefits
it
produces.
We can
distinguish
between
the
intended
and the
unintended benefits
that
result
from
the
operations
of an
institu-
tion, and
draw
distinctions,
similar
o
those we
draw n
the case
of
benefits
conferred by individuals,
between someone's
benefiting
from an
institu-
tion which exists
to
benefit him, his benefiting incidentally
from
the op-
erations
of an
institution,
his
receiving
benefits
which
are intended ulti-
mately
to furtherthe interests
of
the
institution,
and
so
on.
Gratitude o institutions is
a
fascinating topic
in
its
own
right,
and de-
serves more attentionthan I can giveit here. I donot pretendto have ex-
hausted the topic,
but
I
do
think
that
I
have established
a
prima
acie
case
for the
possibility
of
gratitude
to
institutions
that
permits
us
to
proceed
with our
exploration
of the
argument
rom
gratitude.
III
Since previous
discussions
of the
argument
from
gratitude
have
been
flawed
by
an
imperfect grasp
of
the nature
of
gratitude,
shall
preface my
own attemptto find a satisfactory ersionof the argumentwith some gen-
eral remarks
about the
notion.
I
shall
not offer
much
by way
of
defending
14.
See
ibid., pp.
189-go.
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Philosophy
&
Public
Affairs
this account of
gratitude:I hope its constituent elements will seem per-
suasive
without
argument.'5
The core of the gratefulresponse is a set of
attitudes.'6 We cannot un-
derstand
what
gratitude
requires
n
the
sphere
of action without
firstun-
derstanding
he attitudes
grateful
ndividualsare
presumed
to have.
Grat-
itude,
as
the
appropriate esponse
to
benefits received
through
the
agency
of
a
benefactor,
nvolves attitudes
both
towards
the
benefit and
towards
the benefactor:we mustproperly ppreciate he benefit and havegoodwill
and respect forour
benefactor.
The
notions of appreciation,goodwill,and
respect
are
themselvesvague
and
could
do
with further
scrutiny-I shall
say
more
below about
goodwill-but
our
first
priority
must
be
to
consider
how
these
attitudes are related
to
the
requirements
of
gratitude
in
the
sphere
of action. The fundamental
point
here is
that
the attitudes which
form the basis
of
the
gratefulresponse generateconstraints
on action
in
two
different
ways.
The
grateful person must,
on
the
one
hand, demon-
strate
or make clear to his benefactor hat he has the
appropriate
ttitudes
and, on the other, not act in ways incompatiblewith his possession of
these attitudes.
It
is
vital
to
keep
these different
types
of
obligation dis-
tinct.
What
gratitude
requires
on
the
first
count
is
essentially
declarative.
In discharging
an
obligation
of this
type the gratefulperson seeks
to
com-
municate
to
his benefactor
that
he
has
certain
attitudes:he acts not
just
because
he
is grateful
but
to
show his
benefactor hat
he is.
Hence what
he does may
have
a
largely symbolicsignificance,
and his
purpose s typi-
cally
achieved
once
and
for all
by
a
single expression
of
thanks
or
token or
gesture
of
appreciation.By contrast,
what
gratitude
requires
on
the
sec-
ond countis notessentiallydeclarative.When,forexample,a gratefulper-
son hears
that
his
benefactorhas fallen on hard
times and
is moved
by
goodwill
to
come
to
his
aid,
he acts
not
because
he
wishes
to
show
that
he
has goodwill,
but
because
he has
goodwill-he
may
even act in
secret
and
conceal
his
identity
from
his benefactor.The benefit he
confers s
substan-
tial rather than
symbolic,
and
is
not
naturallydescribedas
a
token or
ges-
ture of
gratitude.Further,
the
requirements
of
gratitude
on
this
second
count cannot be met once
and
for all. For
example,
what
the
gratefulper-
son is
committed
to
by
the
goodwill
he has
for
his benefactor
depends
I
5. The best
account
of
gratitudewith
which I amfamiliar
s
Aquinas,Summa
Theologiae
IIaIIae,
qq.
I06-7. I have
discussed some of
thepointsI make n
this section n
Gratefulness
and
Gratitude, roceedings
f
the
Aristotelian
Society
8i
(i980-8i).
I6. This point
s
well
argued
n
Fred Berger,
Gratitude, thics
85
(I974-75).
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Political
Obligation
and the Argument
from Gratitude
upon the circumstances: having helped his benefactor
on
one occasion,
he is not then free
of
obligation, because circumstances may arise in
which goodwillrequires
him to
give help again.
All this is only
a
sketch,
but it will
suffice. The
main
point
I
wish to draw
from it seems uncontentious: there
are
different kinds of obligations of
gratitude.
We have
distinguished obligations
o
demonstrate
our
gratitude
from
obligations
not to act in
ways incompatible
with the
attitudeswhich
makeup the core of the gratefulresponse.But we can alsodistinguishob-
ligationsof gratitude
n
terms
of
the differentattitudesunderlying them:
some arise
out
of
goodwill,
others
out of
respect,
and so on. A
proper
awareness
of this
variety
s essential
if
we are to
develop
a
satisfactoryver-
sion
of
the
argument
from
gratitude.
It is
equally clear,
I
think,
that
gratitude
s
not a
species
of
fairness.
Quite apart
rom
the point
that a
grasp
of
the appropriate ttitudes s fun-
damental
for an
understanding
of
gratitude
n a
way
that it
is not for fair-
ness,
it
is plain
that the content
of
obligations
of
gratitude s
often
such
that they cannot plausiblybe thoughtof as obligationsof fairness. What
gratituderequires
cannot
always
be seen
as, say,
a
matter
of
reciprocity
or
of
conformity
to
a
practice
in which
both
beneficiary
and benefactor
are
participants.Further,
even when the
content
of an
obligation
of
gratitude
might
allow us
to
view
it
as
an
obligation
of
fairness,
the
grateful person
cannot
be motivated
to
fulfill the
obligationby
considerations
of
fairness.
If he acts
well
towards
his benefactor
only
because he
thinks
that
fairness
requires this,
or because he wishes
to
reward
or
compensate
his
benefac-
tor,
we shall be
inclined to
say
that
despite
first
appearances
we do not
after all have a case of gratitude.Appealsto gratitude,then, are not ap-
peals
to
fairness,
and the
argument
from
gratitude
s
not
a
species
of the
argument
from
fairness.
All this
puts
us
in a
better
position
to
appreciatemy point
that
discus-
sions
of the
argument
rom
gratitude
have been
hamperedby
an
imperfect
grasp
of the nature of
gratitude.
f
(with Simmons)
we base
the
argument
on
an
obligation
of
requital,
we leave
it
obscure what
obligation
of
grati-
tude this is
meant
to
be.
And
f
we then
clarify
he
obligation as
Simmons
does)
in
terms
of
compensation
or
repayment,
t
seems
no
longer
to
be
an
obligationof gratitudeatall.True,at least one recent discussion does fare
better
than
Simmons's
in
this
respect.
The
version
of the
argument
dis-
cussed by
M.B.E. Smith
appeals unequivocally
o
the
obligation
to
show
or
display
our
gratitude
o
a
benefactor.But even
Smith
does
not
recognize
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Philosophy
&
Public
Affairs
the
varietyof obligations
of gratitude,and
in
dismissing
this version
of the
argument
he overlooks
he possibility
of a
version
which appeals
not to an
obligation
to demonstrate
our gratitude,
but
to an
obligation
not
to act in
ways incompatible
with the attitudes
which constitute
the core
of
the
gratefulresponse.
It is this
possibility
I
shall
explore
n
what follows.
IV
Gratitude
requires
appreciation
of the
benefits
we receive
together
with
goodwill
and
respect
for our benefactors.
Now,
it may
well
be
possible
to
base
a persuasive
version
of the
argumentfrom
gratitude
on the
require-
ments
of appreciation
r
respect,
but
our best
chance
of success,
I believe,
lies
with
an
argument
based
on
the
requirements
of goodwill-an
argu-
ment
that
appeals
to
our
obligation
not
to act in ways
that betray
ack
of
goodwill
or
a benefactor.
Letme
first
indicate,
very
roughly,
the
content
of this
obligation.
Good-
will fora benefactormayinvolveother constraintson our actionsbesides
those
I
list;
some
of
the constraints
I list
maybe
as much requirements
of
respect
as
requirements
of goodwill;
and
a longer
account
would have
to
offer
more
detailed
formulations
f the
several
constraints.
But
forthe
mo-
ment
none
of this
matters.
My
immediate
purpose
s
simply
to
give
a
pre-
liminary
view
of the different
ways
of
developing
the
argument
from
grat-
itude
in terms
of the requirement
of goodwill.
With
these provisos,
it
seems
safe
to
say
that
goodwill
or
a
benefactor
requires
one
(a)
to help
him if he
is
in need or distress
andone
cando so
atno
great
cost
to
oneself;
(b)
tocomply
with
his reasonable
requests;
(c)
to
avoidharming
him
or
acting
contrary
o his
interests;
and
(d)
to respect
his
rights.
Violation
of any
of these
requirements
would
seem prima
facie to
license
a charge
of
ingratitude.
Clearly,
however,
an
adequate
version
of the
argument
from
gratitude
must
be based
on
a
principle
which
is
not
only
true or
acceptable,
but
meets certainothercriteriaaswell.First,theprinciplemust satisfythe cri-
terion
of relevance.
t
must be
relevant
o,
or
bear
on,
the
issue
of a
citizen's
compliance
with
the
law. We must
be able
to
see
compliance
with
the
law
as
an instance
of
the
kind of
actionwhich
the
principle
asserts
to be
re-
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203
Political
Obligation
and
the Argument
from
Gratitude
quired
by
considerations
of
gratitude.
Second,
as
a
response
to
the
tradi-
tionalproblem
of
political
obligation,
he argument
rom gratitude
must
be
an independent
argument.
If it can persuade
us
thatwe
have an
obligation
to comply
with
the law only
by
presupposing
anotherargument
which
can
already
persuade
us
of
this,
we
would do
better
to
jettison
the argument
from
gratitude
n favor
of this other,
more
fundamental
argument.
Anad-
equate
version
of
the
argument
must therefore
appeal
to a
principle
which
meets the criterionof independence.The actions requiredbythe principle
must be
actions
whose obligatoriness
n the name
of gratitude
does
not
de-
pend
on
their
being
already
obligatory
or someother
reason.
Judged
by
these criteria,principles
(a),
(b), and (d) appearunlikely
to
yield
adequate
versions
of the
argument.
Principles
(a)
and (b)
do
not
seem
to
meet
the criterion
of
relevance.
It seems intolerably
strained
to
represent
the
citizen
who
complies
with
the law eitheras helping
a
bene-
factor
in need
or
as
meeting
a benefactor's
reasonable
request:
his com-
pliance
with
the law does
not rescue
the state from
anykind
of
grave
mis-
fortune, and the state does not request but demands his compliance.
Principle(d),
on the
other
hand,
runs
foul
of
the criterion
of
independ-
ence.
We
have
a
general
obligation
o
respect
the
rights
of
others,
even if
the
violation
of
a benefactor's ights
is peculiarly
reprehensible.
An
argu-
ment
based
on
(d)
will
not count as
an
independent
argument,
since the
appeal
to
(d) presupposes
that the
state
already
has
a
right
to its
citizens'
compliance
with the
law,
in which case
the
problem
of
political
obligation
has
already
been solved.
Principle
c),
that one has
an
obligation
o
avoidharming
one's
benefac-
tororacting contrary o his interests,maylookat firstas unpromisingas
principles
(a), (b),
and
(d).
But
a
little reflection shows
that this is
not
so.
Admittedly,
ome
of the actionsproscribed
by (c)
(for
example,
the
inflic-
tion
of
physical
harm on
a benefactor)
may
owe
their
proscription
on
grounds
of ingratitude
o their being
alreadyproscribed
by
some
other ob-
ligation.
But this is
not true
of
all the actions
that
come
within the scope
of
the
principle.
It is
not
true, conspicuously,
of
some
of the actions
that
involve
damage
to
a
benefactor's
nterests
rather
than
physical
harm to
him.
We do
have a
particular
obligation
of
gratitude
o
be
mindful
of our
benefactors' nterests, to takecarenot to damagethem, and to give them
a
special
weight
in our deliberations.
Most
of
us,
for
example,
do not scru-
ple
in casual
conversation
o
pass
on
gossip
about mutual
acquaintances;
nor do
we,
I
believe,
have
any general
obligation
o abstain
from
gossip.
If,
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204
Philosophy
&
Public
Affairs
however,the
gossip
concerns
someone who
has
given
me a
great
deal of
help, I
dofeel
myself
under
an
obligationnot
to
retail
t: I
have an
obliga-
tionto
protect
my
benefactor's
eputation,
and
passing on
the
gossip is in-
compatible with
the
regard I
should
have
for
his
interests.
Again,
as a
member of a
committee,
I
may
feel an
obligationnot
to
vote
for
a
proposal
which
would
significantly
damage
my
benefactor's
nterests.
Doubtless
this
obligationwill
almost
always be
outweighed
by
my
duty, as
a
member
of the committee,to somewidergood;buteven so, I shallapologizetomy
benefactor or
having
acted
in
a
way
that
adversely
affectshis
interests-
a
fact which
surely
suggests the
existence of an
obligation hat
has
been
overridden.
Rather
differently,
I
may
feel an
obligationnot
to
put
myself
in
competition
with a
benefactor,
and
take
care to
avoid
situations in
which
I
can
succeed
only
at
his
expense. We do
indeed,
it
seems, have an
obligation
of
gratitude
not
to
damage
our
benefactors'
nterests, and
the
obligatorinessof
the
actions
requiredunder
this rubric
does
not,
in
gen-
eral,
depend
on
their
being
already
obligatory
or
another
reason.
Thus
a
version of the argumentfrom gratitude hat appealsto principle(c) can
meet
the criterion
of
independence.
But what
of
the
criterionof
relevance?
Is
principle
(c)
relevant
to
the
problem of
political
obligation?
Does
a
citizen's
compliance
with
the law
fall within
the
scope
of
principle
(c), so that
noncompliancewith
the
law
can
be
argued
on
this
ground
to
be
in
violation
of an
obligation
of
grati-
tude?
If
citizens are
beneficiaries of
the
state-a
matter to
which I
shall
return
below-it
seems that
this
question
must be
answered
affirmatively.
In
general,
noncompliance
with
the law
damages
the
interests of
the
state.
It is manifestly n the state's nterests thatits citizens shouldbe law-abid-
ing; indeed
without a fair
measure of
compliance
with
the law
no
state
could function
or
survive.
This
does
not
mean
that it
is
in
the
state's
inter-
ests
that
its
citizens should
comply
with
every
aw,
however
pointless,
mis-
conceived,
or
unjust,
or that
their
complianceshould
ever be
slavish or
un-
critical. On
the
contrary,
the
interests of the
state
may
sometimes be
advanced f
bad
egislation
s
opposed
or
disregarded,
nd in
these
circum-
stances the
argument
from
gratitude
will
demand not
compliance,
but
noncompliance
with
the law.
Once
we
have
allowed or
these
points,
how-
ever,we can hardlydeny that it is in the state's nterests forits citizens to
respect
the
law and that
this
respect
will
involve
general
compliance
with
the law.
Ignoring
for
the
moment,
then,
the
ways
in
which
its
various
premises
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205
Political
Obligation
and the
Argument
from
Gratitude
stand
in
need
of
qualification,
we can
summarize
the new
version
of
the
argument
from
gratitude
as
follows:
(i)
The
person
who
benefits fromX
has
an
obligation
of
gratitude
not
to
act
contrary
o
X's
nterests.
(2)
Every
citizen
has received
benefits from
the
state.
(3)
Every
citizen
has
an
obligationof
gratitude
not to
act
in
ways that
arecontrary othe state's nterests.
(4)
Noncompliancewith
the law
is
contrary
o
the
state's
nterests.
(5)
Every
citizen
has
an
obligationof
gratitude o
comply
with
the law.
v
This version of
the
argument from
gratitudemay
still
not
seem
especially
attractive,
but in
this section
I
shall tryto
improve
ts
chances of
accept-
ance by
showing
that
the
objectionsmost
likely
to
be
brought
against
it
do
not succeed. I shall begin with twoobjectionswhich applyspecificallyto
this version of the
argument, and then
consider some
other
objections
which have a
wider
application.
The
firstobjection
concedes
that
it
is
in
the
state's
interests
that
its cit-
izens should
comply
with
the law but
holds
that
typically
noncompliance
does
not fall within
the
scope
of
principle
(c)
because
it
is
not
motivated
by ill
will
towards he state. If
the law
is broken
n
the
course of
revolution-
aryor
seditious
activity
or
because
an
individual
wishes
to
revenge himself
on
the
authorities,
noncompliance
may
have this
kind of
motivation.
But
these cases are atypical:usually the lawbreakeracts out of self-interest
and harborsno
particular
ll will
towardsthe
state.
Hence
in
the
typical
case
noncompliance
with
the law
cannot
be said to
contravene
principle
(c)
or violate
the associated
obligation
of
gratitude
which a
citizen
may
owe to the
state.
The
facts to which
this
objection
appealscannot be
disputed;what
is
open
to
disputeis whether
they
justify
the
objection.
I
have
claimed
that
gratitude
requires
a
measure of
goodwill
towardsa
benefactor,and
that
the
person who
acts
in
a
way
that
is
contrary o
his
benefactor's
nterests
lacks thatgoodwill.But lackof goodwilldoesnotentailpositive ll will.The
possession of
ill
will
is
but
one
way
of
lacking goodwill:
ndifference,
ab-
sence
of
concern,
and want of
consideration
may all,
as
much
as
ill
will,
betray
ack
of
goodwill
or
a
person.
So
actions can
show
a
lack of
goodwill
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206 Philosophy
&
Public
Affairs
without being motivatedby ill will; andthe fact that lawbreakers ypically
act from motives of self-interestdoes not
mean that their contraventionof
the law cannot betraya lack of goodwill
owards he state and violate
prin-
ciple (c).
The second objection challenges
what
the first concedes. It maintains
that while general noncompliance with the law may be contraryto the
state's interests,
it
does
not follow
that
individualacts of
noncompliance
are. Particularbreaches of the law, it insists, are not contrary o the inter-
ests
of the
state.
The idea
is
not
that
sometimes,
in
the
case
of
bad laws,
the state's interests may positivelyrequirenoncompliance,but that most
particular ailures to comply
with
the
law have no
effect
on
the state's in-
terests. As
a
rule,
it
is wildly implausible
to attribute
disastrous conse-
quences to individual acts
of
noncompliance:
few individual
acts
of
this
kind are even remotely likely
to
destroy
the
state
or the
legal system,
whether
by setting
an
example
to
others, by causing
a
loss
of
confidence
in
the rule
of
law,
or
in
some other way.'7 Most breaches
of
the law thus
makeno difference o the state and cannot violateany obligationciti-
zens may
have
to avoid
actionscontrary
o
the state's nterests.
This objection, too,
is
easily
answered. First
of
all, just
as
damage
to a
person's
nterests
need not involve
a
threat
to
his existence-his
interests
may
be harmed
without his life
being
even
remotely
n
danger-so
what
poses
no threat
to
the state's existence
may
still
in
some other
way
be
con-
trary
o
its
interests-and
in
this
connectionwe
should
not
forget
that
typ-
ically
a breach
of the
law
is
at
least
likely
to
have
some
undesirable con-
sequences
for the state.
Of
course,
this
point
does
not take
us
very far;
it
merely exposes the coreof the objection,which is that these undesirable
consequences
of
particular
breaches
of the law either are too trivial to
qualify
as
damage
to
the state's nterests
or,
f
they
do so
qualify,
constitute
damage
so
slight
as
to be
negligible.
But
clearly,
f
this is the
objection,
t
assumes
that
when
we
consider
the
bearing
of
acts
of
noncompliance
with
the
law
on
the state's
nterests we must take
into account
only
the effects
of each
particular
act
in
isolation.
It
is therefore
an
adequatereply
to
point
out
that this
assumption
is
at
least
dubious.
Many philosophers,
and
among
them
many consequentialists,
have denied
that
the moral
signifi-
cance of an action is determinedby its effects alonein isolationfromthe
effects
of other similar
actions.
In
particular,
Derek
Parfit
has
recently
I7. See, e. g.,
Woozley,Law and
Obedience, p. I I 2ff.
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207
Political
Obligation
and
the Argument
from
Gratitude
shown
that
when acts have
very
small or
imperceptibleeffects, we can
sometimes
reach
strongly
counterintuitive
conclusions
if
we look
only
at
the consequences of each act on its own: in these circumstances, he ar-
gues, we must
look at the
consequences
of what
we collectivelydo.
8
Thus
in considering
whether
acts
of
noncompliance
with
the law
damage
the
state's interests
we are
certainly
not
obliged,as
the
present objection as-
sumes,
to confine our attention
to
the
consequences
of
each act in
isola-
tion. There is no denyingthatcollectively he activitiesof lawbreakersn-
flict
severe damage
on vital
interests
of
the state.
In
the
light
of
Parfit's
argumentswe might appeal
o
this fact
and
claim that each act of
noncom-
pliance with the
law
contravenes
principle (c)
because
all of
them
taken
together
cause
significant
damage
to
the state's nterests.
So
far
we
have focused
on
the distinctive features of
my
version
of
the
argument
from
gratitude,
and
have
neglected those features
which
it
shares
with
all
versions
of
the
argument.
In
particular,
we have not con-
sidered
its
assumption
that
citizens receive benefits
from
the
state,
and
are as a result underan obligationof gratitude o it. This assumptionwe
must
now examine.
That
citizens under
all
but the
most ineffectual
or
barbarous
of
govern-
ments receive
significant
benefits
from
the states
to which
they belong
seems
undeniable. This is
not to
say
that
the state is the source of all or
even most
of
the
goods
we
enjoy:
that
would be
a
grotesqueexaggeration.
Nor do we
all receive the same benefits
from
the state or
benefit
to
the
same
degree: especially
between citizens
of
differentstates there
may
be
great
variations
n the nature
and
extent of
these benefits.
Such
variations
within and between states would imply that the resultant obligationof
gratitude
does
not
always
have the same
weight
or
stringency.
But
this is
a
consequence
I am
happy
to
accept. (By
the same
token,
citizens
who
re-
ceive
no
significant
benefits
from
the state
will fall
outside the
scope
of
the
argument.
But
again
this is
no
objection:
do we
really
want to
say
that
any-
one
in
this unfortunatesituationhas
a
general obligation
o
comply
with
the
law?) Moreover,
he fact that
citizens receive
significant
benefits
from
the state
does
not
mean
that
they
cannot
suffer harm or
injustice
at
its
hands,
or
that, overall,
they might
not fare
better as citizens
of
another
state or outside the jurisdictionof any state. These considerations,the
truth
of which
will
sometimes
be
very
difficult to
assess,
are
undoubtedly
i
8. See DerekParfit,Reasonsand Persons Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,I984), chap.
3, esp. pp. 75-82.
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208
Philosophy
&
PublicAffairs
relevant to the issue of our obligation o complywith the law. But they are
best handled as possible grounds or distinct ines of argumentwhose con-
clusions we must then weigh against that of the argumentfrom gratitude
in orderto settle whether, all things considered, n a particular ase a cit-
izen should comply
with
the
law.
If the argument from gratitude s to succeed, however, we must estab-
lish not only that citizens receive benefits
from
the state but that these
benefits place them under an obligationof gratitude.Recent discussions
tend to take much
too
restrictive
a
view
of
the circumstances
in
which a
grateful response
is
appropriate.Simmons,
for
example, as
I
have said,
lays down five
conditionswhich must be met beforethe
receipt
of a
benefit
can
give
rise
to an
obligation
of
gratitude,
he chief
of
these
being (I)
that
the benefit
must be
grantedby
means
of
some
special
effortor
sacrifice
and
(2)
that thebenefit must
not
be
grantedunintentionally,
nvoluntar-
ily,
or
for disqualifying
reasons.
He then
argues
that
the
benefits
citizens
receivefromthe state
do not
meet these conditions
and
that,
f
onlyforthis
reason, the argument from gratitudemust
fail.'9
But should we accept
Simmons's
account? Is
he not
simply
mistaken
to hold that
benefits call
for
gratitudeonly
if
they
involve
special
effort or
sacrifice
on the
part
of a
benefactor?
If I am about to drownwhen
a
strong
swimmer
already
n
the
water
notices
my plight,
swims
over,
and rescues
me,
without
any special
effort
or sacrifice
on his
part,
do I
owe
him no
gratitude?
Would
gratitude
in these circumstances
be
inappropriate?Again,
so
far
as
motivation
s
concerned,
while
I
may
be under
no
obligation
o
the
person
who
benefits
me
inadvertently
or
entirely
out of
self-interest,
we
must
not
inflate
this
point and claim that only benefits motivatedpurely by goodwill require
gratitude.
We
should
allow that
obligations
of
gratitude
are
generated
when
benefits are
the
result
of
mixed motives
and
conferred
rom a mix-
ture
of
self-interest
and
goodwill.
If
so,
we can
accept
that
there is
some
truth even
in
a
Thrasymachean
view
of the
state,
while still
holding
that
the
benefits citizens
receive from the
state
give
rise
to
obligations
of
grat-
itude.
Only
if
these benefits
were
provided olely by way
of
advancing
the
interests
of
the
authoritiesor
a
particular
lass would the
argument
from
gratitude collapse. (But
then
if
we
thought Thrasymachus's
view
repre-
sented the whole truth about the state, we wouldhardlywant to say that
citizens
have
any obligation
o
comply
with the
law.)
In
sum, provided
we
i9.
See
note 8 above.
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209
PoliticalObligation
and
the
Argument
from
Gratitude
take a
tolerably
realisticview
of the way the state operates
and
bear in
mindwhat was
said in Section
II
in response
to the claimthat gratitude
o
institutions
is impossible,
we appear
to
have
no goodreason for
denying
that the benefits
citizens receive
from the
state
can
generate
obligations
of gratitude.
This
may
be
challenged,
finally,
by
those
who
believe
that
gratitude
to
the state is ruled
out by the fact
of taxation.Taxes,
it will be said,
are the
pricecitizens payfor the benefitstheyreceive fromthe state:the relation-
ship
between citizen and state resembles
a commercial
relationship,
and
no more
in the one case
than in the other
is there a
place
for gratitude.
This objection
can be quicklydisposed
of. First,
we
may challenge
its easy
assumption
that gratitudenever
has
a
place
in
commercial
relationships.
Second,
we must surelyreject
the idea that the
relationship
of citizen
to
state is
akin to
a commercial
relationship.
For one
thing,
the
state,
unlike
a
commercial
nstitution,
s
a
redistributive gency.
There is
no
direct re-
lationship
between
the taxes one pays
andthe benefits
one receives,many
of the benefits providedbythe statebeingavailableeven tothose who pay
no taxes at all. Third,
the
objection
seems
to
equate
the
state
with
the au-
thorities
or
the
government:
t
represents
taxation
as
the
price paid
collec-
tivelyby citizens
for
the benefits
suppliedby
the government.
Hence what
it
would
exclude,
if
successful,
is the
possibility
of an
obligation
of
grati-
tude
owed by citizens to
the
government.
But this is
not what
I
have
sought
to establish.
In
my
view
politicalobligation
as
an
obligation
of
grat-
itude
to the state is
an
obligation
which each citizen owes
to his
fellow cit-
izens collectively.
VI
Sections IV
and V present
what
I
believe
is a strongcase
for my
version of
the argument
from
gratitude.
More
can be saidin its defense,
but I prefer
to conclude
with a number of
more general
pointswhich
I hope will place
my enterprise
n
a
favorable
ight and supply
a motive for tackling
what-
ever other
difficulties
are
thought
still
to lie
in
its
way.
First,
the claim
made by my
versionof the
argumentis
a
limited
one.
Although t seeks in the spiritof traditional nswersto the problemof po-
litical
obligation
to
establish
a general
obligation
o
comply
with the law,
thisobligation
s only,
in
Ross's
phrase,
a
prima
acie obligation,
and I
have
said nothing
about
ts
weight
or
stringency,
save to remark
hatit will vary
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8/20/2019 FP Walker Unidad 2
21/22
210 Philosophy
&
Public Affairs
with the nature
and
extent
of the
benefits
a
citizen receives.
My version of
the argument, then, unlike the Socraticversion
in
the Crito, allows that
our obligation
of
gratitude
to
comply
with
the
law
may
sometimes be
overriddenby other, weightier obligations
and
does
not involve us in any
extravagant
commitments.
Second,considerations
of
gratitude
can
provide
a
congenialframework
for reflection
on
other issues
in
politicalphilosophy.As we have seen, the
considerationsto which my version of the argumentfrom gratitude ap-
peals
would
justify noncompliance
with
the
law in
certain
circumstances.
Itlooksthereforeas
if
they
could
supply
the foundation or a
theory
of civil
disobedience.20Further,
since
the motivationof the
benefits
we
receive
bearson the appropriateness
f a
gratefulresponse