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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000077
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/25
TAGS:SNARPRELPGOVPHUMKCRMMX
SUBJECT: MEXICO: TAPACHULA ARMS CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON SOUTHERN BORDER
PROBLEMS
REF: 09 MEXICO 2952
CLASSIFIED BY: Gustavo Delgado, Political Minister Counselor; REASON:
1.4(B), (D)
1. (SBU) Summary: Two recent arms trafficking conferences -- one
in September focused on the northern border (reftel) and a
subsequent one in Tapachula, looking at the southern border --
highlighted lax border controls and suggested ways to improve law
enforcement efforts to stem the tide of illegal guns. This cable
reports on the Tapachula discussion, and off-site trips to threedifferent border locations, which offered dramatic evidence of the
porous southern border and serious resource shortfalls, and helped
focus attention on ways to help Mexico, Guatemala and Belize
address shared border security challenges. End Summary.
Follow Up on the Southern Border
--------------------------------------------- --
2. (SBU) Many of the GOM and USG law enforcement officials who
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participated in the Tapachula conference in October had also
attended the earlier Northern Border Conference in Phoenix. This
time, however, Belize's National Police and representatives from
Guatemala's Attorney General's office also participated, adding a
new wrinkle to the discussion by presenting an overview of arms
trafficking laws in their countries and suggesting ways in which
they could improve coordination with Mexico and the U.S. with
regards to illegal arms trafficking.
The Ground Truth: Laws Not Enough
--------------------------------------------- -----
3. (SBU) Each country highlighted internal controls that regulate
the sale, distribution, and transport of weapons and ammunition,
drawing attention to sanctions against the unlawful transport of
weapons across any national boundary. Unfortunately, our visit to
three border crossings between Guatemala and Mexico in Chiapas
revealed neither country presently works seriously to enforce these
laws.
4. (SBU) At the first border crossing in Talisman, Chiapas, the
conference participants witnessed almost as many individuals
crossing the border illegally as legally. Immigration officials
conjectured that individuals crossing illegally under the bridge
were either visiting family members on the other side of border or
engaging in informal commerce. Although the delegation did not
have an opportunity to talk with any of the individuals crossing
under the bridge at the border, it appeared the majority were
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carrying what appeared to be personal belongings rather than items
of commerce.
5. (SBU) The border officials made every attempt to illustrate a
secure border crossing, but their explanations highlighted serious
procedural inconsistencies that undermine effective controls. While
border officials inspect 100 percent of the individuals and cars
crossing the bridge legally, the data collected is stored in a
local database that is not connected to federal or international
criminal databases. Border officials are also hampered by their
lack of access to national registries that would allow them todetermine if the individuals crossing are on any criminal or
terrorist watchlists. Mexican law allows individuals to cross the
border with an "original" identification document but does not
prescribe what constitutes an "original" document. As long as the
individual agrees to confine one's visit to the state of Chiapas
MEXICO 00000077 002 OF 003
and return to Guatemala after an undefined period of time, one is
granted admission to the country. Limited resources also undermine
the effort: while there are 30,000 U.S. CBP officers on the 1,926
mile Mexican/U.S. border, only 125 Mexican immigration officials
monitor the 577 mile border with Guatemala. Mexican immigration
officials repeatedly confirmed that they do not have the manpower
or resources to direct efforts effectively along the southern
border.
6. (SBU) The tour continued to the Ciudad Hidalgo station on the
Pan American highway, the border crossing with highest number of
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legal crossings in Chiapas. Border officials estimated that on a
daily basis 95% of all exports, 350-400 shipments; and 26% of all
imports, flow through these border crossings to and from Central
America. Additionally, 80-100 carloads of visitors pass through
the border on a daily basis. While officials displayed an
impressive array of non-intrusive inspection equipment, e.g.,
hand-held spectrometers for the identification of drugs and
explosives and gamma-ray inspection equipment for large containers,
these devices are not incorporated effectively into border control
protocols. Border officials were inconsistent in using their
inspection equipment to check the cabs of trucks and there is no
revealed coordinated approach between Mexico and Guatemala to share
information that would reduce crossing times and avoid duplicativeinspections, as, for example, is being done at certain places in
the Mexican-U.S. border.
7. (SBU) The final border crossing only served to re-inforce the
concerns that emerged from the first two sites the group visited.
One of the most memorable images of the day was the steady flow of
rafts transporting people and goods across the river illegally
within sight of the legal border crossing.
Family Feuds Prevent Internal Coordination
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
8. (C) The last part of the conference consisted of open and frank
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panel discussions. The most interesting discussion focused on
information and intelligence sharing among Mexican agencies,
including the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), the Marine
Secretariat (SEMAR), the Office of the Attorney General (PGR), and
the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN). The
discussion started with many self-congratulatory comments from
panel members on how well their respective organizations collect
and share information. The lack of coordination between federal
and state officials became apparent when a representative from the
Chiapas State Attorney General's Office complained that his state
does not receive any information from the federal authorities and
has no input or visibility in the federal process. While the state
representative acknowledged a common perception of corruption atthe state level, he argued it was counterproductive and illogical
to exclude them from the process. Other participants recognized an
acceptable process for intelligence collection, but complained
about inadequate dissemination of actionable information and
insufficient formal mechanisms for sharing collected information.
Conclusions and Follow Up Actions
--------------------------------------------- -----
9. (SBU) The conference generated a list of eight conclusions,
including few measurable actions. Several of the conclusions
MEXICO 00000077 003 OF 003
focused on the need to explore mechanisms for better
information-sharing with international partners or internally.
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There was consensus on the need to regionalize arms-trafficking
efforts, specifically by including Guatemala in future GC Armas
meetings in Mexico. Guatemalan representation pledged to review
current procedures and incorporate practices that will improve
interagency coordination and information. Mexico and Guatemala
agreed to work on practical measures to facilitate the flow of
information between the two countries on the issue of arms
trafficking. Belize also suggested a formal dialogue with Mexico
on increasing the number of formal border crossings between the two
countries, as a way to improve border controls.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) This conference highlighted weak controls on Mexico's
southern border that are contributing to problems with illegal
migration and guns/drugs smuggling. Much more needs to be done to
improve secure information sharing among federal agencies and
between Federal and State officials in Mexico. Better cooperation
among Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize could also help coordinate
current efforts by each state and ensure that existing laws are
enforced. The conference represented a small first step in that
direction, a follow-up meeting in February 2010 will provide
another opportunity to strengthen joint efforts.
FEELEY
0000000000000000000000000000000
R 232312Z JAN 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4721
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
HQ USNORTHCOM
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T MEXICO 000193
NOFORNE.O. 12958: DNG: CO 01/22/2019
TAGS:PRELPGOVPHUMPINRSNARKCRMMX
SUBJECT: THE BATTLE JOINED: NARCO VIOLENCE TRENDS IN 2008
REF: A. CIUDAD JUAREZ 22
B. MEXICO 3586
C. MEXICO 2371
D. MEXICO 3498
E. MEXICO 3779
F. MEXICO 1766
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) 2008 set a new record for organized crime-related
homicides with more than 6000 killings. Violence in Mexico
suddenly provided fodder for U.S. and international media
with commentators suggesting worse to come. While the death
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toll is already at disturbing levels, and there are no signs
violence will taper off anytime soon, we will continue to
evaluate information or evidence that would suggest the
cartels have decided to up the ante significantly by
undertaking mass-casualty attacks on civilians,
systematically attacking GOM officials or institutions or
targeting USG personnel. Internecine struggles among the
cartels and GOM counter narcotic successes have increased the
costs of doing business and account for most of the up-tick
last year. Frustrated traffickers, seeking to diversify
profit-making activities through kidnappings and extortion,
account for more. End Summary.
----------------------------------
Drug-Related Homicides on the Rise
----------------------------------
2. (C) Few killings in Mexico are thoroughly investigated,
and determining which are truly related to organized crime
remains an inexact science, but Mexico's Attorney General's
office's year-end estimate stands at 6262. Other GOM
authorities put the toll from organized crime slightly
higher. SEDENA reports that drug-related killings
represented roughly 17% of all homicides last year, while the
National System of Public Security (SNSP -- part of the
Public Security Secretariat (SSP)) estimates a total of
approximately 10,700 intentional homicides.
(S/NF) Table I: Organized Crime-Related Killings, By Year*
--------------------------------------------- ----------
2005 1855
2006 2489
2007 3038
2008 6380
----------------------------------------
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*Source: SEDENA
(S/NF) Table II: 2008 OC-Related Killings, By Month*
--------------------------------------------- -----
Jan 282
Feb 283
Mar 417
Apr 320
May 496
Jun 531
Jul 540
Aug 587
Sep 526Oct 847
Nov 843
Dec 708
--------------------------------------------- ------
*Source: SEDENA
--------------------------------------------
Spike in Violence Concentrated at the Border
--------------------------------------------
3. (C) Violence continued to be concentrated in a few key
states, and in 2008 there was a spike in drug-related
killings in the northern border territories. An estimated 41
percent of these homicides took place in Chihuahua and Baja
California states and largely in two urban areas, Ciudad
Juarez and Tijuana. (see MEXICO 3586). Sinaloa continued to
rank among the most violent states with approximately 1048
(or 18%) of these killings. The surge in violence along the
border stems largely from the intensified struggle among
cartels over a few lucrative land crossings to the U.S. In
particular, the January 2008 arrest of cartel leader Alfredo
Beltran Leyva sparked a serious rift among the Gulf, Juarez
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and Sinaloa (Pacific) cartels, which is being played out
viciously in Ciudad Juarez. (See MEXICO 1766) In Tijuana,
rival factions of the weakened Arellano Felix Organization,
one of which is backed by the Sinaloa cartel, are battling
for control.
--------------------------
Changes In Cartel Behavior
--------------------------
4. (SBU) Beyond its broadened scope, the nature of cartel
violence changed in 2008: organized violence was
characterized by significantly increased brutality, a callousdisregard for the potential for collateral damage and more
frequent targeting of soldiers and police. Mexico's drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) have also more frequently
orchestrated violence to send intimidating messages to
security forces, the Mexican public and the body politic.
5. (SBU) Incidents, such as the August beheadings of 12 in
Yucatan, the execution style killing of 24 on the outskirts
of Mexico City in September, late fall killings of soldiers
in Monterrey and Guerrero in late December contributed to
growing public unease here and garnered media attention
abroad. Several first-time-ever incidents involving grenades
and improvised explosive devices (such as the notorious
Independence Day grenade attack in Morelia, the shooting and
undetonated grenade attack on the US Consulate in Monterrey,
the use of improvised explosive devices in downtown Mexico
City and Sinaloa, and a grenade attack on police cadets in
Jalisco) demonstrate that not only have the cartels
successfully expanded their arsenals, but at least some
elements have developed a tolerance for inflicting civilian
casualties.
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6. (SBU) Cartels have also expanded their use of violence to
intimidate. Beheadings and the prominent placement of
dismembered bodies in public places, relatively rare two
years ago are now common throughout the country. The late
night grenade/shooting attack on our consulate in Monterrey
was obviously designed to send a message, although no
individual or group has ever claimed responsibility. More
explicit was the January assault on the Monterrey offices of
Televisa, accompanied by a message telling the broadcaster to
do a better job reporting on corrupt public officials.
Attacks such as these remain sporadic so far, and we have
insufficient indications whether they mark a new trend or
not.
7. (SBU) Despite these sporadic attacks, Mexico's drug war
continues to primarily impact security forces and those
linked directly or indirectly to the drug trade. The
civilian population in some urban areas along the border
remains bunkered down with some of those who have the money
either sending their children to school in the U.S. or
relocating entirely to minimize risk. In much of the rest of
the country, though, the civilian population not involved in
the drug trade remains essentially insulated from the
violence, though not from its effects.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Police Killings Increase Along With Overall Death Toll
--------------------------------------------- --------
8. (SBU) SEDENA estimates that at least 522 civilian law
enforcement and military personnel were murdered last year,
compared to 315 in 2007.
(S/NF) Table III: Drug-Related Military/Police Homicides:
2007* 2008**
(% of total)
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AFI 22 (6.9) 5 (1.0)
PFP 12 (3.8) 37 (19.7)
State
Police 62 (19.8) 110 (21.1)
Ministerial
Police 63 (20.0) 14 (2.7)
Municipal
Police 120 (38.0) 305 (58.4)
Military 27 (8.6) 51 (9.8)
Other 9 (2.9) Unavailable
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Total 315 522CENAPI (Mexico's Center for Information, Analysis and
Planning) statistics
**SEDENA statistics
9. (C) Increased confrontations between security forces and
criminals is one explanation for the increasing killing of
security forces personnel. GOM authorities argue that
killings are no longer just score-settling among bad cops,
but increasingly the consequence of the government's
aggressive fight against the cartels. Some analysts we have
spoken to agree. However, they also note that with few
exceptions the majority of deaths are not the result of
direct confrontations. They argue that the crackdown on
police corruption has put compromised police officials in the
position of either being prosecuted or breaking their
established agreements/arrangements with the cartels. Hence,
some of those who presumably choose the latter course are
being punished brutally. (See MEXICO 2371, 3498)
10. (SBU) It is worth noting that police victims (at all
levels of government) represented eight percent of all 2008
killings believed to be drug-related, a figure slightly lower
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than the percentage in 2007. The vast majority of victims
continue to be state and municipal law enforcement officers.
Senior level, federal police killings were still rare
occurrences in 2008. The most high-profile death remains the
May killing of Edgar Millan Gomez, the country's
highest-ranking federal police officer.
--------------------------------------
Targeting of Soldiers An Ominous Sign
--------------------------------------
11. (S/NF) There have been notable incidents of horrific
violence against soldiers, including a string of slayings of
enlisted men in Monterrey in October and the systematicdecapitation of seven troops in Guerrero (see MEXICO 3779).
The theory that those killed in Guerrero were rogue soldiers
involved in drug trafficking has been discounted, suggesting
the cartels have begun to target soldiers to exact revenge
for successes registered by the military and attempt to
undermine the institution's resolve. The Monterrey and
Guerrero killings immediately followed successful military
operations in the respective regions resulting in seizures
and arrests. Whether such tactics will have a chilling
effect remains to be seen. Sources tell us that while some
soldiers are more fearful, many others are keen to strike
back at the cartels with greater resolve. SEDENA and SEMAR
have instructed regional commanders to implement force
protection counter-measures to reduce the risk of future
incidents.
----------------------------------------
U.S. Personnel and Institutions Targets?
----------------------------------------
12. (C) We have observed a significant up-tick in threats,
as well as incidents of surveillance, against USG personnel
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and properties over the last three months. All threats are
treated seriously and precautions taken; fortunately, none
has come to fruition.
13. (S/NF) On October 12, unknown persons fired gunshots and
tossed an un-detonated grenade at the U.S. Consulate in
Monterrey. The attack occurred after hours, no one was
injured, and little damage occurred. No message was left and
we have uncovered no useful intelligence regarding the
authors or their motives. One unsubstantiated report cited a
source claiming a senior Gulf cartel leader ordered the
attack. However, with little hard evidence, no attempt to
claim credit and no follow on incident to date, thepossibility remains that this was an isolated, possibly even
impulsive, attack not likely undertaken at the behest of
senior cartel leaders.
14. (C) While the cartels have not yet directly targeted USG
law enforcement or other personnel, they have shown little
reticence about going after some of our most reliable
partners in Mexican law enforcement agencies. Ten close DEA
law enforcement liaison officers have been killed since 2007,
seven of whom were members of Special Vetted Units.
Similarly, within the past two years 51 close FBI contacts
have been murdered. More than sixty of Mexico's best law
enforcement officers in whom we have placed our trust and
with whom we have collaborated on sensitive investigations,
shared intelligence and in many cases trained and vetted have
been murdered by the cartels. We do know from sources that
cartel members have at least contemplated the possibility of
doing harm to both our personnel and institutions, but we
frankly don't know enough about how DTO members think and
operate to know what factors might trigger a decision to
mount such an attack, but the potential threat is very real.
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15. (C) We assess that the threat to U.S. personnel could
increase if the violence continues to escalate and more
high-level government officials and political leaders are
targeted. Also, a reaction may be triggered if traffickers
perceive their losses are due to U.S. support to the GOM's
counter-narcotics efforts. We will continue to monitor
potential threats to U.S. personnel from organized criminal
gangs and be alert to information that suggests drug
traffickers increasingly see the U.S. hand as responsible for
their losses.
---------------------
A Measure of Success?---------------------
16. (C) While attributing last year's significant spike in
violence to its own successes marks an effort by the Calderon
administration to put the best face possible on a grim
situation, there is also considerable truth to the assertion.
President Calderon's counter-narcotics team has scored
significant successes, particularly in the last 12 months.
Record numbers of weapons and drugs have been seized, key
members of drug cartels have been arrested and/or extradited,
cartel sources inside government institutions have been
arrested ) including a former Deputy Attorney General and
the head of Interpol in Mexico. The GOM has disrupted cartel
operations in meaningful ways; in year-end reports SEDENA and
SEMAR reported that together they have reduced the maritime
trafficking of illicit drugs by 65 percent and cut direct air
transit of illegal drugs from Colombia by 90 percent.
According to collaborative sensitive reporting, the January
2008 arrest of Alfredo Beltran Leyva split the Pacific
Cartel, and accentuated antagonism between that DTO and the
Gulf organization which caused the spike in violence in
Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Baja California (see also MEXICO
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1766). In addition to these rifts, frustrated traffickers
have turned to kidnappings and extortion to compensate for
the loss in drug-trafficking revenue, expanding their reach
and impacting a greater number of bystanders who have no
involvement in DTO activities. These kinds of impacts bring
home to ordinary Mexicans the nature of the struggle here.
-------
Outlook
-------
17. (C) Mexican authorities and law enforcement analysts
predict that violence will likely get worse before it getsbetter. Recent truce rumors notwithstanding, there is
currently no indication that the violence will soon abate;
CENAPI reports 280 killings for the first 20 days of January.
The cartels have shown themselves to be remarkably
innovative, vicious, and resilient when aggressively
confronted. Given their powerful weaponry and deep
penetration of the country's security institutions, further
attacks against security forces and government officials seem
all but inevitable. However, while violence remains at
unacceptably high levels here, we have no reason to believe
at this point that it will escalate either quantitatively or
qualitatively.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BASSETT
000000000000000000000000000
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
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DE RUEHC #4787 1981819
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 171805Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2799
S E C R E T STATE 074787
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2034
TAGS:PINREFINPINSSNARMX
SUBJECT: (C/NF) MEXICO SECURITY AND ECONOMIC TEAMDYNAMICS (C-AL9-01454)
Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (C/NF) PRESIDENT FELIPE CALDERON'S SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
TEAMS CONTINUE TO ATTRACT HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON.
WITH US-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION CONTINUING TO EXPAND,
WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS REMAIN HIGHLY INTERESTED IN THEIR
MEXICAN COUNTERPARTS. WHILE MOST SENIOR FIGURES IN THE
MEXICAN SECURITY APPARATUS ARE WELL KNOWN, WASHINGTON
ANALYSTS WOULD APPRECIATE CONTINUED REPORTING ON CHANGING
SECURITY TEAM DYNAMICS, AS WELL AS CLARIFICATION ON SOME OF
THE GROUP'S NEWEST MEMBERS WHOSE ROLES REMAIN AMBIGUOUS.
WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ALSO WELCOME REPORTING ON HOW MEXICO'S
TOP ECONOMIC POLICYMAKERS ARE PRIVATELY RESPONDING TO THE
SOURING ECONOMY. AS TIME AND RESOURCES ALLOW AND DURING THE
COURSE OF NORMAL DUTIES, WASHINGTON ANALYSTS WOULD APPRECIATE
POST,S INSIGHT INTO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON THE EVOLVING
DYNAMICS OF CALDERON'S SECURITY AND ECONOMIC TEAMS.
A. (U) SECURITY TEAM:
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1) (C/NF) WHAT ARE PERSONAL DYNAMICS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF
THE SECURITY TEAM? HOW WELL DO THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE
TEAM (I.E. GENARO GARCIA LUNA, EDUARDO MEDINA MORA, GEN.
GUILLERMO GALVAN, ADM. FRANCISCO SAYNEZ, FERNANDO GOMEZ MONT,
AND JORGE TELLO PEON) WORK TOGETHER? UPDATED DETAILS OF GROUP
DYNAMICS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL, INCLUDING NOTABLE
FRIENDSHIPS, ALLIANCES, RIVALRIES, AND SUSPICIONS.
2) (C/NF) HOW OFTEN DOES THE TEAM MEET? HAS ANY ONE FIGURE
EMERGED AS A CLEAR LEADER/COORDINATOR? WHO ARE THE PRINCIPAL
ARCHITECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS? IN
PLANNING SECURITY OPERATIONS WHO, OTHER THAN CALDERON, HAS
FINAL SAY?
3) (C/NF) WHAT IS THE CURRENT MOOD AMONG TEAM MEMBERS? ARE
THEY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT?
DO THEY THINK THE FIGHT IS WINNABLE? ARE THERE ANY
SIGNIFICANT DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE CURRENT STRATEGY OR FUTURE
PROSPECTS? HOW DOES THE TEAM GO ABOUT CREATING A STRATEGY?
WHEN THE TEAM HAS A SETBACK, HOW DO THEY GO ABOUT RECOVERING?
B. (U) ECONOMIC TEAM:
1) (C/NF) WHAT ARE THE CURRENT DYNAMICS WITHIN THE ECONOMIC
TEAM? WHO ARE THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECTS OF THE CURRENT
ECONOMIC STRATEGY? ARE ANY PERSONNEL MOVES LIKELY IN THE
NEAR FUTURE? IS ANYONE ON THE ECONOMIC TEAM CONSIDERED
EXPENDABLE? IS ANYONE WAITING IN THE WINGS TO JOIN THE TEAM?
2) (C/NF) HOW HAS THE ECONOMIC TEAM RESPONDED TO THE STRESS
THAT INVARIABLY COMES WITH THE JOB? ARE SOME MEMBERS COPING
BETTER THAN OTHERS? IS ORTIZ,S DEPARTURE HAVING A MAJOR
IMPACT? IS THE NEW DEPUTY SETTLING IN?
2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-01454 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF
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REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON
00000000000000000000000000000
VZCZCXRO1895
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #2676/01 2522147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 092147Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8187
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 002676
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO; DEPT FOR WHA DAS JACOBSON
AND MEX OFFICE DIRECTOR LEE AND DSTAFF CUE.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS:PRELMARRMASSPHUMPGOVPINRMX
SUBJECT: MEXICO: PROMISING FIRST TALKS WITH SEDENA ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
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Reason: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (c) Summary: DATT, ODC Chief, DOJ Attache and Pol MinCouns
met with officials from the National Defense Secretariat
(SEDENA) on September 7 to discuss initiating a human rights
dialogue with the Mexican military that would allow us to
understand the legal process in the Mexican system of
military justice and clarify specific questions with regards
to alleged violations. General Lopez Portillo, the Senior
Human Rights official in SEDENA and a veteran military
prosecutor, was the lead official on the Mexican side,
accompanied by a Director General level representative from
the Mexican Foreign Ministry (SRE). They welcomed thebeginning of a dialogue with the Embassy on human rights
matters and proposed regular senior formal meetings (he
suggested 2-3 a year) as well as working level discussions to
clarify specific cases. (A list of all participants is
provided in para 7).
---------------------------------------------
Willing to Talk but a Dialogue Will Take Work
---------------------------------------------
2. (c) Although we previously had provided a list of specific
questions on several cases involving alleged human rights
violations through official SEDENA and SRE channels, and our
meeting had been coordinated a month in advance through the
SEDENA Protocol office (S2), Lopez Portillo did not receive
our questions before the meeting. This was not an indication
of SEDENA's unwillingness to discuss the cases, but rather
reflects a lack of experience in engaging on the human rights
topic and their somewhat rigid rules for transmitting
information to and within the SEDENA bureaucracy.
3. (c) Unaware of the questions we had provided on
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allegations related to the specific cases, General Lopez
Portillo organized a general and open agenda for the meeting,
aimed at facilitating an open and frank discussion on
internal legal and judicial procedures within the Mexican
military. Throughout the meeting, our Mexican interlocutors
were well-disposed to answering our questions and
establishing a collaborative dialogue. We noted our interest
in reviewing the details of some specific cases as part of an
ongoing dialogue on human rights issues that would allow us
to understand better how SEDENA and the Mexican legal system
handled crimes involving military personnel and civilians. We
provided a copy of the questions we had provided prior to the
meeting and suggested a follow-up meeting to go over thecases in more detail.
------------------------------------
SEDENA AND SRE SUGGEST A WAY FORWARD
------------------------------------
4. (c) SRE Director General for Human Rights and Democracy
Alejandro Negrin agreed with Lopez Portillo that we should
establish a formal and regular dialogue to discuss both the
specific cases and larger framework of how the Mexican
judicial system works in response to crimes involving
military personnel and civilians. He noted relevant legal
reforms and the ongoing effort by SEDENA to clarify its
procedures and respond to responsible questions. Lopez
Portillo noted SEDENA's interest in continuing to do more in
this regard and was supportive of establishing a bi-lateral
mechanism that would allow us to work together to help
clarify allegations. He suggested formal senior level
meetings several times a year, with working level meetings in
between.
5. (c) Lopez Portillo promised a timely written response to
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the written questions we had provided earlier. He also
undertook to set up meetings to review military legal
procedure, particularly with regard to crimes involving
military and civilians. He suggested that we work closely
and collaboratively to clarify procedures and outstanding
allegations, many of which he observed, were designed to cast
doubt and dispersion on the Mexican military and not to
establish the truth. Both sides agreed that new questions
MEXICO 00002676 002 OF 002
about additional cases in the future should be providedthrough SRE channels with a courtesy copy given to SEDENA.
The official response to specific cases would be delivered
from SEDENA through the SRE. Lopez Portillo said that he was
eager to work together with us to ensure that there would be
a satisfactory response on all human rights allegations.
-------
COMMENT
-------
6. (c) Establishing a productive human rights dialogue with
the Mexican military will take some work and considerable
fine tuning. This is not an area that the Mexican military
has traditionally discussed with any outsiders. While the
Mexican military has made some progress in establishing
mechanisms to review human rights allegations in response to
internal constitutional reforms and Mexico's international
obligations, it is still a delicate subject and one they are
likely to manage cautiously and not always adroitly. We are
encouraged by our initial meeting but much remains to be
done. We will follow up promptly with SEDENA and SRE to set
up our next meeting. Lopez Portillo provided repeated
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assurances that SEDENA is prepared to respond in writing --
supplemented by working level discussion to clarify any
questions of procedure and translation -- to our questions on
specific cases. We will also expand current training and
subject matter expert exchanges that could help provide
SEDENA with support in their efforts to address human rights
issues in a more comprehensive and transparent way.
------------
PARTICIPANTS
------------
7. (c) The Mexican side was led by MG Jaime Lopez Portilloand included Col. J.J. Juarez, Section 5 DH, Ltc Marcas
Burgos Legorretta, Section 5 DH, Major C.S. Lopez, and Ltc A.
Santos, S-2 as well as Alejandro Negrin, the Director General
of Human Rights and Democracy in the SRE. The U.S. side
included Defense Attache Col. Dan Alabre; ODC Chief Col.
Linwood Ham, Department of Justice Attache Tony Garcia and
Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
PASCUAL
000000000000000000000
INFO LOG-00 AF-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 CPR-00 INL-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 OIGO-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00
TEDE-00 INR-00 LAB-01 L-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00
DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 P-00 ISNE-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00
NCTC-00 ASDS-00 IIP-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00
G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 PESU-00 SANA-00
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/001W
O 052026Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8484
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO PRIORITY
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYHQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
US MARSHALS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 002882
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2019
TAGS:KCRMPGOVSNARMX
SUBJECT: ELEMENTS OF GOM POLICY TEAM INTERESTED IN FOCUSING
TOGETHER ON IMPROVING SECURITY IN A FEW KEY CITIES
Classified By: NAS Director Keith Mines, reasons 1.5 (b) (d)
1. (C) Summary: At a dinner hosted by PGR for a visiting DOJ
delegation, National Security Coordinator Tello Peon and
Undersecretary for Governance Gutierrez Fernandez told the
delegation they would like to explore seriously focusing our
joint efforts on two or three key cities to reverse the
current wave of violence and instability and show success in
the fight against the DTOs in the next 18 months. They
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suggested starting in Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and one other
city with a joint planning cell to review what resources we
could collectively bring to bear. They believe the symbolism
of turning several of the most violent cities would be
potent, sending a signal to the rest of the country that the
fight against organized crime can be won, and combating the
current sense of impotence felt by many Mexicans. They
believe it would also go a long way toward stitching up the
country,s damaged international reputation. End Summary.
2. (U) Acting Attorney General Alcantara hosted a dinner for
Deputy Attorney General for the Criminal Division Lanny
Breuer September 21 in Mexico City. Other attendeesincluded:
GOM
National Security System Coordinator Jorge Tello Peon
Undersecretary for Governance (SEGOB) Geronimo Gutierrez
Fernandez
PGR DAG (SIEDO) Marisela Morales
PGR DAG Victor Emilio Corzo Cabanas
PGR Director for Analysis and Strategic Information Oscar
Rocha Dobrowski
US
Deputy Assistant AG Bruce Swartz
Deputy Assistant AG for Criminal Division Kenneth Blanco
Special Assistant to the AG Paul Rosen
DOJ Attache Tony Garcia
NAS Director Keith Mines
GOM WANTS FULL TRANSFER OF INTEL TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING
--------------------------------------------- -----------
3. (C) Alcantara opened the meeting with two requests from
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Oscar Rocha. First, he said PGR would like to develop a more
general exchange of intelligence information and capacity,
not the case-by-case exchange we now have. Second, they
would like for us to provide a full exchange of technology
for use in intelligence gathering, not just the loan of
equipment for specific cases, but the transfer of the
know-how and training as well. Morales added that the FBI is
helping to create a cyber-unit in Mexico but it would be
beneficial if it were expanded and replicated more broadly.
The SSP, she said, already has a cyber-unit but the real
mandate rests with PGR-SIEDO. The U.S. side offered that
there is great capacity in CCIPS in the Criminal Division and
they would be happy to find ways to offer training andcapacity building to their Mexican counterparts. We would be
pleased, Breuer said, in the effort to press High Value
Targets, to get our Mexican counterparts to the point where
they can do these things themselves. It will take the
development of strong trust through proper vetting and good
training but it would be excellent to get to the point where
there is no longer impunity for a Chapo Guzman because his
operating space has been eliminated.
4. (C) Rocha then spoke of the technological leap about to
take place in the coming years in the intelligence field. He
cited the target-finding equipment used by the USMS with
Mexican counterparts but asked if it would be possible to
acquire not only such equipment for GOM officials, but also
the training and full technology transfer that would go with
it. He suggested we work with vetted units first to provide
such equipment and training, and then move it out more
broadly, both to PGR and CISEN. The U.S. side suggested
getting together in the appropriate working group to see what
could be done. Rocha reiterated that his intent would be to
develop indigenous to the PGR all the capacity they currently
have only in conjunction with the USMS.
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STRATEGIC MISCALCULATIONS IN MERIDA
-----------------------------------
5. (C) Gutierrez Fernandez then turned to the Merida
Initiative, saying that in retrospect he and other GOM
officials realize that not enough strategic thought went into
Merida in the early phase. There was too much emphasis in
the initial planning on equipment, which they now know is
slow to arrive and even slower to be of direct utility in the
fight against the DTOs. Of more immediate importance is
building institutions that can effectively use the equipment.
He was careful to point out that all the equipment is neededand will be put to good use, but wishes that there had been a
more direct focus on institution building, and supported the
current shift in Merida focus to capacity building and
creating more effective institutions.
"WE HAVE EIGHTEEN MONTHS"
-------------------------
6. (C) Gutierrez went on to say, however, that he now
realizes there is not even time for the institution building
to take hold in the remaining years of the Calderon
administration. "We have 18 months," he said, "and if we
do not produce a tangible success that is recognizable to the
Mexican people, it will be difficult to sustain the
confrontation into the next administration." He lamented
the pervasive, debilitating fear that is so much a part of
contemporary Mexican society, where even people in the
Yucatan, with "European levels of security" are afraid
because of the instability in a few distant cities. He
expressed a real concern with "losing" certain regions. It
is damaging Mexico's international reputation, hurting
foreign investment, and leading to a sense of government
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impotence, Gutierrez said.
DON,T SHY AWAY FROM THE HARDEST CHALLENGES
------------------------------------------
7. (C) Gutierrez believes what is needed is a clear roadmap
for the remaining years of security cooperation between the
U.S. and Mexico under President Calderon that targets a few
joint projects in a few cities, rather than doing a little of
everything. Tello Peon agreed, suggesting that there is not
time for pilot projects, and certainly not time to work in a
few relatively safe cities such as Nuevo Laredo as has been
suggested, in order to develop the experience to take on thereal challenges.
8. (C) Instead, he believes, we need to confront the cities
with the largest insecurity and fix them. If we could turn
around Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and one other city such as
Culiacan, it would solve 60% of the violence, and send a
signal to the Mexican people that the war can be won.
Politically, he and Gutierrez said, Mexico must succeed in
Juarez because Calderon has staked so much of his reputation
there, with a major show of force that, to date, has not
panned out. Even if it is not completely solved by the time
Calderon leaves office, if they can get things moving in the
right direction, setting the conditions for ultimate success,
it will be enough. There was a brief &chicken and egg8
discussion, with one side suggesting that well-placed and
effective federal forces could push back the DTOs
sufficiently for the state and local forces to function,
while others believed that well-functioning state and local
forces will be a precondition for the federal forces to
produce stability.
MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER
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-----------------------
9. (C) Gutierrez thought that to start we need a good joint
assessment of organized criminal groups that makes explicit
their vulnerabilities. We have, he said, five things to put
into the fight: resources, training, joint operations,
technology, and cooperation, and we need to mobilize
effectively all of them. He especially mentioned the need to
synchronize our joint efforts, citing the recent show of
force the U.S. promised on our side of the border that could
not be matched by anything on the Mexican side, leaving it
hollow. Tello Peon suggested we form a planning cell, a few
experts on each side, who could focus on a few programs in afew places for the next 2 years.
10. (C) In addition to the intelligence and operational
cooperation that would be at the heart of the new approach,
Gutierrez and Tello Peon mentioned the importance of cultural
and political factors. Politically, Mexico may have a
federal system, Gutierrez said, but historically it has been
more centralized like Colombia or France. The federal
government, however, no longer has the ability to manage the
system from top to bottom. He suggested it would be
necessary for success to break through the impasse produced
by Mexico,s currently dysfunctional federal system and
ensure programs can be synchronized with the states. Tello
Peon also said there will be a need to work on the cultural
factors required to produce a &culture of lawfulness8 that
would mobilize the societal support necessary for success.
Culture and politics will be very complex, he said, but can
be made to work. A clearly articulated and strong doctrine
will help get people behind the strategy.
11. (C) Tello Peon ended the discussion by saying he arrived
at the dinner somewhat fatigued but would leave energized.
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He thought it was an excellent mix of people and welcomed the
honest exchange of new ideas. Mexico, he summarized, is
committed to staying the course, which is sustainable with a
few clear successes.
12. (C) Comment: We will follow up with Tello Peon and
Gutierrez in the coming weeks to see how committed the GOM is
to the strategy of selecting a few key cities and working to
turn security. If it is their strategy and they plan to
execute it, we should get behind it, using the new strategic
framework to build a regional program to take on the biggest
challenges in key border cities. A considerable amount could
be done with existing funding and a marginal increase instaffing. We would use the remainder of the calendar year
for planning, and have a new series of programs ready to roll
out in the new year.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
PASCUAL
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003061
NOFORN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS:PRELPGOVPINRMX
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DENNIS BLAIR'S
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CALDERON, OCTOBER 19
Classified By: Ambassador Carlos Pascual.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (S/NF) Summary. DNI Dennis Blair met with President
Calderon for about forty minutes at the Presidential Palace
on October 19. The bulk of the discussion focused on
cooperation on intelligence sharing and the integration of
operations by Mexican intelligence and law enforcement
authorities. Calderon also commented extensively on
political developments in Latin American and the role of the
United States. While he said the United States had regained
significant stature in Latin America, he also urged greater
U.S. involvement in the politics of the region. Several
upcoming elections will be critical in shaping the region's
political course. The U.S., he said, needs to be seen as a
critical player. End Summary.
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2. (S/NF) The issue at the heart of the discussion was that
Mexico must continue to improve its coordination and response
capacity among its own security forces to act effectively on
intelligence leads regardless of the source, including
Mexico's own internal intelligence channels. Mexico's
Federal Police still largely bases its operational capacity
in Mexico City. The Secretary of Defense (SEDENA) is more
decentralized, but has yet to define a cooperative platform
to work with the Federal Police. When operations are
undertaken in rural areas with difficult terrain, the
complexity of moving large security operations in a short
time frame may often result in targeted individuals escaping
from these operations. Calderon said this situation made him"very sad," and that it was a "great mistake" on their part.
Further, Calderon indicated that he would assess the
possibility of creating a joint strike force capability.
(Note: In separate subsequent meetings, a discussion was
launched with GOM officials on the possibility of undertaking
a simulated exercise that would begin to test how multiple
agencies could cooperate together (septel). End note.)
3. (S/NF) Blair underscored that the fight against crime has
to move beyond high-value targets. "Cut the head off this
snake and new heads will grow." Blair said the key
ingredient to success is generating community confidence to
call in tips against drug traffickers. To get that, people
need to feel secure -- they have to believe that the police
can maintain public safety. And it also means that
intelligence has to be used quickly, effectively, and
responsibly. Intelligence, operations, and institutional
capacity have to be interwoven. Calderon agreed. He
responded, "You made it very clear. Without attacking the
body as well, we can't win. And we have to create the
capacity to take on the body."
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4. (S/NF) DNI Blair asked Calderon for his perspective on
political developments in the region and how the United
States could continue to increase its diplomatic
effectiveness. Calderon emphasized that Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez is active everywhere, including Mexico. He went
out of his way to highlight that he believes Chavez funded
the PRD opposition during the Presidential campaign nearly
four years ago. Chavez uses social programs, including
sending doctors, to curry political influence, and there are
governors in Mexico who may be friendly to him. Calderon
said that Mexico is trying to isolate Venezuela through the
Rio Group. Calderon also commented that he is particularly
concerned about Venezuela's relations with Iran, and that theIranian Embassy in Mexico is very active. Calderon
underscored that Iran's growing influence in Latin American
should be of considerable concern to the United States, and
Chavez is doing all he can to aid and abet it.
5. (S/NF) Calderon exhorted the U.S. to watch Guatemala and
Belize, since their internal weaknesses make them vulnerable.
He is concerned about Mexico's southern border, and said the
GOM is starting a strategic planning process to better treat
the topic. (Note: Calderon is scheduled to visit Guatemala
next week. End note.) Calderon later in the meeting raised
the southern border again as an area for U.S.-Mexico
cooperation. Ambassador Pascual noted that the U.S. and
Mexico were to hold the next day a joint conference on the
Guatemala border to combat arms trafficking from the south.
MEXICO 00003061 002 OF 002
6. (S/NF) Circling back to Venezuela, Calderon said that
Chavez has no qualms about involving himself in Latin
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American elections, and that he tried to do so in Mexico's
own 2006 presidential contest. The region needs a visible
U.S. presence, he noted. Chavez, said Calderon, will also
have the opportunity to do so in a number of upcoming votes,
especially Honduras. Most importantly, said Calderon, the
United States must be ready to engage the next Brazilian
president. Brazil, he said, is key to restraining Chavez,
but he lamented that President Lula has been reluctant to do
so. The U.S. needs to engage Brazil more and influence its
outlook. In closing, Calderon said that there is a link
among Iran, Venezuela, drugs, narcotics trafficking, and rule
of law issues. The U.S. should look at Latin America from an
interconnected perspective.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003101
NOFORN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS:PRELPGOVPINRMX
SUBJECT: MEXICO: ARTICLE 29 'STATE OF EXCEPTION' --
UNCERTAIN RESULTS, FEW BENEFITS
REF: A. MEXICO 3076
B. MEXICO 2154
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires John Feeley.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (S/NF) Summary. Defense Secretary Galvan raised recently
the possibility of invoking Article 29 of the constitution to
declare a state of exception in certain areas of the country
that would provide more solid legal grounds for the
military's role in the domestic counternarcotics (CN) fight.
Secretary of Government Gomez Mont has alternately provided a
different view, citing a Supreme Court decision as sufficient
precedent for providing the military the legal basis for its
domestic CN activities. Our analysis suggests that the legal
benefits to invoking a state of exception are uncertain at
best, and the political costs appear high. While the
possibility of such a declaration cannot be discounted at
some future date, the GOM seems far from settled on the
efficacy or need for such an immediate move. End Summary.
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Background and Context
----------------------
2. (S/NF) In an October 19 meeting with Director for
National Intelligence Dennis Blair (ref a), Secretary of
Defense (SEDENA) General Guillermo Galvan Galvan lamented the
lack of legal basis for the military's domestic
counternarcotics deployment as key to shaping the public's
perception that the Armed Forces lack the appropriate
authorities to conduct such operations. He noted that SEDENA
is working to pass the National Security law (ref b),
proposed by President Calderon in the final days of the last
congressional session, to help shore up these legalfoundations. Additionally, he mentioned that Article 29 of
the Mexican constitution would permit the President to
declare a state of exception in specific areas of crisis and
give the military greater juridical scope to maneuver. In a
later meeting, Secretary of Government Fernando Francisco
Gomez Mont responded to questions by U.S. officials on the
Article 29 issue. He contradicted Galvan's view that the
military does not have legal basis for its domestic CN
activities and cited a Supreme Court decision as having
already set precedent (Note: Gomez Mont is almost certainly
referring to a 1996 Supreme Court decision that ruled the
military has the authority to operate at the request of local
authorities in support of policing operations. End note.) He
implied that the invocation of Article 29 does not have the
legal urgency or necessity Galvan suggested, but did admit
that the state of exception in places such as Ciudad Juarez
"had been discussed." He said that no decision had been
reached.
Article 29 Text
---------------
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3. (S/NF) The translated text of Article 29 of the
constitution reads: "In the event of invasion, serious
disturbance, or any other event which may place society in
great danger or conflict, only the President of the Mexican
Republic, with the consent of the Council of Ministers and
with the approval of the Federal Congress, and during
adjournments of the latter, of the Permanent Committee, may
suspend throughout the country or in a determined place the
guarantees which present an obstacle to a rapid and ready
combating of the situation; but he must do so for a limited
time, by means of general preventive measures without such
suspensions being limited to a specified individual. If the
suspension should occur while the Congress is in session, thelatter shall grant such authorizations that it deems
necessary to enable the Executive to meet the situation. If
the suspension occurs during a period of adjournment, the
Congress shall be convoked without delay in order to grant
them."
What Would Article 29 Look Like?
--------------------------------
4. (S/NF) The terms of the state of exception detailed in
Article 29 are vague and offer little insight into how its
MEXICO 00003101 002 OF 003
invocation would play out on the ground. There appears to be
a great deal of leeway for the President -- with the approval
of Congress -- to determine what kinds of guarantees to
suspend given the nature of the emergency at hand. To paint
a scenario: the GOM could elect to apply the article in a
zone of perceived crisis, such as Ciudad Juarez, for the
period of one year. The decree could potentially suspend
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rights guaranteed in the first chapter of the constitution,
including freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of
assembly, freedom of passage, or some tenets of legal due
process. The military, for example, might be granted broader
detention authorities. The law does not explicitly call for
greater military involvement, and Gomez Mont told US
officials that it is not martial law "in the way that you
know it." Galvan's interest in the state of exception
suggests two possibilities: that he envisions a potentially
broader role for the military (at the expense, perhaps, of
cooperation with other insitutions), or that he is seeking a
stronger legal framework and additional legal protections to
back up the military's current domestic operations. Calderonhas already put the military in charge of municipal police in
Ciudad Juarez and other areas in Chihuahua State.
5. (S/NF) The discussion of Article 29's application is
highly theoretical. Gomez Mont, when asked whether a state
of exception would imply the federalization of municipal
authorities, acknowledged a "constitutional gray area." He
admitted that municipal governments could "be limited," but
said that Mexico's signature to the UN Human Rights Charter
limits how far the GOM could go in suspending rights.
The Limits
----------
6. (SBU) The GOM does not take lightly its use of Article 29.
The GOM has not, in fact, invoked it since when it declared
war on Italy, Germany, and Japan during World War II. The
GOM has even abstained from employing the measure during
times of cataclysmic internal strife such as the 1968 student
protests, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the 1990s fight
against armed uprisings in Chiapas, or the 2006 Oaxaca
protests.
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7. (C) The GOM's hesitation so far to invoke the article is
due to a number of factors, which are particularly relevant
given the democratic context in which Mexico now operates.
Perhaps most critical, the article clearly stipulates that
Congress -- meaning both Chambers -- must approve the measure
and its various permissions, circumvention of rights,
geographic application, and time frame, suggesting that the
President's ability to achieve a state of exception under his
terms would be uncertain, at best. Such a move would not be
seen solely as a law enforcement procedure but as a carefully
calculated move with significant political implications.
President Calderon lacks an absolute majority in either theChamber of Deputies or the Senate, and it is unlikely that
his opponents would approve carte blanche significantly
expanded authorities for the military or federal government.
Indeed, Calderon instead might run the risk of having his
hands tied by Congress, depending on the vote and final
details of how Article 29 would be invoked. For example, the
legislature might vote to allow the federal government to
declare a limited state of exception in a crisis zone for a
short period of time, asking that Calderon then return to
Congress to renew the mandate. This would give Congress at
least nominal oversight over the military's counternarcotics
operations, a role it has sought but not had up to this
point. Congress could also reject wholesale the article's
invocation, which would be an embarrassing public blow to the
GOM.
8. (C) Moreover, Calderon is negotiating with Congress on
other legislation that will better serve his counternarcotics
goals. Proposed in late April, reforms to the National
Security Act would provide a firmer legal framework for the
military's domestic counterdrug fight, give the President the
power to declare a threat to domestic security and deploy the
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military without congressional approval. It would also
provide the military with greater intelligence authorities
and powers over the state and local forces in the area.
MEXICO 00003101 003 OF 003
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) contacts have
indicated that they would prefer to limit presidential
authority than expand it, and PRD Senator and member of the
Justice Committee, Tomas Torres, has told Poloff that the
reform as written is unlikely to pass. Nevertheless, such
legislation permanently codifying the military's role and thePresident's authority to deploy it would certainly be of
greater use to Calderon than would be a watered down state of
exception.
9. (S/NF) Gomez Mont told U.S. officials during the October
19 exchange that the invocation of Article 29 would be
"highly controversial," and downplayed its immediate
necessity. The public relations cost of declaring a state of
exception in places like Ciudad Juarez would likely be high,
and almost certainly would draw increased scrutiny from the
international and domestic human rights community. Moreover,
a defeat by Congress of an Article 29 proposal would be seen
as a public rejection of Calderon's counternarcotics strategy.
Comment
-------
10. (C) Benefits to an Article 29 strategy would be limited.
If written correctly and approved by Congress, it could give
the military a temporary legal cover for its activities and
perhaps allow it to focus more on operations and less on its
critics. Notable Mexico legal experts have envisioned the
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employment of Article 29 only in the case of a "firestorm,"
such as local or state governments rejecting military
assistance in areas where the GOM sees it as badly needed.
Galvan's views are more reflective of the military's desire
for legal protections on human rights and other grounds, than
of any imminent legal or political challenges to the
military's current domestic counternarcotics role. Clearly,
Calderon is looking for new tools with which to fight
increased levels of violence in places like Ciudad Juarez,
but any benefits he would gain with an Article 29 state of
exception would be undermined by the high political costs of
such an approach. With questionable support in Congress and
limited political capital, he would put at risk popular andcongressional support that has given the military broad room
to maneuver in the current legal framework. While the
possibility of the declaration of a state of exception cannot
be discounted at some future date, the GOM seems far from
settled on the efficacy or need for such an immediate move.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
FEELEY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 003195
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR DAN RESTREPO; DEPT FOR WHA DAS JACOBSON, MEX
DIRECTOR LEE, D STAFF CUE, AND INR HOHMAN.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS:PRELPGOVPINRMX
SUBJECT: MEXICO: MORE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION NEEDED ON
INTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (S/NF) Summary. President Calderon's security strategy
lacks an effective intelligence apparatus to produce high
quality information and targeted operations. Embassy
officers working with the GOM report that Mexico's use of
strategic and tactical intelligence is fractured, ad hoc, and
reliant on U.S. support. Despite their myriad inefficiencies
and deficiencies, Mexican security services broadly recognize
the need for improvement. Sustained U.S. assistance can help
shape and fortify the technical capacity of institutions and
can also create a more reliable, collegial inter-agency
environment. End Summary.
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GOM Intel Strategy Criticized
-----------------------------
2. (C) Recent criticism of President Calderon's security
strategy cites a poorly utilized and underdeveloped
intelligence apparatus as a key obstacle to greater
improvements in the country's security environment.
Calderon's political opponents from both the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD) have told Poloff that large-scale joint
military-police counterdrug deployments, notably Joint
Operation Chihuahua, have failed to make real gains in thewar against organized crime due to a reliance on overwhelming
numerical superiority of troops absent the strategic and
operational use of intelligence. Critics argue that the more
effective use of intelligence would help the security
services better cooperate on counterdrug issues, wrap-up more
high-level traffickers, and, eventually, curb the country's
escalating rates of narco-related violence. Emboffs working
with the GOM in counter-narcotics and intelligence matters
similarly note that Mexico's use of strategic and tactical
intelligence is often fractured, ad hoc, and heavily reliant
on the United States for leads and operations.
The Players
-----------
3. (S/NF) A myriad of GOM agencies have a stake in
counternarcotics intel issues, including the Secretariats of
Defense (SEDENA) and Marines (SEMAR), the Mexican National
Intelligence Center (CISEN), the Public Security Secretariat
(SSP), which includes the federal police, and the Attorney
General's Office (PGR). Each has a different intelligence
mission and varying levels of development and
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professionalism. As Mexico's primary intelligence agency,
CISEN is the natural choice to be the GOM's coordinator of
intelligence and analytic efforts. Indeed, it technically
has the lead on encouraging interagency coordination and is
developing mechanisms to facilitate such endeavors. For the
most part, however, CISEN lacks the capacity to effectively
direct the inter-agency process, particularly when it
includes such institutional giants as SSP, which
bureaucratically overshadows CISEN in budget, personnel, and
other resource issues. CISEN's inability thus far to serve
as a real leader on intelligence operations and analysis has
effectively left Mexico without an effective interagency
coordinator.
4. (S/NF) SSP is increasingly becoming a major player on the
intel block. It is exploring ways to take advantage of new
authorities granted under the Federal Police reform
legislation passed last year to develop its intelligence
capabilities. SSP can now directly solicit telephonic
information from phone companies with a judicial order,
bypassing the PGR entirely. It is also interested in
building its own complete telecommunications intercept
capability, the implementation of which has stalled over the
past two years because of turf disputes between SSP and the
Attorney General's Office. Moreover, as the keeper of
Plataforma Mexico -- the massive new criminal database -- the
SSP oversees one of the GOM's cornerstone and resource-heavy
information-sharing projects.
MEXICO 00003195 002 OF 005
The Challenges
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